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**MĀDHYAMIKA SOTERIOLOGY: A REINTERPRETATION OF  
ŚŪNYATĀ IN THE LIGHT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ONE MIND**

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A Dissertation  
Submitted to  
the Temple University Graduate Board

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in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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by  
Chur Hyun Park  
May, 2001

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## ABSTRACT

### MĀDHYAMIKA SOTERIOLOGY: A REINTERPRETATION OF ŚŪNYATĀ IN THE LIGHT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ONE MIND

Chur Hyun Park

Doctor of Philosophy

Temple University, 2001

Main Advisor: Dr. Ellen Zhang

This dissertation is a study of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā* in terms of Buddhist soteriology. My basic view of the doctrine of *śūnyatā* is that Nāgārjuna was aware of "the soteriological system" of *śūnyatā* given the fact that he separates the three aspects of *śūnyatā*, i.e.— *śūnyatāprayojana*, *śūnyatā*, *śūnyatārtha*. Although Nāgārjuna was not concerned to make this system understood by using a self-explanatory manner, but I attempt to interpret these aspects of *śūnyatā* as a soteriological system. I have drawn this interpretation from the doctrine of One Mind which is considered to be the culmination of the doctrine of *śūnyatā* according to Chinese Buddhist tradition. The doctrine of One Mind, although, not in the case of *śūnyatā*, is designed to establish a soteriological system and to exhibit itself outwardly as such. In this dissertation I will attempt to achieve two goals: One is to examine the soteriological system of

*śūnyatā* and the other is to set out its soteriological characteristics in the light of the doctrine of One Mind.

The dissertation consists of three parts. In the first part, my major concern is to investigate the historical/doctrinal background of *śūnyatā* and One Mind in two separate chapters, i.e., chapters 2 and 3, focusing on the motifs of the two doctrines with regard to soteriological systems. The main issue of chapter 2 is to illustrate that the Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths and the doctrinal equalization of the fundamental early Buddhist doctrines, which are found earlier in the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures, underlie the soteriological project of *śūnyatā* according to Nāgārjuna. In chapter 3, I will show that One Mind doctrine is not derived from an antecedent doctrine/thought. Rather, I suggest that antecedent Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines like *tathatā*, *tathāgatagarbha*, *ālayavijñāna* are dissolved into the enterprise of One Mind doctrine in a unique manner. I assert that this enterprise is indebted to the idea of One Voice or the Perfect Voice which is found in *Weimo(jie soshuo) jing*, etc.

In the second part, I attempt to explore the soteriological meaning of the three aspects of *śūnyatā*, i.e., *śūnyatārtha*, *śūnyatā*, and *śūnyatāprayojana*. These three are interrelated with each other in a single soteriological system.

Candrakīrti, who was traditionally believed to be faithful to Nāgārjuna, put special emphasis on these three concepts by endeavoring to relate each of them to specific verses of the *Kārikā*. The term *śūnyatārtha* is identical with the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā*; the term *śūnyatā* is identical with the ultimate truth; the term

*śūnyatāprajojana* is identical with the destruction of *prapañca* or “the designative function of language.”

In the third part my task is to reinterpret *śūnyatā* doctrine in the light of One Mind. One aspect of this is a review of the project of the Two Truths from the perspective of the Two Gates. The other is a review of the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprajojana* relationship from the perspective of the *ti/yong* paradigm. My main concern here is to demonstrate a continuity/discontinuity between the doctrine of *śūnyatā* and One Mind. As for continuity, I argue that the project of the Two Truths shares a foundational ground with the Two Gates. As for discontinuity, I suggest that the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprajojana* relationship should not be paralleled with the *ti/yong* paradigm.

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## NOTES ON TRANSLITERATIONS

1. I do not split Sanskrit words, except in some cases requiring analysis. I do not use hyphens between two or more words, for example, *saṃvṛti satya*, not *saṃvṛti-satya*
2. I follow the *Pinyin* System with regard to romanization of Chinese characters, except for Chinese characters in the titles of works which use the Wade-Giles system.
3. For convenience, all Chinese words are split into single units of meaning when romanized. I do not use hyphens between two or more characters within a single unit (for example, *Weimojie soshuo jing*, not *Wei-mo-jie so-shuo jing*). However, I use hyphens in English translations of Chinese words romanized (for example, the Arising-Ceasing Gate for *shengmie men*). All Korean and Japanese words follow the same rules applied to Chinese words.
4. Sometimes in cases, not requiring subtlety of translation, I rely on scholarly translations of Sanskrit, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese texts without specific references.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(Chi.)	Chinese
<i>EB</i>	<i>The Eastern Buddhist</i>
<i>HPC</i>	<i>Han'guk pulgyo chōnsō</i>
<i>IBK</i>	<i>Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyū</i>
<i>IPQ</i>	<i>International Philosophical Quarterly</i>
(Jan.)	Japanese
<i>JAOS</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
<i>JCP</i>	<i>Journal of Chinese Philosophy</i>
<i>JIP</i>	<i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i>
<i>JIABS</i>	<i>The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies</i>
<i>NNMRP</i>	<i>The Nava Nālandāvihāra Research Publication</i>
<i>P</i>	Peking bsTan 'gyur
<i>PEW</i>	<i>Philosophy East and West</i>
<i>PTS</i>	Pāli Text Society
(Kor.)	Korean
(Skt.)	Sanskrit
<i>T</i>	<i>Taishō shinshū daizōkyō</i>
<i>Z</i>	<i>Zokuzōkyō</i>

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Some Problems of Western Methodology Applied to the Interpretation of *Śūnyatā*

Among those Western (or Western-trained Asian) scholars who, since the mid-nineteenth century, have written on Indian philosophical and religious thought, there have been radical discontinuities in the interpretations of *śūnyatā*. I will neither attempt to present a comprehensive survey of the Mādhyamika philosophy nor to include all the interpretations of *śūnyatā* which have been discussed by Western scholarship. I will deal with the interpretations of “nihilism,” “absolutism” and “logical positivism” because they are representative of major Western methodological frameworks applied to the interpretation of *śūnyatā*.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Nihilistic Interpretation

The nihilistic interpretation of *śūnyatā* is found among classical Indian critics of Mādhyamika, in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools, but also among Western critics.<sup>2</sup> The concept “nihilistic” is understood here as meaning that the phenomena are unreal, or nonexistent, not in the sense that the ultimate truth or state is expressed as utter annihilation. Related to this, Jay L. Garfield, while commenting on Thomas Wood’s nihilistic interpretation of *śūnyatā*, says:

Wood interprets emptiness as complete nonexistence and reads Nāgārjuna as a thoroughgoing nihilist. So he interprets Nāgārjuna as asserting that if one sees conventional phenomena as real in any way, one is in trouble and that philosophical problems vanish only if one see all apparent phenomena as illusions. In offering this interpretation, Wood notes that Nāgārjuna often characterizes phenomena to be like dreams or mirages.<sup>3</sup>

In this interpretation, the ultimate truth seems to be nothing more than “to see the phenomena as unreal.” However, Wood fails to see that this understanding is only valid when Nāgārjuna is arguing against an opponent’s substantial view of the phenomena. What Nāgārjuna really proposes by the doctrine of *śūnyatā* is not the nonexistence of the phenomena but the immanent nonexistence of self-nature in the phenomena.

### The Absolutist Interpretation

The absolutist interpretation of *śūnyatā* presupposes that Nāgārjuna's philosophy of *śūnyatā* was not an expression of nihilistic excess. According to Andrew P. Tuck, Th. Stcherbatsky “was the first to write that regardless of soteriological emphasis and negative terminology, no Buddhist school was guilty of philosophical nihilism.”<sup>4</sup> He goes on to say:

According to Stcherbatsky, Nāgārjuna’s emphasis on “emptiness” was meant to deny the apparent reality of empirical phenomena, not to deny the reality of the thing-in-itself, i.e.—the absolute. He asserted that the Mādhyamika was a philosophy of the ultimate oneness of all reality. It was, in his terms, a “radical monism [*sic*].”

Thus, as Tuck indicates, for Stcherbatsky, “*śūnyatā* must be seen as something like Śaṅkara's *nirguṇa Brahma*—‘the real ground of existence’ on which the world of conventional reality is (erroneously) founded.” T. R. V. Murti



was influenced by Stcherbasky's absolutistic reading of *śūnyatā*, that Mādhyamika philosophy is actually a "no-doctrine-about-the real" doctrine.<sup>5</sup> According to Murti, *śūnyatā* is negative only in terms of thought, but in itself it is the non-relational knowledge of the absolute. Both Stcherbatsky and Murti introduce the theory of Two Truths to argue for their absolutistic interpretation of *śūnyatā*. They interpreted it as the theory of two levels of reality, "the conditioned or empirical one" (*saṃvṛti satya*), produced by the cognitive intellect, and "the ultimate" or "the absolute reality" (*paramārtha satya*), which is immediately perceived in something called "pure sensation." In this way, their explication of Buddhist theory echoes, but subtly alters Kant's disjunction between phenomena and *noumena*. According to them, ultimate truth, like the Kantian *noumena*, is not the object of intuition (space and time) and categories. Although both of them are in agreement that *śūnyatā* is identical with the ultimate reality, Murti interprets his reading of the Mādhyamika as "epistemological absolutism," as distinguished from Stcherbasky's "metaphysical absolutism."<sup>6</sup> By claiming that all absolutism need not be of the Vedāntic type, he believes that he has found a way to avoid describing the Mādhyamika as a metaphysical absolutism.<sup>7</sup> According to him, Nāgārjuna's *paramārtha* is different from Śaṅkara's *Brahman* because it is reached by an epistemological approach.<sup>8</sup>

Inconveniently for both Stcherbasky and Murti, however, Nāgārjuna does not posit any category of ultimate existence, epistemological or metaphysical, which could be said to act as a ground for *saṃsāra*. Those philosophers who are

obsessed with the idea of a positive entity, a reality or basis from which everything is declared to be *śūnyatā* are to be compared, “according to Candrakīrti, with those who, when they are told that they will get nothing, expect that “nothing” will actually be given to them.”<sup>9</sup>

### The Positivistic Interpretation

The positivistic interpretation was overwhelming among those Buddhologists or Indologists who were influenced by analytic philosophy beginning in the 1950s.<sup>10</sup> The positivistic interpreters diagramed, charted, and symbolized their way through Mādhyamika texts. Richard H. Robinson can be considered one of the most influential and insistent of the analytic scholars. Robinson concentrates almost entirely on what he calls Nāgārjuna’s dialectical apparatus, relegating the preceding interpretations, such as nihilism and absolutism, to what he terms the “metaphysical” phase of scholarship.<sup>11</sup> He asserts, like other positivistic interpreters, that Nāgārjuna’s primary goal is nothing more than to defeat his philosophical opponents, who advocate the view of *svabhāva* or “own-being,” by showing that *svabhāva* is internally inconsistent.<sup>12</sup> Robinson does not hesitate to portray Nāgārjuna as an audacious but failed warrior, indicating his deficiency in comparing analytic philosophy with Nāgārjuna.<sup>13</sup> Although Murti and Stcherbatsky concentrate their attentions on *śūnyatā* as the mysterious, central term in the Mādhyamika philosophy, Robinson shifts his concern to forms of the Nāgārjunian dialectic, such as the *catuṣkoṭi*, or “four-cornered negations,” often used by Nāgārjuna to deny four

exhaustive alternatives and the role of conceptual analysis. For Robinson, like other positivists, “philosophical statements, not excluding *śūnyatā*, are significant only to the extent that they can be hardened into notated shorthand and then checked for logical validity and dialectical effectiveness.”<sup>14</sup> However, this claim should not be understood as intended to lessen the central role of *śūnyatā* in the Mādhyamika philosophy or to deny that there is a mystical element in the Mādhyamika philosophy. Rather, he seems to show that *śūnyatā* is meaningless unless it is dealt with in terms of logical analysis. Thus, Robinson portrays Nāgārjuna as a dialectician but neglects Nāgārjuna’s views on the apparent unreliability of linguistic representation. Although he observes that for Nāgārjuna, all language has only a limited, functional value, he fails to recognize that for Nāgārjuna the unreliability of language is only useful for soteriological purposes.

#### The Main Issues of Concern in the Dissertation

The present dissertation will deal with the related three topics which comprise the pivotal issues of Part I, II, and III.

#### Issues of Concern in Part I

The term *śūnyatā* dates back to early Buddhist literature like *Suttanipāta*, but it is used as a basic concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism beginning with early Mahāyāna Buddhist literature like the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. Nāgārjuna

developed this into a more sophisticated concept and adapted it as the leading concept in his soteriology.

Most Mādhyamika scholarship has pursued a historical/doctrinal motif of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā*. Some scholars seek for the origins of the motif in Early Buddhism, even while denying the relationship between the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature and Nāgārjuna. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility of the direct influence of Early Buddhism upon Nāgārjuna, however, if we confine Nāgārjuna to Early Buddhism, it is nearly impossible to explain the historical/doctrinal context of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. In contrast, the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature offers clues for understanding it.

Throughout the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna tries not only to show the soteriological enterprise of *śūnyatā* but also to actualize it by the theory of the Two Truths. Therefore, the theory of Two Truths is essential to the understanding of the soteriological enterprise of *śūnyatā*. It is generally believed that the idea of the Two Truths is found in Early Buddhism, but it can be said that the theory of the Two Truths for Mahāyāna Buddhism was predicted in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature of 8,000 Verses and culminating in later *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, like *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing* or "the Scripture on the Wisdom of the Benevolent King." Moreover, Nāgārjuna intends to identify fundamental early Buddhist doctrines in demonstrating the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā*, as is indicated in *Kārikā* 24:18. I believe that the idea of this doctrinal identification is

intertwined with its historical context. We can find clues for understanding the historical context as well as a preliminary stage of Nāgārjuna's intention of doctrinal identification in the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*.

When we turn to the later periods of Mahāyāna Buddhism, however, the doctrine of *śūnyatā* assumes a more complicated character, through its interaction with Mahāyāna Buddhist concepts such as *ālayavijñāna* and *tathāgatagarbha*. These concepts are unified under the doctrine of One Mind (Skt. *ekacitta?* *ekāgracitta?* *ekāagra?*; Chi. *yixin*). In understanding this phenomenon there are two possible approaches. One is to see it from the categories of orthodox and non-orthodox. The other is to seek for an answer from the perspective of Buddhist soteriology. According to the former position, the later development of the concept of *śūnyatā* is no more than a heresy.

The matter of orthodoxy has been debated among Buddhist schools throughout the history of Buddhist thought. Few, if any, modern Buddhist scholars are interested in this matter. In his article, "Phenomenology and T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen Buddhism," Hsuehli Cheng, asserts, for example, that Chinese Heyan and Tientai scholarship dissents from the Buddha's fundamental doctrines.<sup>15</sup> In the same context some Buddhist scholars reprimand the Abhidharma Buddhist for deviating from the Buddha's teachings. However, the phenomenon of orthodoxy is always in danger of bringing about a dogmatism against that which the Buddha strongly criticized. Nevertheless, the dominant trends of modern scholarship—especially Mādhyamika scholarship—share the belief that doctrines like *ālayavijñāna*, *tathāgatagarbha*, and One Mind severely

distorted the spirit of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*. In contrast, to the latter position, all Buddhist doctrines or concepts contribute to a soteriological purpose in order to adjust to new situations in a historical/doctrinal context. I credit this insight to the *Dacheng qixin lun* which aims to show the unity of different soteriological strategies with the fundamental doctrines of Mahāyāna Buddhism under the One Mind doctrine. My understanding of *śūnyatā* and One Mind is that they are two fundamental soteriological concepts in Mahāyāna Buddhism. They are not of an ultimate value but of a functional value, and differences appear in their soteriological strategies. I also owe this idea to *Dacheng qixin lun*. The text aims to integrate the different soteriological strategies of the major Mahāyāna doctrines under One Mind. My concern here, of course, lies not in showing how accurately the text is portraying the soteriological strategy of the related doctrines, but in the fact that such an insight, that all Buddhist doctrines possess their own soteriological programs, casts a new light in interpretation of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*.

The dominant scholarship on the *Dacheng qixin lun* has debated the question of the authorship of the text and the antecedent influences of the text. For a long time Japanese scholarship has centered on what is the origin of the *Dacheng qixin lun*: an Indian origin or Chinese origin? In contrast, Korean scholarship has chiefly concerned itself with what is the central thought of the text, endeavoring to seek it from an antecedent thought of the text. Unfortunately, the major current of scholarship has had little recourse to the doctrine of One Mind. In this dissertation I intend to pursue an analysis of the historical/doctrinal

background of One Mind doctrine. In so doing, I will argue that the One Mind doctrine plays central role within the enterprise of the *Dacheng qixin lun*, and that the harmonizing spirit of One Mind doctrine gives hints for understanding its historical/doctrinal context.

### Issues of Concern in Part II

Some scholars, like Hajime Nakamura, hold that the central doctrine of the *Kārikā* is *pratītyasamutpāda* or “Dependent Co-Arising.” According to Nakamura, the *Kārikā* is a treatise, which demonstrates *pratītyasamutpāda*, where *śūnyatā* is only used as an auxiliary concept for *pratītyasamutpāda*. I suggest, however, that *śūnyatā* represents the position that is not confined to Dependent Co-Arising.

There have been a series of debates among scholars over the interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s view of *śūnyatā*. The dominant problem in Mādhyamika scholarship has been how to resolve certain essential questions, i.e., 1) Does this system acknowledge an absolute—absolute being or absolute nothing? 2) “Is it an ontology, epistemology, or soteriology? 3) Does it confine itself to logic/language/criticism/dialectic?”<sup>16</sup> Thus, the understanding of *śūnyatā* is open to a wide-variety of interpretations, but the interpretation of *śūnyatā* is largely reduced to two perspectives: a philosophical perspective and a soteriological perspective.<sup>17</sup> I follow the latter position in recognition that *śūnyatā* is a basic soteriological concept in Māhāyana Buddhism.

An attempt to interpret *śūnyatā* from a soteriological perspective is found earlier in a work of Frederick J. Streng where he characterizes the religious meaning of *śūnyatā* as a kind of “dialectic.”<sup>18</sup> However, he has nothing to say about “the soteriological system.” Of course, we cannot deny that Nāgārjuna’s dialectic plays an important role in his soteriology, but it is not fair to say that it represents Nāgārjuna’s soteriology. I believe that Nāgārjuna intended to show “the soteriological system” of *śūnyatā* according to three aspects.

Since the Prasaṅga branch of Mādhyamika dominated the Mādhyamika tradition, modern scholarship on the Mādhyamika has maintained the belief that Mādhyamika never established a positive system. I contend that Nāgārjuna himself was conscious of a system when he used the term *śūnyatā*. In *Kārikā* 24:7, Nāgārjuna states, “We say that you do not know ‘the function of *śūnyatā*,’ ‘*śūnyatā*,’ and ‘the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā*.’” As a consequence, you are harmed by it.”<sup>19</sup> The significance of these three aspects of *śūnyatā* is noted by some Japanese scholars who rely primarily on an exegetical methodology based upon Candrakīrti’s commentary, but they fail to understand the three aspects of *śūnyatā* as a soteriological system of *śūnyatā*.

Here, my task is to reinterpret the doctrine of *śūnyatā* in terms of Buddhist soteriology, focusing on the interpretation of the three aspects of *śūnyatā*, i.e., *śūnyatāprajñā*, or “the function of *śūnyatā*,” “*śūnyatā*,” and “*śūnyatārtha*,” or “the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā*.” I have coined the term “soteriological system” to describe these three aspects of *śūnyatā*.



The term “soteriology,” understood as a branch of Christian theology, originally refers to the Christian salvation, but its usage has broaden over time to include the discussion of any form of “salvation” within a religious context.<sup>20</sup> At first sight, my understanding of the three aspects of *śūnyatā* is that they are a Nāgārjunian scheme exhibiting his project of the Buddhist salvation. Related to this, in the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* (hereafter abridged as “*Kārikā*”) 18:5, for example, Nāgārjuna says, “Action and misery having ceased, there is *nirvāṇa*. Action and misery come from conceptual thought. This comes from *prapañca* or ‘the referential function of language.’ *Prapañca* ceases through emptiness.” In 24:39, he also asserts, “If it (the world) were not empty, then action would be without profit. The act of ending suffering and abandoning misery and defilement would not exist.” Thus, *śūnyatā*, only makes sense for Nāgārjuna when it has a soteriological purpose.

As regard the word “system,” I intend to show how the three aspects of *śūnyatā* come together as a single unit in his religious project/strategy. Of course, it is true that Nāgārjuna was not concerned with explicating this system in a self-explanatory manner. But this does not mean that Nāgārjuna was aware of a system in which he exhibits his project of *śūnyatā*. I have drawn this interpretation from the doctrine of One Mind. The doctrine of One Mind not only establishes its own system, like the system of One Mind-Two Gates-Three Greatnesses, but it also exhibits its projects outwardly. Not only is there a

doctrinal continuity between *śūnyatā* and One Mind but also both the systems of *śūnyatā* and One Mind share common ground with each other in some respects.

### Issues of Concern in Part III

In the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna employs the theory of Two Truths in order to aid his audience in the comprehension of the essence of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*. Nāgārjuna intends to accomplish this by distinguishing *śūnyatā* from *śūnyatāprajñā* and *śūnyatārtha*. Thus, the theory of the Two Truths is essential to understanding of *śūnyatā* doctrine.

Nevertheless, the theory of the Two Truths is open to a wide variety of interpretations, now as well as in ancient time. I propose that the project of the Two Truths is one way of expressing the two soteriological forces of Mahāyāna Buddhism, i.e., Wisdom (*prajñā*) and Compassion (*karuṇā*), through the dynamic relationship between the ultimate truth and the conventional truth. I owe this insight to the project of the Two Gates in the *Dacheng qixin lun* where, as the metaphoric term “Gate” indicates, the strategy of Wisdom and Compassion is expressed through the dynamic relation of the Two Truths. Here, my concern is to explore the common ground on which the Two Truths and the Two Gates stand and to discuss how much difference there is between the two systems from the point of view of language usage.

The *ti/yong* pair is one of the traditional Chinese pairs of concepts like *li/shi*, *yin/yang*, *neng/suo*, etc.. The *ti/yong* pair is found in non-Buddhist tradition as well as Buddhist tradition. As Whalen Lie points out, in the Chinese tradition

the usage of this pair varies according to different contexts.<sup>21</sup> The pair of the *ti/yong* in the *Dacheng qixin lun* is present in the form of a unique theory of “permeation,” which is technically called “the *ti/yong* permeation.”

My basic understanding of the *ti/yong* pair in the text is that it explains Wisdom in terms of “essence” and “function.” I am not ready to voice my opinion on the origin of the pair of the *ti/yong*, but for the present time I am willing to say that an attempt to recognize Wisdom in terms of essence and function can be sought in Nāgārjuna’s distinction between *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprayojana*. Although Nāgārjuna does not recognize these two concepts as a pair, it is necessary to do so in order to understand their interrelation, and we can understand them as a pair with the help of the *ti/yong* pair. Through the *ti/yong* paradigm we can explore Nāgārjuna’s distinction between *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprayojana*. My goal here is to show in what sense the distinction between *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprayojana* is similar to the pair of the *ti/yong* and in what sense they cannot be reconciled with one another.

#### Considerations Regarding the Textual Basis and Methodology of the Present Study

As mentioned before, I am not engaged in a full-scale study of the two central concepts of these two texts—*śūnyatā* and One Mind. Nevertheless, this study attempts a partial comparison between these two concepts. As regard the basic textual sources for the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, I will use the *Kārikā*, which is believed to be Nāgārjuna’s most fundamental work. There is no doubt that the *Kārikā* is essential to understanding Mādhyamika Buddhism. However, I do not

believe that it can suffice to investigate Mādhyamika Buddhism through this single text. The *Kārikā*, like its related work *Vigrahavyārtanī*, is devoted almost exclusively to a refutation of Nāgārjuna's opponent's arguments. It has no special references to the term *prajñā* which is so essential to the understanding of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*. In contrast, the *Ratnavālī*, which is extant in Sanskrit and believed by scholars to be from Nāgārjuna himself, emphasizes the significance of *prajñā*. Therefore, I view the *Ratnavālī* as no less an important source than the *Kārikā* for this study.

Traditionally, Mādhyamika is divided into Candrakīrti's branch of Mādhyamika and Bhāvaviveka's branch, along with their respective sub-branches. For my study I will concentrate on Candrakīrti rather than Bhāvaviveka. My ultimate goal is not to examine Candrakīrti's position but to investigate the soteriological characteristics of *śūnyatā* in the light of the doctrine of One Mind, based on Candrakīrti's interpretation of *śūnyatā*.

The concept of One Mind, like *śūnyatā*, has had different connotations according to different Chinese Buddhist traditions. Some scholars hold that *Laṅkāvatāra* is the textual basis of the *Dacheng qixin lun*, but I think that these two texts disagree particularly on the concept of One Mind. Also, the concept of One Mind in the *Dacheng qixin lun* exerts a strong influence upon Chinese sectarian Buddhism, but the concept of One Mind in Heyan is different from that of the Tiantai. The former emphasizes the actualizing aspect of Mind, while the

latter stresses the original purity of Mind. Therefore, I will limit my scope to the *Dacheng qixin lun* and its major commentators.

Ancient Buddhist monk-scholars have written a number of commentaries on the text, but those of Huiyuan (523-92), the Korean monk Wonhyo (617-86), and Fazang (643-712) are esteemed as the finest and labeled as the “Three Great Commentaries.” Most Japanese scholars agree that Fazang’s commentary is the most excellent of these commentaries, but most Korean scholarship gives preeminence to Wonhyo’s commentary. In fact, Fazang’s commentary is indebted with Wonhyo’s. Regardless of these issues, I rely on Wonhyo’s interpretation of One Mind almost exclusively due to the fact that Wonhyo’s interpretation gives crucial clues for understanding the enterprise of One Mind. I will use Fazang’s commentary, only in so far as I believe it can help to support Wonhyo’s position.

**PART I**  
**THE HISTORICAL/DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND**  
**OF ŚŪNYĀ AND ONE MIND**

## CHAPTER 2

### THE HISTORICAL/DOCTRINAL CONTEXT OF *ŚŪNYATĀ*

#### Preliminary Remarks

It is clear that two basic principles underlie all Buddhist doctrines: silence and a pedagogical device. According to Buddhist tradition, silence is believed to be the most effective “language” of all the kinds of languages. This starts from a belief that all Buddhist doctrines are an expression of a religious experience which transcends our ordinary mental experience. Language, on the other hand, is inherently limited to the mind. Consequently, all Buddhist doctrines are only meaningful as a pedagogical means to a religious experience. In this sense, Buddhist doctrines can never be reduced to pure theory for the sake of philosophical debate. But this does not mean that Buddhism is not aware of the significance of philosophical methodology. Rather Buddhism is ready to employ philosophical thinking for a religious purpose.

There is no evidence in early Buddhist scriptures that the Buddha rejects a philosophical way of thinking. But he is aware of a paradoxical toxin immanent in the philosophical way of thinking. In fact, currents of thought contemporaneous with him centered on ontological issues, such as *ātman* or Brahman. His doctrine of *anātman* does not focus on proving the absence of *ātman* but on criticizing any ontological enterprise of an Absolute Being. For the

Buddha the quest for an Absolute Being ends up with a philosophical dilemma and more essentially, causes a dogmatic view of Being and Non-being resulting in a conceptual construction hindering Buddhist practice. Thus the Buddha is not interested in pinpointing the problem of the very quest through the doctrine of *anātman*.

After the Buddha's demise, however, this danger of philosophical paradox in Buddhist doctrines seems to be gradually forgotten. When we reach the period of Abhidharma Buddhism, the main concern of Buddhism is to conceptually analyze and systematize Buddhist doctrines in terms of *svabhāva* or "dharma-entities." However, it is fair to say that this enterprise of Abhidharma Buddhism is not motivated by mere philosophical concern but by a religious prospect. Nevertheless, Abhidharma Buddhism failed to be aware of the danger of philosophical paradox immanent in the theory of entity. Later on, the theory of entity became a main target of a new religious movement called Mahāyāna.

The Mahāyāna Buddhists seemed to believe that Abhidharma Buddhists, first of all, failed to note the significance of the doctrine of Dependent Co-Arising by interpreting it as a law of causal sequence between cause and effect. The Abhidharma Buddhists did this because they understood the doctrine of Dependent Co-Arising from a perspective of dharma-entity theory.

Most Buddhist scholars agree that the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures are the first anti-Abhidharma Buddhist movement, which is chiefly devoted to resurrecting the fundamental spirit of Buddhist doctrines by employing the concept of *śūnyatā* presented in Early Buddhism.<sup>22</sup> Influenced by this movement,



Nāgārjuna seems to be dedicated to a criticism of a philosophical dilemma immanent in the theory of dharma-entity. In the course of time, however, it is assumed that the concept of *śūnyatā* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures was in the danger of being misunderstood as nihilism by Abhidharma Buddhists. In relation to this, some significant information is available in the later *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures. Given that Nāgārjuna warned his opponents concerning the misinterpretation of *śūnyatā* in the *Kārikā*, it can be presumed that he was already aware of the existence of these later *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures.

Some Western scholars, however, would not admit the relationship between the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures and Nāgārjuna. David J. Kalupahana, following A. K. Wader, holds that Nāgārjuna's major works have no reference to Mahāyāna tradition.<sup>23</sup> He instead finds theoretical sources for Nāgārjuna's works from *Kccāyanagotta Sutta*.<sup>24</sup> It is easily noted from Nāgārjuna's extant works that he was acquainted with non-Buddhist traditions as well as Early Buddhism,<sup>25</sup> but this fact can never justify a claim that Nāgārjuna has nothing to do with the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures. In an endeavor to connect Nāgārjuna with Mahāyāna Buddhism, Chr. Lindtner does not hesitate to disparage A.K. Warder's article, "Is Nāgārjuna Mahāyānist?" as "a strange question." He instead argues that, "Nāgārjuna was first of all an ardently devoted Mahāyānist and a staunch propagator of his faith (especially evidenced by his *Sūtrasamuccaya*, *Catuhstava* and *Ratnāvalī*)."<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, he holds that the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures are the main source of inspiration for the *Kārikā*.<sup>27</sup> By following him, I would

suggest that the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures offer a significant clue to the historical/doctrinal motif of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā*. I will focus on presenting the relationship between the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures and Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā* because I believe that this task is crucial to demonstrating the historical/doctrinal motif of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā*. I think that the historical motif of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā* is interlocked with a doctrinal motif. For convenience, however, I shall deal with these two issues separately.

### The Historical Motif of Nāgārjuna's Concept of *Śūnyatā*

Most Buddhist scholars agree that the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures<sup>28</sup> were gradually composed over time. They are divided into two groups, i.e., Shorter and Larger *ślokas* or "Verses." It is agreeable to many scholars that the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures were enlarged from the *Prajñāpāramitā* of 8,000 *Verses* belonging to the group of the Shorter Verses. Thus, it can be generally said that the Shorter Verses belong to an earlier period than the Larger Ones. This standard, however, does not apply to the *Vajracchedikāpāramitā Sūtra* belonging to the group of Larger Verses. The *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures went through a process of minimization into shorter *ślokas*, starting with the *Vajracchedikāpāramitā Sūtra*. Not only is the *Sūtra* gradually abridged but also new *Sūtras* were composed separately like the *Heart Sūtra*, etc.. In determining the period a particular *Sūtra* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures belongs to, it may be generally said that the earlier chapters of a *Sūtra* belong to earlier periods. For

example, the earliest chapters of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (the 8,000 Verses) and *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (the 25,000 Verses) have had later chapters added to them.<sup>29</sup> This change does not merely mean an increase in the number of chapters but is often paired with a historical/doctrinal situation. Representatively, a gradual increase of chapters in the 8,000 Verses and 25,000 Verses reflects on a doctrinal/historical situation in relation to the concept of *śūnyatā*.<sup>30</sup>

Modern scholarship agrees that Nāgārjuna is a precursor who attempted to theorize the concept of *śūnyatā* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures. Most scholars have so far connected Nāgārjuna earlier *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures like the 8,000 Verses and 25,000 Verses, but Hajime Nakamura has proposed, in one of his recent works, that Nāgārjuna follows the latest thought of *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures, like the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing* etc.. By commenting on the development of the concept of *śūnyatā* through the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures, Hajime Nakamura attempts to draw the following historical hypothesis:

It is unknown to us why the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures are repeatedly using the word *śūnyatā*. But it seems that the *Sūtras* criticize the theory of *svabhāva*, echoed by the Hīnayanā Buddhist schools like the Sārvastivādins, etc., by employing the concept of *śūnyatā* which might appear to be negative to them.<sup>31</sup> That is, all existences do not exist independently but are dependent upon each other. Therefore, the claim that all existences exist can be justified because they possess the principle of self-negation. It is assumed that a negative expression of *śūnyatā* might appear to be appropriate to the writers of the *Sūtras*. That is why it is followed by the statement of “because of *niḥsvabhāva*” or “the internal absence of entity.” But when we reach earlier periods of the

*Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, the concept of *śūnyatā* was misunderstood as “a nothing” by its opponents who judge it as nihilism.... At some time in a final stage of the compilation of *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, for example in the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*, it amounts to stating explicitly that *śūnyatā* or *niḥsvabhāva*, lest it be misunderstood as a nihilism, is no more than Dependent Co-Arising meaning a mutual relationship or mutual dependence.... Nāgārjuna comes after this tradition of the latest *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, such as in the text entitled the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*.<sup>32</sup>

In contrast with this proposition that the three concepts, *śūnyatā*, *niḥsvabhāva* and the *pratītyāsamutpāda* occur in order in the development of *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, he also suggests that the order of these three concepts are reversed within a logical sequence. According to him, *pratītyāsamutpāda* always precedes *niḥsvabhāva* which is followed by *śūnyatā* in a logical sequence. It seems to be roughly plausible although I am skeptical of his latter position. I agree that the *Sūtra* employs the *pratītyāsamutpāda* with a view to protecting *śūnyatā* from nihilistic interpretation. It can be presumed that Abhidharma Buddhists were committed to misunderstanding *śūnyatā* as nihilism and this fact was later reflected in the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, like the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing* etc.. It is assumed that Nāgārjuna witnessed this historical situation and decided to compose his *magnum opus*, the *Kārikā*, which is believed to be his first work. This assumption can be legitimated from a significant remark in Piṅgala's the *Middle Treatise*,<sup>33</sup> one of the authoritative commentaries of the *Kārikā*:

After the Buddha's death, in the second five hundred years of the patterned dharma, men's faculties became dulled, they became deeply attached to all dharmas, and sought for settled fixed characteristics in the twelve causal links, the five *skandhā*, the

twelve avenues, the eighteen realms, and so on. They did not know the Buddha's intention and were merely attached to words and letters. Hearing utter emptiness taught in the Mahāyāna-dharma they did not know the reason for things being empty, and so conceived doubts and views, such as "If all things are utterly empty, how can you differentiate sin and merit, karmic recompense and so on? If this is so, there would be no worldly truth and no truth of the supreme meaning." They seized hold of the characteristic of "emptiness" and produced voracious attachment, generating all sorts of errors about utter emptiness. It was for such reasons as these that the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed this *Middle Treatise*.<sup>34</sup>

Thus it is fair to say that when Nāgārjuna decided to write the treatise he had been familiar with the aforesaid historical atmosphere of his time. It seems that Nāgārjuna understands that Abhidharmic misinterpretation of fundamental Buddhist doctrines in Early Buddhism and *śūnyatā* is due to the theory of *svabhāva*. He seems to believe that Abhidharmic clinging to an Absolute Being or an entitistic Being (*dharma*-entity) is essentially interlocked with a belief in an Absolute Nothing or an entitistic Nothing, which causes the misperception of the concept of *śūnyatā* as nihilism.

### The Doctrinal Motif of Nāgārjuna's Theorization of *Śūnyatā*

#### Nāgārjuna's Soteriological Enterprise of *Śūnyatā*

Throughout the *Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna devotes himself to demonstrating what he really intends by *śūnyatā*. Fortunately, we can find his enterprise of *śūnyatā* in *Kārikā* 24:7. In rebuking his opponent's misunderstanding of *śūnyatā*, he says that "We hold that you do not understand *śūnyatāpariyojana* ('the function of emptiness'), *śūnyatā* ('the internal meaning of emptiness, or silence'), and

*śūnyatārtha* ('the doctrinal meaning of emptiness'). Therefore, you argue like that." Thus Nāgārjuna attempts to present the enterprise of *śūnyatā*, i.e.—*śūnyatāpariyojana*, *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatārtha*. This implies that he must have conceived of an implicit system when he employed the concept of *śūnyatā*.<sup>35</sup> What he really means by *śūnyatā* is that the Buddha's teaching, coming from silence, is ultimately aimed at leading ordinary people to silence. For him the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā* or *śūnyatārtha* is nothing else but Dependent-Co-Arising, and the purpose/function of *śūnyatā* is to destroy a belief that language refers to a real thing or entity by *śūnyatāpariyojana*.<sup>36</sup> Thus, Nāgārjuna's enterprise of *śūnyatā* may be called "a soteriological enterprise."<sup>37</sup> I agree with some scholars that Nāgārjuna would never use his own independent logic. I do not believe, however, that this means that Nāgārjuna would be reluctant to use a positive system or expression.<sup>38</sup> Rather, I would say that if one fails to read Nāgārjuna's positive enterprise, one never understands Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā*. I would hold that the misinterpretation of *śūnyatā* as absolutism, nihilism, positivism, etc., are all due to ignorance of the significance of Nāgārjuna's soteriological enterprise.

Nāgārjuna intends to actualize this soteriological enterprise by the Two Truths (24:8, 9 and 10 of the *Kārikā*) and the doctrinal identification of "Dependent Co-Arising," "*śūnyatā*," "conventional designation" and "the Middle Way" (*Kārikā* 24:18). I do believe that Nāgārjuna's doctrine of Two Truths targets for criticizing the Abhidharma Buddhists' clinging to the Buddha's

teachings. Nāgārjuna seems to believe that Abhidharma Buddhists's misunderstanding of *śūnyatā* is to be attributed to their failure to recognize the Buddha's silence and the pedagogical aspects included in his teaching.

Nāgārjuna intends to connect the danger of misunderstanding *śūnyatā* with the reasons for which the Buddha was reluctant to pronounce his teaching.

In relation to this, the following verses are very significant:

By a misperception of emptiness a person of little intelligence is destroyed. Like a snake incorrectly seized or like a spell incorrectly cast. (24:11)

For that reason—that the *Dharma* is deep and difficult to understand and to learn—the Buddha's mind despaired of being able to teach it. (24:12)

Thus the Two Truths and the identification of the “Dependent Co-Arising,” *śūnyatā*, “conventional designation,” and “the Middle Way,” are crucial to demonstrating Nāgārjuna's soteriological enterprise. Is it then safe to say that this doctrinal system is attributed to Nāgārjuna himself? My answer to this question is “No.” Surprisingly enough, there are available in Early Buddhism and the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures remarks indicative of the doctrinal systematization, as well as the theory of the Two Truths. Surprising, there appears to be a similarity between Nāgārjuna and the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures of the latest layer, like the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*. I will concentrate on demonstrating a doctrinal motivation for Nāgārjuna's system in the rest of this chapter.

### The Doctrinal Motivation of Nāgārjuna's Two Truths

From the standpoint of the history of Buddhist thought, it can be said that the Two Truths in the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures succeed the Two Truths of Early Buddhism. Although, in the earlier Buddhist literature, the word for the Two Truths (Skt. *satyadvaya*) is only found rarely and the theory itself is undeveloped, still, a potential enterprise of the Two Truths is presented in early Buddhist scriptures.<sup>39</sup> The Two Truths of Early Buddhism are based on the form of truth where *paramāṛthā satya* is silence and *samvṛti satya* is a pedagogical expression by way of language.<sup>40</sup>

In contrast, Abhidharma Buddhism views the Two Truths as the demarcation between *dharma*-entity and phenomenal existence. Abhidharma Buddhism intends to find a substantial foundation behind phenomenal existence and regards it as *paramāṛthā satya*. This fact can be verified from some Abhidharma texts. In this relation, the following verses in the Chinese version of *Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra* illustrate this point:

The world of death-birth is *samvṛti satya*, and all dharmas are *paramāṛthā satya*. The person who practices *samādhi* is *samvṛti satya*, and the state of *samādhi* is *paramāṛthā satya*. Actor and receiver are *samvṛti-satya*, and *karma* and *kriya* are *paramāṛthā satya*.... As “tree,” etc. is just a name and the four dusts of *rūpa*, etc. is real existence, so *pudgala* is just name, and the five aggregates of *rūpa*, etc. is a real existence.<sup>41</sup>

According to Kosai Yasui, Abhidharma attempts to clearly bifurcate *samvṛtti satya* and *paramāṛthā satya*. This bifurcation is further theorized in Vasubandhu's *Abhidhammakosa*.<sup>42</sup> I believe that the Two Truths of the



*Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, as seen in the immediately following section, are a direct reaction to Abhidharma.

The *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures of 8,000 Verses, which is believed to belong to the earliest layer of the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, attempt to demonstrate the emptiness of all dharmas, which characterizes the inexpressible, unobtainable and indiscriminate nature of dharmas, rather than positively advocating the Two Truths. The following quotations suggest some examples of such a case.

Subhuti! All dharmas cannot be expressible. Subhuti! the appearance of all dharmas cannot be obtained. (T. no. 227, 566c23-25)

The Buddha said to Subhuti, “all dharmas cannot be discriminated. You should know that *prajñāparamitā* is like this. All dharmas cannot be destroyed. You should know that *prajñāparamitā* is like this. All dharmas are simply a name. You should know that *prajñāparamitā* is like this.” (T. no. 227, 579b13-16)

Thus the Two Truths, in the 8,000 Verses, are the prototype of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the history of Buddhist thought. However, as Yasui Kōsai indicates, the Two Truths of Mahāyāna Buddhism awakes for the 25,000 Verses.<sup>43</sup> For example, the following passage of the 25,000 Verses should be noted:

Subhuti! it is said that the fruit of wholesome and unwholesome is established based on *samvṛti satya*. But it cannot be said that it is not established through *paramārthā satya*. For the *dharma* (*paramārthā satya*) cannot be observed and taught. (*Yingyinban xicang dazangjing*, *Ban ruo bu* 8 (19), P. 147, 4; *Mohe banruo*, *Sishepin* Chapter 78, T. no. 223, 397b27-28).<sup>44</sup>

Further, it should be noted that the *25,000 Verses* establish the Two Truths as the relationship between an expedient device and truth. In this relation, the following passage of the *25,000 Verses* is indicative:

Oh Sariputra! Bodhisattvas teach the ordinary people by *samvṛti satya* and *paramārthā satya*. (*Yingyinban xicang dazangjing*, Banruobu, 7 (18), p. 164, 4; *Mohe banruo*, Juzupin, Chapter 78, T. no. 223, 405 a 5-16).<sup>45</sup>

Thus the Two Truths in the *25,000 Verses* assumes a more developed form when compared with the *8,000 Verses*. However, the relationship between *samvṛti satya* and *paramārthā satya* is not yet explicitly described in the *25,000 Verses*.

When we reach the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*, however, we see a passage reminiscent of the verses of the *Kārikā* that, “Without a foundation in the conventional truth, the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved (24:10).” The *Sūtra* reads: “Language is just named *samvṛti satya*, and it is not real. But *paramārthā satya* cannot be taught without *samvṛti satya* [as a foundation].”<sup>46</sup>

This passage shows that no clear bifurcation can be found between *samvṛti satya* and *paramārthā satya*. Rather it emphasizes the pedagogical function of *samvṛti satya* as leading to *paramārthā satya*. Moreover, the *Sūtra* says, in the immediately following passage that, “Once one comprehends that *samvṛti satya* is not contradicted with *paramārthā satya*, one can understand both of them or the Two Truths.”

The development of the Two Truths, thus, coincides with the history of the composition of the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures. It can be said that Nāgārjuna’s

Two Truths follow the latest layer of the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, like the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*.

### The Doctrinal Motivation of Nāgārjuna's Doctrinal Systemization

Nāgārjuna intends to demonstrate the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā* by identifying Dependent Co-Arising, *śūnyatā*, conventional designation and the Middle Way. This identification of doctrines does not simply signify a mathematical equalization but is part of Nāgārjuna's intention to cure wrong belief and to recover the real meaning of the doctrines. Throughout the *Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna insists on claiming an identification between Dependent Co-Arising and *śūnyatā*. However, if one see this identity as a merely mathematical equalization, one ends up with losing sight of the historical/doctrinal context. In this case it is worth asking the question of whether or not Nāgārjuna would employ the concept of *śūnyatā* to interpret Dependent Co-Arising, or vice versa. The following two verses in the *Kārikā* present a significant clue as to the contrasting possibilities of this question:

If things did not exist without essence, the phrase, "when this exists, so this will be," would not be acceptable. (1:12)

Something that is not dependently arisen, such a thing does not exist. Therefore, a non-empty thing does not exist. (24:19)

The phrase "when this exists, so this will be" in the first verses, needless to say, recalls to us a typical form of Dependent Co-Arising in Early Buddhism, "When this arises, this will be. When this does not exist, this will not be." Through the

first verses it is asserted that Nāgārjuna intended to reinterpret Dependent Co-Arising in terms of *niḥsvabhāva* or *śūnyatā*.

Contrary to this, the second verses confirm that *śūnyatā* is not “being” or “nothing” in an ontological sense but only Dependent Co-Arising. In verse 18 the coordinating conjunction “therefore” (*yasmāt tasmāt*) makes a clear-cut logical relation between the two sentences. Thus it should be noted that Nāgārjuna views Dependent Co-Arising in terms of *śūnyatā* on one hand, while on the other hand employing the former in demonstrating the latter.

How can it be possible that these seemingly contrasting positions are compatible with each other? The answer is that these two different stances are paired with a historical/doctrinal situation. One is a realistic view of Dependent Co-Arising, the other is a nihilistic view of *śūnyatā*. By being aware of this situation, Nāgārjuna criticizes a realistic view of Dependent Co-Arising in terms of *śūnyatā*, and at the same time destroys a nihilistic view of *śūnyatā* in terms of Dependent Co-Arising.<sup>47</sup> Thus, we have the doctrinal identification of “Dependent Co-Arising” and “*śūnyatā*,” “*śūnyatā*” and “conventional designation,” all equally based on “the Middle Way.”<sup>48</sup>

Where can we then find a motif of the doctrinal enterprise of *Kārikā* 24:18? Through the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures we see that the above doctrines are not identical with each other, but a partial identification of these doctrines is seen in the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*. In relation to the identification of Dependent Co-Arising and *śūnyatā*, the Sūtra states that, “Bodhisattvas and

Māhāsattvas practice the *prajñāpāramitā* to realize that Dependent Co-Arising is *śūnyatā*, or the absence of entity, and thereby they never cause self-pride.”<sup>49</sup>

Thus a new interpretation of Dependent Co-Arising was earlier undertaken in the *Prajñāparamitā Sūtras* of the latest layer, like the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*. We can find there an emphasis on the Non-arising of all dharmas in several places. There is no doubt that the idea of “Non-Arising” influenced Nāgārjuna. Seemingly, this expression denies the Dependent Origination of Twelve Links (hereafter abridged as “the Twelve Links”) itself.<sup>50</sup>

However, Nāgārjuna would never intend to create a new doctrine of Dependent Co-Arising in order to dismantle the Twelve Links. I would say that Nāgārjuna was interested in interpreting the Twelve Links as the meaning of Non-arising. That is, he seems to believe that the meaning of Non-arising never contradicts the Twelve Links, but the former refers to the truth of the latter. I believe that the identification of the *pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā* signifies the reinterpretation of the former in terms of the latter. That is, the declaration that *pratītyasamutpadā* is *śūnyatā* is to demonstrate the Non-arising of an entity in *pratītyasamutpadā*. But the Non-arising of an entity does not mean another entity. Non-arising of an entity is not something beyond “arising” but rather legitimates “arising” in the conventional habit of language. Therefore, Nāgārjuna seems to feel it necessary to declare that *śūnyatā* is *prajñāptirupādāya*.

The identification of *śūnyatā* and conventional designation, then, is seen in the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*. The *Sūtra* reads that “all dharmas are

immanently empty in entity. [Therefore] there is no ‘arising’ and no ‘ceasing.’ When conditions come together, it is called ‘arising.’ When conditions disperse, it is called ceasing.”<sup>51</sup> However, we do not find the identification of *śūnyatā* and the Middle Way in the *Sūtra*, except that *śūnyatā* is aligned with other doctrines, like *anātman*, the Middle Way, etc., as the same pedagogical device.<sup>52</sup> Rather, we can find remarks indicative of Nāgārjuna’s doctrinal identification between *śūnyatā* and the Middle Way in earlier Buddhist literature.<sup>53</sup> In a real sense, the doctrinal identification in a logical sequence is attributed to Nāgārjuna.

### Summation

As we have seen before, Nāgārjuna’s concept of *śūnyatā* was set up based on the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, especially, of the latest layer like the *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*. The Two Truths and the doctrinal identification as indicated in *Kārikā* 24:18, which are essential elements of Nāgārjuna’s soteriological enterprise of *śūnyatā*, are already available in the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures.

The word *śūnyatā* goes back to early Buddhism, but it was not highlighted as an independent concept in Early Buddhism. It would often be used in alignment with *anātman*, i.e., *śūnyatā anātman* or *anātman śūnyatā*. The *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures make the term *śūnyatā* into a significant concept. The scriptures intend to nullify Abhidharma’s theory of *svabhāva* by employing the concept of *śūnyatā*. In the course of time, however, Abhidharma Buddhists misunderstood the concept of *śūnyatā* as nihilism. It seems that the latest

*Prajñāparamitā* scriptures recognize this situation and make an effort to solve this problem by introducing the concept of Dependent Co-Arising, although it seems that this problem had remained unsolved until Nāgārjuna.

Although there is no doubt that Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā* took its impetus from the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures, Nāgārjuna developed the concept of *śūnyatā* more theoretically. Here is the continuity and discontinuity between Nāgārjuna and the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE HISTORICAL/DOCTRINAL CONTEXT OF ONE MIND

#### Preliminary Remarks

One Mind (Skt. *ekacitta?*; Ch. *yixin*) plays no less an important role with in Chinese Buddhism than does *śūnyatā*. The concept of One Mind reaches its peak in the *Dacheng qixin lun* (the *Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda-śāstra?*), or “The Treatise on Mahāyāna and the Awakening of Faith,” where One Mind is dealt with comprehensively and systematically.<sup>54</sup> The text exerted a strong influence upon many Buddhist schools—especially the Heyan and Chan (Kor. Sōn; Jan. Zen) schools—in China, Korea and Japan, but the original Sanskrit of the text is not extant. Only the two Chinese versions are available. The text was translated in 550 C.E. by Paramārtha (Chi. Zhenti 499-569) and about 150 years later by Śikṣānanda.

The authorship of this text has traditionally been attributed to Aśvaghoṣa (Chi. Maming), but most Buddhist scholars are skeptical of ascribing the text to Aśvaghoṣa (100-150), who was a great Buddhist poet, and wrote the *Buddhacarita* (Ch. *Fosuoxingzan*, “The Life of Buddha”) and *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Some scholars have presumed that there might have been another person named Aśvaghoṣa or that Paramārtha himself could have been the author of the text.



Some argue that a native Chinese Buddhist who is affiliated with the Dilun school fabricated the text.<sup>55</sup>

Apart from the problem of the authorship of the text, we cannot find a Sanskrit original for the term One Mind. The Sanskrit term *ekāgra* is translated as *yixin* in the Chinese translation of the *Laṅkāvatara Sūtra*, which has been traditionally believed to be closely related to the *Dacheng qixin lun*. In order that we may find the Sanskrit original of *yixin*, we need to examine some earlier Buddhist texts using *yixin* and available in Sanskrit and Chinese. Given that *yixin* is identified with “the Ordinary Mind” in the *Dacheng qixin lun*, we must not ignore the significance of *xin* or “Mind.” This being so, is it possible to derive the meaning of *xin* from *ekāgra*? Lexically, the word *ekāgra* is defined as, “to concentrate one’s consciousness on a single object.” We should not ignore the significance of this notion within the concept of One Mind, but it seems clear that the term *ekāgra* fails to suffice for *xin*. The *Dacheng qixin lun*, which is characterized as a compendium of Mahāyāna Buddhism, aims at harmonizing all different Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines/concepts with One Mind.

Another possible way to seek for the Sanskrit original of One Mind could be to reconstruct it from the Chinese term *yixin*. From this, we can see a relationship with the Sanskrit term *ekacitta*, composed of *eka* (Chinese *yi*) and *citta* (Chinese *xin*). Surprisingly enough, we find the term *ekacitta* in the *Mahāyānasūtralaṅkāra*, but it does not match the concept of One Mind in the *Dacheng qixin lun*. Therefore, there is reason to say that the Indian origin of the text is questionable. In relation to this, Hiroo Kashiwagi holds that, “throughout

all the Indian or Tibetan sources nowhere is the *Dacheng qixin lun* quoted, nowhere else can be found such an idea as available in the text. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the text, which is questionable in terms of its composition, might be created in China.”<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, he rejects the idea of limiting its composition to a particular historical/doctrinal event at issue in that time. He instead suggests that the doctrinal motif of the text be extended to Indian Buddhism. He himself characterizes his position as “a kind of theory of Indian origin.”<sup>57</sup> He seems to believe that the reason for writing the text is reflected in “the external form” of the text or “the ways by which the text organizes its structures” and “its internal form,” or “the main doctrinal concepts/systems,” as represented in its technical terms “*Mahāyāna*,” “Dharma and Its Significance,” “One Mind-Two Gates-Three Greatnesses,” etc.<sup>58</sup> I think that his method serves to demonstrate the enterprise of the text where the term One Mind is employed as a key concept.

In the text One Mind is considered to be the essence of *Mahāyāna*, which has its two aspects or Two Gates and is described as the triad of *ti* or “essence,” *xaing* or “Attributes” and *yong* or “function.” The fundamental concepts of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, like *tathatā*, *tathāgatagarbha*, and *ālayavijñāna* are embraced in this system where these concepts are designed to play different roles. Thus, no matter what the Sanskrit original of One Mind might be, it is assumed that the term acts as the key concept to the enterprise of the text.

That being so, what does the text intend by the term One Mind? The answer is that this text aims at absorbing all the different doctrines of *Mahāyāna*

Buddhism into One Mind, where all different doctrines are reduced to “One Meaning” or “guide one to *nirvāṇa*,” the final goal of Buddhiam. I think that something of this project is already to be seen in India. I would indicate that not a few texts in Sanskrit emphasize the idea of reconciling all dharmas into One Meaning.

I would suggest that the *Dacheng qixin lun* comes upon the wake of this doctrinal trend and create its system, where antecedent concepts or doctrines lost their original meaning. That is why the endeavour to find a central thought in this text from an antecedent of the text, as has been attempted by some scholars, is far from demonstrating the historical/doctrinal motif of the *Dacheng qixin lun*. In relation to this, Hiroo Kashiwagi’s remarks are very indicative of what we have said: “The text attempts to freely single out foundational doctrines of Mahāyāna Buddhism which are available in other texts anterior to it with a view to absorbing them into its own enterprise.”<sup>59</sup> But he clearly rejects that an antecedent thought acts as a leading thought for the enterprise of the text. Thus, it seems to be more resonable to focus on seeking clues as to the enterprise of the text from the system of the text. Even though scholars do not yet unanimously agree with this position, it seems to be more viable than any other.

As I have already mentioned, Asian scholarship has been chiefly centered on determining the problem of the place of the composition of the text, the authorship of the text, the authorship of the Chinese translation, or the central idea of the text. It seems that the first three matters have chiefly been at issues among Japanese scholars while the last one has been considered primarily among Korean

scholars in the search for Wonhyo's position regarding a central thought in the text. With regard to the former, I believe, that a proper understanding of Wonhyo's point of view as to a central idea of the text sheds light upon the search for the enterprise of the text.<sup>60</sup> It seems clear that Wonhyo is aware of the significance of the peculiar enterprise and system of the text. In other words, he seems to believe that the enterprise of the text lies in singling out all different antecedent doctrines in order to harmonize them into its own system, represented by One Mind-Two Gates-Three Greatnesses.<sup>61</sup>

Many Korean scholars, however, are condemned to misunderstand Wonhyo's perspective on the text. The attempt to find the central thought of the text from a particular thought anterior to the text, or to limit the enterprise of the text to reconciliation of doctrinal disputes has been a predominant trend within Korean scholarship. It can be reduced to the following three positions: 1) Wonhyo's perspective on the text can be encapsulated by the *tathāgatagarbha* thought (in comparison with Fa-zang's), 2) Yogācāra thought, or 3) a reconciliation of confrontation between two main Mahāyāna Buddhist schools, the Mādhyāmika and Yogācāra. Of course, the first position can be said to be related to the third position, but the first is distinct from the third in the sense that it would not admit the predominance of *tathāgatagarbha* thought in Wonhyo's perspective on the text. Rather, it characterizes the methodology of "the reconciliation of confrontation" itself as Wonhyo's standpoint. I will investigate some of the problems of these positions and reapply Wonhyo's perspective to the

text. I believe that might offer a key to demonstrating the historical/doctrinal motif of the text, as well as the concept of One Mind.

#### Wonhyo's Position on the Central Thought of the *Dacheng qixin lun*

##### *Tathāgatagarbha* Thought

Some Korean scholars argue that Wonhyo attempted to appraise the text as *tathāgatagarbha* thought earlier than Fazang.<sup>62</sup> Fyōngrae Lee, who is representative of the scholars advocating this position, holds that Wonhyo devoted himself to proclaiming *tathāgatagarbha* thought throughout his entire life.<sup>63</sup> He goes even further saying that *tathāgatagarbha* thought penetrates throughout Wonhyo's fundamental commentaries such as the *Izang' ūi*, the *Taehyedokyeong chongyo*, the *Puphwa [kyōng] chongyo*, the *Yōl'ban [kyōng] chong'yo*, the *Kūm'gang samme kyōngnon*, the *Taesōng kishillon pyōgi* (hereafter *Pyōlgi*), and the *Taesōng kishillon so* (hereafter *So*).<sup>64</sup>

Pyōngrae Lee claims that there is no doubt that that Wonhyo employed *tathāgatagarbha* thought as an important tool in his works. Nevertheless, it seems to be implausible that Wonhyo meant to place a particular thought, the *tathāgatagarbha* thought, on a par with his *huajjaeng* thought. In this relation, Wonhyo states in a commentary on a phrase in the *Dacheng qixin lun* that, "This treatise, though it is only a single text, totally expresses the infinite meanings of the limitless and profound teaching of the Buddha since it includes the different meanings of all Buddhist scriptures."<sup>65</sup>

Wonhyo's statement also sheds doubt on Pyŏngraee Lee's argument that Wonhyo attempted to reconcile the confrontation of the Madhyāmika and Yogācāra schools by way of *tathāgatagarbha* thought. Following Japanese scholar Shun'ei Hirai, Pyŏngraee holds that, "Wonhyo attempts to place *tathāgatagarbha* thought in a higher position than Prajñā/Madhyāmika thought and Yogācāra/Cittamātratha thought and thereby unify all Buddhist thought."<sup>66</sup> This argument has some problems.

We can find passages indicative of Wonhyo's critique of the *Zhongguan lun* and *Weishi lun* in *Pyŏlgi*. As Sungbae Park indicates, however, Wonhyo omitted these passages when he revised it in *So*.<sup>67</sup> T'aewon Park attempts to strengthen Sungbae Park's supposition by adding his own views. By contrasting the changed sentences in *So* and the omitted parts in *Pyŏlgi*, he means to legitimate his argument. He holds that, in *Pyŏlgi*, Wonhyo describes the logical character of the *Dacheng qixin lun* by using the words *musobullib* (Chi. *wusobuli*) or "unrestricted setting up" and *musobulp'a* (Chi. *wusobupo*) or "unrestricted destructing" with a view to contrasting them with that of *Zhongguan* and *Weishi*, but, in *So*, he replaces these expressions with the word *ipp'amue* (Chi. *lipowuai*) or "no confrontation between 'to establish' and 'to destroy' by connecting it with One Mind and its two aspects."<sup>68</sup> Based on this evidence, T'aewon Park claims that the words in *So* substitute for their omitted counterparts in *Pyŏlgi*.

T'aewon Park also criticizes Pyŏngraee Lee's view of seeing the *tathāgatagarbha* thought as the central thought of the *Dacheng qixin lun* by claiming that the text places One Mind in a superior position to *tathāgatagarbha*

which is an auxiliary concept to One Mind. It is true, as he indicated, that the text undertakes a hierarchical arrangement in soteriological concepts such as One Mind, *tathāgatagarbha*, and *ālayavijñāna*, however, T'aewon Park did not apply the same logic for the relationship between One Mind and *ālayavijñāna*, even though the concept of *ālayavijñāna* is the lowest concept of those three concepts in the *Dacheng qixin lun*.<sup>69</sup>

This arrangement of placing One Mind in the highest position, then, is attempted not by way of an ontological enterprise but by a soteriological enterprise under which those soteriological concepts are used strategically. In other words, the concept of One Mind represents the holistic aspect of the Mind of sentient beings. It legitimates the practices based on self-power by showing that nothing is outside the Mind. The role of the concept of *tathāgatagarbha* is to show the practical aspect of One Mind as immanent pure mind. It contributes to encouraging one to return to the immanent purity of the human mind. In contrast, the concept of *ālayavijñāna* is devoted to explaining a dynamic transference of the Mind from a pure state into a corrupted state or vice versa. Here the hierarchical arrangements of concepts are only meaningful in terms of the soteriological enterprise of One Mind. Thus there is no reason to say that *tathāgatagarbha* thought is the central thought of the text.

### Yogācāra Thought

In his work *Taesŭng kisillon sasang pyŏng'ga* T'aewon Park holds that Yogācāra thought plays a leading role within the doctrinal foundation of the

*Dacheng qixin lun*. It seems that he attempts to legitimate his argument by way of the ancient commentators of the text. He claims that many of the important ancient commentators of the text, except Fazang, agree that Yogācāra thought is the central thought of the text. As far as Wonhyo's perspective on the text is concerned, I do not agree with him. I will critically review his position point by point.

He presumes that Wonhyo purposely omits the problematic sentence of *Pyōlgi*, where he criticizes Madhyāmika and Yogācāra thought in *So*. In relation to this, he goes on to argue that, "When Wonhyo wrote *So*, he seems to become aware that the criticism of the *Zhongguan lun* and the *Weishi lun* weakens the predominance of *tathāgatagarbha* thought in his perspective on the *Dacheng qixin lun*."<sup>70</sup> I believe that the claim can be justified that Wonhyo purposely omitted the sentence when he wrote *So*, but I do not agree with his assumption that Wonhyo did this because it contradicts his own perspective, i.e.—seeing the *Dacheng qixin lun* from the standpoint of Yogācāra thought. Rather it seems to be more plausible that Wonhyo omitted the sentence because he changed his perspective when he wrote *So*. That is to say, it appears to be a fundamental difference between *Pyōlgi* and *So*, at least in terms of methodology.

In *Pyōlgi*, Wonhyo tends to distinguish the character of the *Dacheng qixin lun* from other texts by indicating the one-sided and partial character of other texts. Wonhyo characterizes the *Zhongguan lun* and the *Shier men lun* as "destroying but not setting up" and the *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* and the *Shedacheng lun* as "setting up but not self-destroying." In contrast, however, he



characterizes the *Dacheng qixin lun* as “setting up but destroying” and “destroying but setting up.” In another passage in *Pyŏlgi*, he holds that the *Dacheng qixin lun* embraces the *li* or “principle” and *shi* or “actualization” of both the *tathatā* Gate and the Arising-Ceasing Gate. In contrast, *Shelun/Dapin* (the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* of 25,000 Verses) and the *Heyan jing*/the *Nieban jing*, according to him, respectively represent *shi* and *yi* of the Suchness Gate and the Arising-Ceasing Gate.<sup>71</sup>

Thus it seems clear that Wonhyo tends to methodologically distinguish the characteristics of the *Dacheng qixin lun* from that of other texts. He is, however, not consistent in this critical attitude toward other texts throughout *Pyŏlgi*. The following quotation from *Pyŏlgi* suggests one example of such cases:

The *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* and so on..., by borrowing the methodology of the *Samādhinirmocana Sūtra*, targets the view of monism or eternalism for curing. Therefore, this treatise maintains that this *ālayavijñāna* or “Transforming Consciousness” only participates in giving rise to “Arising and Ceasing,” by discriminating between *citta* and *cetasikā*, since it (*ālayavijñāna*) is designed to show that it is activated in such a manner under the influence of *karma* and *kleśa*. In contrast, this treatise (the *Dacheng qixin lun*), borrowing its methodology from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, is designed for curing a dualistic view of the discrimination between *thataṭā* or “suchness” and the deluded Mind. Therefore, the treatise teaches that there is no difference between Non-Arising-Ceasing and Arising-Ceasing by reconciling them. It can be shown from this that this discrimination is merely rooted in Ignorance. As these discriminated appearances are caused by Ignorance, so they are also caused by *karma* and *kleśa*. Therefore, it shows clearly that *ālayavijñāna* does not possess two different essences, though it is expressed by two different meanings.<sup>72</sup>

When we look at *So*, however, we cannot find Wonhyo’s critical attitude toward other texts. He instead tends to distinguish the *Dacheng qixin lun* from other

texts in terms of their descriptive distinctions. That is, he characterizes the text as “a summary treatise” which is single but embraces all meanings of the Buddhist doctrines, while he calls the *Dazhidu lun* and the *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* a “lengthy treatises.” Related to this, it should be noted that he characterizes the *Dacheng qixin lun* as “a mysterious technique of Aśvaghōṣa.”

T’aewon Park also provides more evidence to legitimate his argument from passages in *Pyōgi* where Wonhyo means to reconcile the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* and the *Dacheng qixin lun*.<sup>73</sup> T’aewon Park especially takes note of Wonhyo’s remarks: “The essence of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* and the *Dacheng qixin lun* are not different.”<sup>74</sup> From this argument, he claims that Wonhyo understands that the two texts belong to the same group of thought. By quoting from the *Kūm’gang samme kyōngnon* that, “if one arrives at the root of One Mind one enters the purity of *amalaviñāna* or the ninth consciousness,” he finally comes to a conclusion that Wonhyo understands the *Dacheng qixin lun* from the standpoint of Yogācāra thought.<sup>75</sup> However, this argument seems to be implausible to me.

First of all, Wonhyo attempts to distinguish One Mind from *ālayavijñāna* by putting the former at a higher position than the latter in his soteriological system. Wonhyo distinguishes One Mind’s two aspects or the *tathatā* Gate and the Arising-Ceasing Gate from the “Two Meanings” of *ālayavijñāna* or “Enlightenment-Meaning” and “Nonenlightenment-Meaning.” In *So* Wonhyo states: “Since the meaning of One Mind is broad it embraces the Two Gates, but since the meaning of *ālayavijñāna* is narrow, it is in the Arising-Ceasing Gate.

[Therefore], it should be known that ‘Gates’ are broad while Meaning is narrow.”<sup>76</sup> The *Dacheng qixin lun* itself verifies Wonhyo’s accounts. There is no doubt that in the text One Mind is placed in a higher position than *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* in its soteriological system, i.e.—One Mind represents a totality of all the dharmas in terms of the Two Gates. In contrast, *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* are placed in the Arising-Ceasing Gate where the former represents the aspect of a pure mind covered with the deluded mind, and the latter shows the active state of the corrupted mind. Ironically, T’aewon Park takes the superiority of One Mind in relation to the other concepts as crucial evidence when he criticizes Pyōngrae Lee’s argument that, Wonhyo sees the central thought of the *Dacheng qixin lun* as the *tathāgatagarbha* thought. It is amazing that he ignores of the superiority of One Mind to *ālayavijñāna*, whereas he notes the superiority of One Mind to *tathāgatagarbha*.

In addition to the aforesaid arguments, T’aewon Park holds that Wonhyo sees the *Laṅkāvataraśūtra* as the antecedent text of the *Dacheng qixin lun*. According to him, the *Dacheng qixin lun* should be considered a text of Yogācāra thought because the *Laṅkāvataraśūtra* is affiliated with Yogācāra thought. We will not deal with the problem of whether the *Laṅkāvataraśūtra* is really in the line of Yogācāra thought, but I do not believe that Wonhyo’s perspective on the text can ever be represented by the *Laṅkāvataraśūtra*, even though one must admit that he was aware of a close relationship between the *Dacheng qixin lun* and the *Laṅkāvataraśūtra*.

An Attempt to Reconcile a Doctrinal Confrontation between  
Mādhyāmika and Yogācāra

As I mentioned earlier, Japanese scholar Shun'ei Hirai claims that *tathāgatagarbha* thought plays a mediating role for reconciling Prajñā/Madhyāmika and Yogācāra/Cittamātra. However, some Korean scholars, like Ikchin Ko, believe that Wonhyo is the first commentator who seeks to understand the historical/doctrinal enterprise of the text in terms of "confrontation-sublation." Ikchin Ko suggests the most instructive arguments on this position. His argument may be divided into two parts. The first is an attempt to seek evidence on the doctrinal confrontation between the two systems and the second to demonstrate which doctrinal system in the text may contribute to the reconciliation of the confrontation.

A Doctrinal Confrontation between  
Madhyāmika and Yogācāra

Ikchin Ko seeks for the project of confrontation-sublation in a passage of *Pyōlgi*. It reads:

"The Middle Treatise" and "the Twelve Treatise," etc. destroy all attachments in their entirety and again destroy the notion of destroying. Consequently, it does not admit the subject of destroying or the object. Therefore, it may be called a treatise caring to remove attachments at the price of "setting up." In contrast, the *Weishi lun* and the *Shedacheng lun*, etc. set up hierarchical criterion in terms of the depth of all dharmas but fail to forsake the established dharmas. Therefore, it is called a treatise that shapes a positive attitude toward dharmas but fails to erase them. However, the *Dacheng qixin lun* is not only wise and gentle but profound and broad; setting up but evading a fixation; forsaking but admitting a setting up. In other words, "to admit" means a setting up after erasing again and "to forsake" denotes an erasing after setting up. Therefore, this treatise may be called the

master of the reconciliation in all disputations as well as the controller of all treatises.<sup>77</sup>

Ikchin Ko has proposed that Wonhyo's project of confrontation-sublation underlies his awareness of his contemporary historical situation. He believes that such evidence is presented in his remarks in the *Posal kyebon chibŭm yogi* or "A Summary on the Precepts of Bodhisattvas." Wonhyo there criticizes the destruction of the positive and negative aspects of being rather than of the deconstruction of absolute being and no-being.<sup>78</sup> There is no doubt that Wonhyo must have written *Pyŏlgi* with an awareness of this historical/doctrinal background.

The Doctrinal System Contributing to  
Reconciliation of the Confrontation  
between Mādhyamika  
and Yogācāra

Ikchin Ko tends to associate Mādhyamika and Yogācāra with the two different aspects of One Mind, i.e., the *tathatā* Gate and the Arising-Ceasing Gate.<sup>79</sup> According to him, these two schools respectively focus on demonstrating the *ti* or "essence" and *yong* or "function" of Mahāyāna. He seeks to find legitimacy for his argument in Wonhyo's words. He writes:

What is the reason? In relation to the former (the position of Mādhyamika) Wonhyo holds that that, "The nature of Mind is of Non-Arising/Non-Ceasing, but all discriminative phenomena are caused only by a discursive thought. If one is free from discursive thought, there is intrinsically no discrimination in all dharmas. This is called *tathatā* or 'suchness'. In contrast, in relation to the latter (the position of Yogācāra) Wonhyo points out that our ego-conscious mind (*manas*) and consciousness (*viññāna*) are derived from our Storehouse consciousness (*ālayaviññāna*), therefore, three worlds are an illusion and are created by our Mind. When the

Mind ceases, all dharmas cease and when the Mind arises, all dharmas arise.”<sup>80</sup>

He continues:

Thus, if Mādhyamika and Yoācāra respectively demonstrate two aspects of the *tathatā* (*ti* or *li*) and the Arising-Ceasing (*yong* or *shi*), it may be said that the Mind of ordinary beings possesses these two aspects. Therefore, the *Dacheng qixin lun* states: “This Mind includes all of the conventional world and supremundane world, because, the *tathatā* aspect of the Mind shows the essence of Mahāyāna and the Arising-Ceasing aspect presents the appearance and function of Mahāyāna itself.” Immediately following this, in the first part of “Revealing of the Right Meaning,” in the third section of the text, it states: “One Mind possesses two kinds of ‘Gates’. One is ‘the Mind-*tathatā* Gate’ and the other is ‘the Mind-Arising-Ceasing gate’. These two gates include all dharmas. Why? Because these two Gates are inseparable from each other.” Here it is not hard to see that the *tathatā* Gate succeeds the appearances of *tathatā* or the essence of Mahāyāna and the Arising-Ceasing Gate succeeds the appearances of the Arising-Ceasing conditions. That being so, since these Two Gates match respectively Mādhyamika and Yoācāra, it may be called a peculiar terminology of the text referring to these two systems.<sup>81</sup>

He points out that Wonhyo not only argues that the Two Gates are inseparable but intends to reconcile these Two Gates in terms of the Three Greatnesses.

According to him, Fazang relates all of *ti*, *xiang* and *yong* to the Arising-Ceasing-Gate in search of the central thought of the *Dacheng qixin lun* from the perspective of *tathāgatagarbha* thought. In contrast, Wonhyo associates *xiang* and *yong* with the Arising-Ceasing Gate while relating *ti* to the *tathatā* Gate.

Thus, he believes that the basic discrepancy between Wonhyo and Fazang in the interpretation of the Three Greatnesses lies in their different positions on the central thought of the *Dacheng qixin lun*. For Wonhyo the Three Greatnesses are devoted to sublating the doctrinal confrontation between Mādhyamika and

Yogācāra. For Fazang the Three Greatnesses contribute to theoretically legitimating *tathāgatagarbha pratītyāsamutpāda* or the Dependent Origination of *tathāgatagarbha*.

Ikchin Ko's argument, however, does not seem to be convincing. Basically, there is no difference between Wonhyo and Fazang on the association of the Three Greatnesses with the Two Gates. This argument is rooted in an incorrect translation of a sentence of *Pyōlgi*, as T'aewon Park indicates.<sup>82</sup> The problematic sentence reads: "There is the *ti* of Mahāyāna in the *tathatā* Gate, and there is the *ti*, *xiang* and *yong* [of Mahāyāna] in the Arising-Ceasing Gate." Here he mistranslates "the *ziti*, *xiang* and *yong* of Mahāyāna" into "the *xiang* and *yong* of Mahāyāna itself." Wonhyo clearly distinguishes the *ziti* in "the Arising-Ceasing Gate" from the *ti* in the *tathatā* Gate in a commentary on a sentence from the *Dacheng qixin lun*.<sup>83</sup> The sentence reads: "The *tathatā*-appearances of the Mind (One Mind) present the *ti* of Mahāyāna and the appearances of the Arising-Ceasing of this mind show the *ziti*, *xiang*, and *yong* of Mahāyāna."<sup>84</sup>

Thus Ikchin Ko's argument seems to commit two serious mistakes. One is that he fails to take note of the omitted sentence of *Pyōlgi* and newly added sentence in *So*. The other is, his argument is based upon an incorrect translation and its consequent misinterpretation of Wonhyo's comment in *Pyōlgi*.

The Place and Role of One Mind in the Enterprise of the *Dacheng qixin lun*

The *Dacheng qixin lun* itself states in regard to the enterprise of the text: "Thus this treatise should be taught in a general way because it is designed to

embrace the limitless meaning of the vast and profound teaching of the *Tathāgata*.<sup>85</sup> In a commentary on this passage, immediately after specifying the names of the *Sūtras* which he believes exercise a strong influence on the treatise, Wonhyo says: “Although this treatise is a single text, it embraces the meanings of all *Sūtras*. Therefore, it is said that the treatise embraces the limitless meaning of the vast and profound teaching of the *Tathāgata*.<sup>86</sup>

This being so, what is the highest and most comprehensive concept in the text that entails all different concepts? It is nothing else but Mahāyāna as implied in the title of the text. The text presents a doctrinal system of Mahāyāna which seems to be enough to suffice its declared enterprise. According to the text, Mahāyāna is explained by way of *fa* or “*Dharma*” and *yi* or “Meaning.” *Dharma* is described as the essence of Mahāyāna, and identical with One Mind. The text stresses the comprehensive nature of One Mind. It embraces all dharmas or “things” in the mundane and supermundane worlds. In relation to this, Wonhyo comments that, “Thus all dharmas embraced in Mahāyāna take One Mind as their immanent nature devoid of independent essences. Therefore, the *Dacheng qixin lun* tells us that *Dharma* is identical with the Mind of all ordinary beings, in the sense that all beings, in common, possess it without discrimination.” According to the text, this Mind embraces all dharmas in the mundane and supermundane worlds. In this regard, Wonhyo comments:

That “this Mind embraces all dharmas or ‘things’ in the mundane and supermundane worlds” shows a fundamental difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna regarding the view of *dharma*. This Mind [One Mind] is really distinguished from the concept of



*dharma* in Hīnayāna in the sense that One Mind is called *Mahāyāna Dharma*.<sup>87</sup>

Thus it is clear that One Mind acts as a leading concept in the enterprise of the text. In the text One Mind has its two aspects or the Two Gates, i.e., the *tathatā* Gate and the Arising-Ceasing Gate. The Two Gates are unified into One Mind. Wonhyo describes this system as *kaehapchajae* (Ch. *kaihezizai*) or “At-Will-Opening up-and-Closing up” and *ipp’amue* (Ch. *lipowuai*) or “Non-Restriction-in-Setting up and Destructing.” Wonhyo comments on this: “Even though the Two Gates embrace all kinds of different meanings, not only do these never conflict with each other, but they also are unified in the meaning of One Mind.”<sup>88</sup> Further, he proposes that One Mind and its two aspects be applied to cure the following two kinds of doubt: a doubt of *Dharma* and Teachings. He writes:

To doubt *Dharma* means to doubt the following things: Is the essence of *Mahāyāna Dharma* one or many? If it is one, there are no other dharmas. That being so, consequently, there are no sentient beings [to be saved]. How then shall the Bodhisattvas vow to save any one? To the contrary, if *Dharma* is many, it is not One essence. That being so, since one is different from others, how can one awaken the mind of Compassion? Because of this doubt, one cannot arouse faith. To doubt Teaching is as follows: Because there are various teachings, should one first practice any teaching? If one should practice all teachings at the same time, one cannot do this all at once. If one should select either of two teachings, which one is to be forsaken? Which one is to be followed? These kinds of doubts will cause a hinderance to the practice. Therefore, the *Dacheng qixin lun* sets up One Mind and its two aspects with a view to cure these two kinds of doubt. The system of One Mind was set up to cure the first doubt.... The system of Two Gates was established to cure the second doubt.<sup>89</sup>

Wonhyo's comments on the system of One Mind and its two aspects might appear to be an arbitrary interpretation, but it deserves attention. Given that One Mind acts as the central principal to embrace all different doctrines, it needs to demonstrate what is the project of One Mind. In the opening section, "The Reason for Writing the Text," the text itself demonstrates the second reason: "to reveal the real meaning of Tathāgatha."<sup>90</sup> Related to this, Wonhyo interprets "the real meaning of Tathāgatha" as One Mind and its two aspects.<sup>91</sup>

The term One Mind does not mean a metaphysical principle or "One reality" equal to the Vedāntic concept of Brahman. In this regard, Wonhyo says, "How is one capable of being 'One', for there is not 'Two'? What is capable of being called 'Mind', for there is not 'One'. This principle [of One Mind] is beyond language and thought, and it is hard to determine what it is called, but it is forcibly called One Mind as a temporary designation."<sup>92</sup> Here we can see a tension between silence and language in One Mind just as in the case of *śūnyatā* mentioned in the previous chapter.

What then is the strategy of One Mind by which it fills the gap between silence and language? The text itself implies that the different manners of teaching are resolved into "One Voice" (Skt. *ekasvara*; Chi. *yi-yin*) or "the Perfect Voice" (*yuanyin*), or "One Meaning." In other words, all teachings refer not to a reality but to pedagogical means to the same goal, which is, symbolically, called "One Voice." In relation to this, Wonhyo says that, "This [One Voice] is beyond discursive thought."<sup>93</sup> Thus, the idea of "One Voice" offers the doctrinal basis on which One Mind is able to embrace all teachings. I would suggest that the

doctrine of silence and the idea of “the Perfect Voice” or “One Voice” underlie the formation of One Mind in the text. Wonhyo seeks for the idea of “One Voice” in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* (Ch. *Weimo jing*) and the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* (Ch. *Heyan jing*).<sup>94</sup>

According to Mahāyāna Buddhism, “One Voice” is associated with “One Vehicle” (Skt. *ekayāna*), “One *dharma*” (Skt. *ekadhātu*), and “One Taste” (Skt. *ekarasa*). Here the term “One” refers not to oneness in terms of Reality but to oneness in terms of the soteriological goal. There is no doubt that the *Dacheng qixin lun* employs One Mind as a key concept in its enterprise with an awareness of One Mind’s relation to these concepts, but these concepts can only be aspects of One Mind. They are not equivalent to One Mind. No less an important aspect of One Mind is its relation to Mind. We should recall that in the text One Mind is identical with the Mind of sentient beings. The text emphasizes the two aspects of this Mind. With regard to this, in his comment on One Mind and its two aspects, Wonhyo writes:

The Gate of *citta tathatā* or “Mind-suchness” [i.e., “Suchness Gate”], as described in the *Dacheng qixin lun*, is an interpretation of a passage from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, “the peace of Mind is called One Mind”; the Gate of the Mind’s Arising-Ceasing [i.e., “the Arising-Ceasing Gate”] is an interpretation of a passage from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, “One Mind is called *thathāgatagarbha*.” Why? Because all dharmas are immanently at peace, Non-Arising and Non-Ceasing. They are nothing but One Mind. The Gate of *citta tathatā* represents this aspect of One Mind. Thus the Gate of *citta tathatā* refers to the expression in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, “the peace of Mind is called One Mind.” Also, the essence of One Mind is “Original Enlightenment,” but it only comes into the phenomena of Arising-Ceasing because of Ignorance. The Buddha-nature is concealed in the gate of the Mind’s Arising-Ceasing. Therefore, it is called *thathāgatagarbha*....<sup>95</sup>

Thus Wonhyo attempts to actualize the idea of One Voice into the system of One Mind and its two aspects. He never ignores of the significance of the phenomenal aspect of One Mind in the system of One Mind-Two Gates.

Given that One Mind plays a leading role within the enterprise of the *Dacheng qixin lun*, any attempts to seek for the enterprise of the text from a particular thought, like *tathāgatagarbha* thought or Yogōcāra thought, or to limit its motivation to the reconciliation of doctrinal confrontations should be reevaluated. However, the text never intends to ignore the significance of *tathāgatagarbha* thought or the Yogācāra thought by emphasizing the concept of One Mind. Rather, it is fair to say that these doctrines are positively employed for demonstrating One Mind.

#### Summation

As we have seen above, the text attempts to integrate all different teachings into the ultimate goal of Buddhism. The concept of One Mind occupies a leading role within the enterprise of the text. I have sought the Sanskrit original of the Chinese term *yixin* from some terms available in other earlier texts, but I have come to conclusion that any antecedent doctrines cannot exhaust the concept of One Mind in the *Dacheng qixin lun*.

Some scholars have proposed that the text may be a forgery that was composed in China in the light of the historical situation of Chinese Buddhist. As Hiroo Kashiwagi indicates, however, it is difficult to limit the text to a particular historical period in Chinese Buddhism. Apart from the problem of whether or not

the text was composed in India or China, it reflects the atmosphere of Indian Buddhism, in the sense that it treats many doctrines which were then at issue.

The present trend in scholarship on the text centers around the problems of authorship of and the thought anterior to the text. The former has chiefly been discussed among Japanese scholars while the latter has been important in Korean scholarship regarding Wonhyo's perspective on the central thought of the text. I have suggested that a correct understanding of Wonhyo's perspective might offer a valuable clue for demonstrating the place and role of One Mind in the text. Although we cannot say that Wonhyo's perspective on One Mind is absolutely right, there is no doubt that many of his comments on One Mind offer valuable clues to demonstrating the historical/doctrinal background of One Mind.

Wonhyo proposes that the essence of One Mind is based on silence, or the basic principle of Buddhist soteriology and is associated with the idea of "One Voice" in the search for the doctrinal basis on which One Mind embraces all different doctrines. Wonhyo's view of "One Voice" offers valuable clues to demonstrating the historical/doctrinal basis of the doctrine of One Mind.

**PART II**  
**THE THREE ASPECTS OF *ŚŪNYATĀ***

## CHAPTER 4

### ŚŪNYATĀRTHA

#### Preliminary Remarks

In the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna argues that his opponents not only misunderstand *śūnyatā* as “‘nothing’ as an entity” but also destroy the conventional habit of language due to the ignorance of *śūnyatāprajñā* (or “the function of *śūnyatā*”), *śūnyatā*, and *śūnyatārtha* (or “the meaning of *śūnyatā*”). My task in this chapter is to investigate what Nāgārjuna really intended by the term *śūnyatārtha*.

Literally, *śūnyatārtha* is a compound of two words, *śūnyatā* and *artha*. Here the term *artha* itself contains two alternative meanings, i.e.—“meaning” and “object,” in accordance with the context in which it is used. Whereas Bhāvaviveka sees *śūnyatārtha* as “the object of indiscriminate cognition,” or *tathatā*, Candrakīrti interprets *śūnyatārtha* as the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā*. While Candrakīrti comments on the word *śūnyatārtha*, he locates its specific content in *Kārikā* 24:18 in where Nāgārjuna attempts to organize fundamental Buddhist doctrines into one single unit. He says that “Whatever is Dependent Co-Arising, that is explained to be emptiness. That (emptiness), being a conventional designation, is itself the Middle Way.”<sup>96</sup> In the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna devotes

himself, almost exclusively, to criticism of the theory of *svabhāva*, but, as is indicated in this verse, there is no doubt that he also was conscious of a doctrinal relation between *sūnyatā* and the earlier Buddhist doctrines.

I have already mentioned *Kārikā* 24:18 in discussing the historical and doctrinal background of *sūnyatā*, but my interest here to show how *sūnyatā* plays a mediating role with the four-fold components.

The doctrinal significance of *Kārikā* 24:18 was noted in the Chinese Buddhist tradition—especially in the Sanlun and Tiantai schools, but the Chinese reading of this verse deviated from Candrakīrti's. Jizang, or the systematizer of the Sanlun school and Zhiyi, the founder of Tiantai school are two main Chinese interpreters of this verse. Therefore, it will be necessary to examine what are the differences between these two and Candrakīrti with regard to their readings of this line of the *Kārikā*.

#### The Chinese Translations and Interpretations of *Kārikā* 24:18

##### Some Problems with Kumārajīva's Translation of *Kārikā* 24:18

The Sanskrit original of *Kārikā* 24:18 reads:

*yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe/  
sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva madhyamāḥ*

All Chinese interpretations of verse 24:18 rely on Kumārajīva's Chinese

translation and Pingala's commentary on it. Kumārajīva's translation reads:

That which arises through a multitude of causes and conditions I explain as non-existent.<sup>97</sup> Again, it is a conventional name, and again, it is the meaning of the middle.



Piṅgala's interpretation of this verse is:

That which arises through a multitude of causes and conditions I explain as empty. Why is this? It is entirely through the combination of causes that things are produced. Since these things depend upon causes and conditions they have no self-nature, and since they have no self-nature, they are empty. Emptiness, moreover, is itself empty. But in order to guide all beings, it is taught by means of conventional designations. Because it is separate from the extremes of both existence and nonexistence, it is called the Middle Way. Since dharmas have no self-nature we cannot say they exist, and since they are not vacuous we cannot say that they are nonexistent....<sup>98</sup>

Grammatically, the Sanskrit original *sā* or “it” goes with “emptiness,” which is explained by the following words of a conventional designation and the Middle Way. A corresponding pronoun for it is not available in Kumārajīva's translation, but in context “conventional designation” and “the Middle Way” does not go with emptiness but with the things that arise through a multitude of causes and conditions. Traditionally, all various Chinese traditions were careless about the fact that, in the verse, the pronoun *sā* goes with emptiness, not Dependent Co-Arising. This mistaken translation was a cause for misinterpretation of the verse. In such misinterpretation, it is said that “the things, which arise through a multitude of causes and conditions,” cannot be regarded as a reality by means of emptiness, or as a nihilistic nothing by means of conventional designation. Thus, “the things which arise through a multitude of causes and conditions” are expressed by the Middle Way; in the sense that they are free from the extreme views of realism and nihilism. It is important to note that the Middle Way, here, plays a central role in integrating the four-fold components into a single unity. I assert that this fact offers a significant clue for understanding that Kumārajīva's

translation of the verse and Piṅgala's comments on it are clearly a deviation from Nāgārjuna's original intent and meaning.

In contrast with my position, however, Paul L. Swanson when he refers to *Kārikā* 24:18 seems to believe that this aspect is immanent in the Sanskrit original of the verse:

This verse can and was interpreted as speaking of the identity of the Two Truths, emptiness (*śūnyatā* = *paramārthasatya*) and [Dependent] Co-Arising or conventional designation (*pratītyasamutpāda* = *saṃvṛtisatya* = *prajñāptirupādāya*), as the Middle Path (*madhyamā*). Kumārjīva's Chinese translation of this verse, on which Chih-i relied completely, more clearly implies the understanding of the Middle Path as a third component in a single unity.<sup>99</sup>

This position is due to Swanson's failure to recognizing a subtle distinction between the Sanskrit original of this verse and how it was understood in the Chinese tradition; though he says, "the importance of this verse is such that it demands close line by line examination."<sup>100</sup>

#### Jizang's Interpretation of *Kārikā* 24:18

In his work *Zhongguan lunshu*, Jizang interprets this verse in four different ways. The first three interpretations emphasize a mediating role in the relationship of the three components (emptiness, conventional designation, and the Middle [Way]), while the last interpretation emphasizes the integration of the four components into a single unit, where "that which arise through causes and conditions" plays a central role in integrating the other three.<sup>101</sup>

In his first interpretation, he illustrates the meaning of "emptiness" by claiming that, "That which arises through causes and conditions is devoid of its

own self-nature”; next he explains the meaning of conventional designation as “emptiness is [conventional] being”; finally he says that the Middle Way is identical with the inclusiveness of the Two Truths which are constituted of “emptiness” and “conventional being”/“conventional designation.”<sup>102</sup> This means that the Middle Way does not form a pattern of the sublation of two contrasting components, emptiness and conventional designation, but that it is expressed by the inclusiveness of the Two Truths. Jizang’s theory of the Two Truths is presented in a various ways throughout such works as the *Ertiyi*, the *Zhongguan lun shu*, and the *Dacheng xuan lun*, but it is not necessary to go into this further in this context.<sup>103</sup>

In the second interpretation Jizang distinguishes “emptying” (*kongsuo*) from “the emptied” (*suo kong*), by defining them as “non-substantialization” (*pusuo*) and as “non-emptiness” (*pukong*) or “non-nothingness” respectively. Then he explains the Middle Way as “non-substantialization” of “emptying” or “non-nothingness” of the emptied.<sup>104</sup> It is clear that Jizang attempts to indicate that the Middle Way is identical with the absence of self-nature, but not as in the case of Piñgala’s commentary. Here the nihilistic interpretation of emptiness is negated by the way of “the non-emptiness of emptiness,” not by way of the “emptiness of emptiness.”

Jizang’s third interpretation aims to show that the Middle Way is explained by means of “not-emptiness” (*feikong*) or “not-nothingness” and “not-being” (*feiyou*) or “not substantial being.” It is also important to note that Jizang uses the terms “being” and “emptiness” in opposite ways. Jizang negates being

and emptiness (nothingness) when they are used as meaning “self-nature,” but he admits them in the sense of “conventional designation.” Further, Jizang calls “being” and “emptiness” as “conventional being” and “conventional emptiness” and distinguishes them from “being” and “emptiness” in terms of self-nature.<sup>105</sup>

In the fourth and last interpretation Jizang points out the threefold meanings of Dependent Co-Arising. That is, he establishes the patterns: Dependent Co-Arising = emptiness, Dependent Co-Arising = conventional designation, and Dependent Co-Arising = the Middle Way. He does this explaining the Middle Way as “not being”/“not emptiness.” This shows clearly that his interpretation basically relies on Kumārajīva’s translation of the verse. However, this does not mean that we cannot find a distinctive perspective in Jizang’s work. Consistent with traditional interpretation on this verse, he makes his own explanation. Jizang relates the threefold meanings of Dependent Co-Arising as follows:

The things that arise through causes and conditions, are ultimately emptiness. Why is this? If there were a self-nature, it would not be compatible with causes and conditions. The things that arise through causes and conditions are devoid of self-nature since they are emptiness. Also conventional designation is regarded as the second meaning of the things that arise through causes and conditions. The things that arise through causes and conditions are also termed conventional designation. Why is it called this? It has already been said that the things that arise through causes and conditions are considered emptiness. Causes and conditions mean the absence of both being and emptiness. They are neither emptiness nor being, but they are called being and emptiness by the way of conventional designation. And again, the Middle Way denotes the third meaning of things that arise through causes and conditions. That is, the things that arise through causes and conditions are nothing more than the middle path [Middle Way]. The things that arise through causes and conditions are emptiness

since they are devoid of their own self-nature. They are not regarded as being. Not being also means not emptiness. What is neither being nor emptiness, therefore, is called the middle path.<sup>106</sup>

It is clear that the things that arise through causes and conditions play a central role in the equalization of the four-fold components in terms of the three equalizations. As mentioned above, Jizang's interpretations of 24:18 vary, but there is no doubt that they rely on Kumārajīva's translation of this verse in the sense that, 1) the Middle Way plays a central role in integrating the three components of emptiness, conventional designation, and the Middle Way, and 2) he sets up a pattern of the things that arise through causes and conditions, namely, emptiness, things that arise through causes and conditions, namely, conventional designation, and things that arise through causes and conditions, namely, the Middle Way. Nevertheless, the idea that emptiness mean "emptiness itself" (*kong yi fu kong*) as found in Kumārajīva's translation is not available in Jizang's interpretations.

#### Zhiyi's Interpretation of *Kārikā* 24:18

Zhiyi, like Jizang, basically relies on Kūmarjīva's translation of *Kārikā* 24:18. Here again can be found a pattern of the things that arise through causes and conditions, namely, emptiness (*kong*), the things that arise through causes and conditions, namely, conventional designation (*jia*), the things that arise through causes and conditions, namely, the Middle Way (*zhong*).

As we have seen above, Jizang was clearly aware of the three-fold components of emptiness, conventional designation, and the Middle Way, but it

was Zhiyi who identified these three-fold components with the term the three-fold truths.<sup>107</sup> Zhiyi borrows the terms “threefold truths” from the three truths as they appear in the *Yinglo jing* and the *Renwang jing*. They are “the truth of existence” (*youti*), “the truth of Non-Being” (*wuti*), and “the supreme truth of the Middle Way” (*zhongdao tiyiyiti*). Furthermore he applied this idea to *Kārikā* 24:18. That is, Zhiyi interprets this verse in terms of a single unit with three aspects, i.e., emptiness, conventional designation, and the Middle Way. These are identical with the real, mundane, and supreme truths.<sup>108</sup> We have discussed that emptiness and conventional designation are linked with the Two Truths, the inclusiveness of which is also explained by the Middle Way as presented in Jizang’s first interpretation of *Kārikā* 24:18. Jizang’s idea of the Middle Way in regard to the inclusiveness of the Two Truths is reminiscent of Zhiyi’s concept of the Middle characterized as a simultaneous affirmation of both emptiness and conventional designation.

Jizang, however, is not consistent in explaining the Middle Way as the inclusiveness of the Two Truths. As seen in his other interpretations of the *Kārikā*, the middle is explained as “non-being of being” and “non-emptiness of emptiness,” or as the “non-emptiness of emptiness” and the “non-being of being.” Thus, on the one hand, Jizang points out a simultaneous identity for emptiness, conventional designation, and the Middle Way, while on the other hand, he explains the Middle Way as—“the non-being of being” and—“the non-emptiness of emptiness.” Here it is interesting to note that these two aspects are reflected in Zhiyi’s explanation of three types of Cessation (*zhi*) and Contemplation (*guan*),<sup>109</sup>

which is regarded as the practical side to the three-fold truths. That is, the three aspects of emptiness, conventional designation and the Middle Way are immediately perceived as being integrated into a single unit, in terms of “the Perfect and Immediate Cessation and Contemplation.” In contrast, the Middle is characterized as the negation of both substantial being and emptiness (nothingness) in terms of the Progressive Cessation and Contemplation.

Thus we can admit of a similarity between Jizang and Zhiyi with regard to the interpretation of *Kārikā* 24:18, but it is not clear that Jizang directly influences Zhiyi.<sup>110</sup>

#### Candrakīrti’s Interpretation of *Kārikā* 24:18

In commenting on 24:18 Candrakīrti says that the three concepts, i.e., emptiness, conventional designation and the Middle Way are nothing more than “the different names or aspects” (*viśeṣaṃjñā*) of Dependent Co-Arising.<sup>111</sup> This statement clearly shows that the four-fold components constitute one single unit. As far as this statement is concerned, we can find no information indicating that three synonyms are devoted to characterizing Dependent Co-Arising, but the following comments indicate that emptiness plays a mediating role in one single unit:

“Dependent Co-Arising,” which is the manifestation of seeds, consciousness and all such things relying on causal condition, is “not to arise as self-existent” (*svabhāvenāmutpāda*). And “not to arise as self-existent” is “emptiness.”... “Emptiness” is “conventional designation.”... “Emptiness”, characterized as not coming to be self-existent, is known as “the Middle Way.”<sup>112</sup>

We can find here the three-fold equation in this verse, i.e.—1) the equation of Dependent Co-Arising and emptiness, 2) the equation of emptiness and conventional designation, and 3) the equation of emptiness and the Middle Way. This three-fold equation provides a logical structure for the integration of the four-fold components into one single unit. The three-fold equation represents Candrakīrti's way of interpreting the verse. Although we cannot find this three-fold equation mentioned elsewhere, I think it is possible to draw the implications of a three-fold equation from the concept of the eight negations. My main task is to investigate how the eight negations can be interpreted as implying the three-fold equation. To do so, I will first present how Candrakīrti determines the definition of the term *pratītyasamutpāda*. I think this definition offers an etymological foundation for justifying an interpretation of the eight negations in that manner.

#### Candrakīrti's Definition of the Term *Pratītyasamutpāda*

In the *Prasannapadā* Candrakīrti gives an etymological analysis of the term *pratītyasamutpāda*. Thereby, he obtains the possibility of characterizing Dependent Co-Arising as the eight negations. When Candrakīrti gives an analysis of the etymology of the term *pratītyasamutpāda*, he divides it into two words, i.e., *pratītya* and *samutpāda*. The word *pratītya*, according to Candrakīrti, basically consists of three grammatical components, the preposition *prati*, the verbal root *i* and the suffix *ya* of an indeclinable participle. The word *samutpāda* consists of



two components, the preposition *samut* and the verbal root *pad*. Related to this, in the *Prasannapāda* Candrakīrti writes:

The verbal root “*i*” means “to go”, the preposition *prati* means “reaching.” But [grammarians share with that opinion that] the addition of a preposition alters the meaning of the root as if it were violently dragged into another place, just as the sweet waters of the Ganges change on emptying into the ocean. Therefore, in this case, the word *pratītya*, being an indeclinable participle with the suffix *ya*, means “reaching” (*prati*) or “depending” (*avapekṣa*). The word *samutpāda* means “to arise.” Thus the meaning of the term *pratītyasamutpāda* is therefore the arising of things as dependent on their causes and condition (*hetupratyayāpekṣo bhāvānām utpādaḥ*).<sup>113</sup>

Two points are worthy of mentioning in regard to this statement. First, the word *pratītya* does not mean a derivative noun (*taddhitānta*). Being an indeclinable participle (*avyayatva*) “with the suffix *ya*” (*lyabanta*), “*ya*” becomes “*tya*” because it is preceded by the root “*i*” with a single vowel. Second, the word *prati* does not mean “repetition” but “reaching.” By the contrast with Candrakīrti, his opponents like Śrīlāta have different opinions in this context. Candrakīrti says:

Others maintain the verbal root “*i*” means “to go” or “to disappear.” [Therefore], *itya* means “fit to disappear”; the preposition *prati* means “repetition” (*vīpsārtha*).<sup>114</sup> Thus they consider *pratītya* to be a derivative noun, and [the term *pratītyasamutpāda*] to be “the arising of things which disappear in the moment” (*prati prati ityānām vināśinām samutpādaḥ*).<sup>115</sup>

Candrakīrti replies to this opinion:

In the case of such passages of the Scriptures as the following one, “O monks, I will teach you the *pratītyasamutpāda*. Those who receive insight into it, will have grasped the teaching of the Buddha and his disciples,” the sense of generalization and the suggested grammatical composition of the compound word (*pratītyasamutpāda*) can be accounted for. Therefore, the above interpretation is justified. But in other passages, [for example, in the passage] “visual consciousness appears when co-ordinated with

the eye [-faculty] and colors and forms,” there is altogether no generalization. In this expression “in co-ordination with the faculty of vision” (*cakṣuḥ pratītya*)—in the case that a single, particular object is directly perceptible by “the faculty of vision” (*sākṣādāṅgikṛtārthaviśeṣe*)—the word *pratītya* can be also applied when visual consciousness arises in co-ordination with the eye [-faculty]. [By the contrast, the interpretation that we propose applies in both cases.] “The meaning of reaching applies when the word *pratītya* does not refer to a single particular case in which an object is directly perceptible by the eye [-faculty]” (*prāptyarthastvanaṅgikṛtārthaviśeṣe* ‘*pi* *pratītya saṁbhavati*). “Arising after having reaching” (*prāpya saṁbhavaḥ*) then means “Dependent Co-Arising” (*pratītyasamutpāda*). It (the meaning of reaching) also can be applied when an object perceptible directly by the eye [-faculty] is referred to (*āṅgikṛtārthaviśeṣe*), for in that case we interpret it as meaning “in co-ordination with the eye[-faculty]” (*cakṣuḥ prāpya*), “indicating reaching to the eye [-faculty]” (*cakṣuḥ prāpya*), “meaning relative to the eye [-faculty]” (*cakṣuḥ prekṣeyati*). If we take the word “*itya*” as a derivative noun derived from a verb, the above sentence “visual consciousness arises in co-ordination with eye [-faculty] and some colors and forms,” must be read with the case endings of nouns in such an irregular way as “*cakṣuḥ pratītyaṃ vijñānaṃ rūpaṇi ca*,” i.e., “visual consciousness is evanescent in regard to the eye [-faculty] and the colors and forms,” because the word *pratītya* is not an indeclinable participle, and because the compound word [*pratītyasamutpāda*] is unable to keep with the present form. This is impossible, therefore, [the word *pratītya*] must be taken as a indeclinable participle (*avyaya*) with the suffix *ya*.<sup>116</sup>

Candrakīrti’s main criticism of his opponents, as is pointed out in the above comments, is that the term *pratītya* is not a derivative noun but an indeclinable participle, and it does not have the meaning of “repetition” but the meaning of “reaching.”

Who then are Candrakīrti’s opponents? There is no information within this quotation concerning this issue, but a similar opinion is credited to Śrīlāta in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. It is assumed, therefore, that Śrīlāta was one of

authentic Abhidharma Buddhist scholars. In the same context, this criticism is immediately followed by his criticism of Bhāvaviveka.

### Candrakīrti's Criticism of Bhāvaviveka

#### Candrakīrti's Criticism of Bhāvaviveka's

#### Inability to Understand Different

#### Opinions Regarding the Term

#### *Pratītyasamutpāda*

Bhāvaviveka argues:

One party (Buddhapālita) holds that the preposition *prati* means “repetition,” the verbal root *i* means “reaching,” and the word *samutpāda* has the sense of “arising.” [Therefore, the term *pratītyasamutpāda*] is explained as meaning “to arise dependent on this and that conditions”—that is, “arising after reaching.”<sup>117</sup>

Candrakīrti reacts to this argument:

.... because that party, which interprets the word *pratītya* as indicating “reaching,” does not give to the preposition *prati* the meaning of “repetition,” nor does it give the verb *i* the meaning of “reaching,” [that party], on the contrary, explains the preposition *prati* as meaning “reaching,” and then takes the whole composite word *pratītya* as meaning “reaching.”<sup>118</sup>

Bhāvaviveka's other objection:

Another party (Śrīlāta) maintains that *pratītyasamutpāda* means “the appearance of all immediately disappearing things” (*prati prati vināśinām utpādaḥ*).<sup>119</sup>

We have already seen that Śrīlāta defined the term *pratītyasamutpāda* as “*prati prati ityānām vināśinām samutpāda*.” Here we find that the original sentence is changed slightly, but Bhāvaviveka's incompetence does not mean that he failed to correctly quote the original sentence. The point that Candrakīrti

proposes is that Bhāvaviveka lost sight of the full meaning of the sentence. This can be verified in Candrakīrti's comments:

Now, if we take the term *pratītyasamutpāda*, interpreted as being “dependent arising” or “dependent co-arising,” to apply to all possible passages having the sense of arising (*niravaśeśasaṃbhavipadārthaparāmarśa*), then it is explained as “arising after having reaching a complex of causes and conditions” (*tāṃ tāṃ hetupratyayasāmagrīṃ prātya saṃbhavaḥ*). It can be then associated with the meaning of “repetition,” but when a single thing (*viśeṣaparamārśa*) is referred to, then there is no need for applying the meaning of “repetition,” [for example,] to that sentence like “in coordination with some eye [-faculty] and colors (and forms).”<sup>120</sup>

Candrakīrti's Criticism of Bhāvaviveka's  
Naïve Argument Against Buddhapālita's  
Opinion Regarding the Term  
*Pratītyasamutpāda*

Bhāvaviveka says that [Buddhapālita's interpretation of] the sentence “visual consciousness arises when co-ordinated with the eye[-faculty] and the colors (and forms)” is wrong, because there are not two things [reaching one another.]<sup>121</sup> But Candrakīrti disagrees with this, “Because there is no argument (*yukti*), and because it is no more than a trivial objection (*pratijñā*).”<sup>122</sup> As Candrakīrti indicates, Bhāvaviveka's statement is not clear, but the point that he wishes to propose is that the proposed sentence does not make sense. He says this because we can use the word “reaching” only when there are two physical things reaching one another. Related to this, Candrakīrti assumes what Bhāvaviveka really intended. Candrakīrti says:

If his real argument is that consciousness, not being physical, cannot be reached by the physical eye, for experience teaches that

the eye [-faculty] can reach only material things, it is not right, because, in the case of the sentence “this recluse has reached the goal,” it is admitted that a thing not being physical can be reached by a physical thing.” Also Master Nāgārjuna has himself said, “if something arises after having reaching this or that, then “nothing self-existent arises” (*tattaprapya yadutpannam notpannam tatsvabhāvataḥ*). It is admitted that the word *pratītya* has the meaning of reaching (*prāpti*). The word reaching (*prāpya*) is synonymous with being dependent (*apekṣyaśabdaparyāya*). Therefore, [this] criticism (Bhāvaviveka’s argument) is not appropriate.<sup>123</sup>

Bhāvaviveka clearly rejects the meaning of reaching for the term *pratītyasamutpādā* while Candrakīrti stresses the significance of the word “reaching” in interpreting the term *pratītyasamutpādā*. It is important to note that Candrakīrti thinks that Nāgārjuna interprets the word “reaching” as being “nothing self-existent arises.” Candrakīrti never objects to “arising” itself but to “self-existent.” Rather, he maintains that “arising after having reaching this or that” is no more than “nothing self-existent arises,” i.e., non-arising.

Candrakīrti’s Criticism of Bhāvaviveka’s  
Definition on the Term  
*Pratītyasamutpāda*

Bhāvaviveka gives the term *pratītyasamutpādā* the meaning, “being dependent on this” (*idaṃpratītya*), with each part of this term referring to a different object. This is so because it reads, “when this is, that appears,” “because this has appeared, that will appear” (*asmin sati idaṃ bhavati, asyotpādad idaṃ utpadyate*).<sup>124</sup> Candrakīrti rejects this interpretation when he says, “as for the word *pratītyasamutpādā*, consisting of two words, it is not right to suppose that each refers to a different object (*pratītyasamutpādaśabdayoḥpratyekam*

*arthaviśeṣānabhidhānāt*).<sup>125</sup> If we interpret the term *pratītyasamutpāda* in this way, we might be involved in an ontological assumption, because the arising of that is presupposed by the arising of this. But Bhāvaviveka seems to be aware of this danger when he says, “*pratītyasamutpādā* is named without any regard to its being composed of two words. We can take it as a conventional expression just as the forest ornament (*araṇyetilaka*).”<sup>126</sup>

In his response to this argument, Candrakīrti says, “It is not right, since our Master admits the term to have a meaning which is harmonious with the meaning of its parts.” Indeed he says, “Whatsoever arises after having reached this and that is nothing self-existent arises (*notpannam tatsvabhāva*).”<sup>127</sup>

Candrakīrti goes on further to say:

If [Bhāvaviveka] explains the term *pratītyasamutpāda* to mean, “when this exist that exists,” as in the case that “because there is something short, there is also something long,” why then doesn’t he admit that when it depends on the short (*hrasvaṃ pratītya*), when it reaches at the short (*hrasvaṃ prāpya*), or when it is relative to it (*hrasvaṃ apekṣa*), the long comes to be? Bhāvaviveka disagrees with what he has already accepted. Thus, this argument is not right (*abhyupagamyata iti na yujyate*).<sup>128</sup>

Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka do not agree on the meaning of “reaching.”

Bhāvaviveka believes that “reaching” makes sense when one entity reaches another entity, and consequently it is contradicted with “nothing self-existent arises.” On the contrary, Candrakīrti gives a definition of *pratītyasamutpāda* referring to “arising after having reaching this and that,” and further he finds no contradiction in asserting that this phrase means “nothing self-existent arises.” The phrases “arising after having reaching this and that,” and “nothing self-

existent arises” are equally essential in Candrakīrti’s interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*. This etymological interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* underlies Candrakīrti’s doctrinal understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* as presented in his interpretation of *Kārikā* verse 24:18. That is, “arising after having reaching this and that” refers to the conventional sense of *pratītyasamutpāda* (*śūnyatā* = *prajñaptir upādāya*) while “nothing self-existent arises” represents the ultimate sense of *pratītyasamutpāda* (*pratītyasamutpāda* = *śūnyatā*).

### The Doctrinal Interpretation of the Eight Negations

#### Some Problems to Be Answered Ahead of the Doctrinal Interpretation of the Eight Negations

The Eight Negations can be read in two different ways. That is, it can be represented as eight “Noes,” or it can be represented as four sets of double negation equipped with the formula *neither–nor*. In view of the first reading, the eight negations are expressions emphasizing the significance of emptiness while, in view of the second reading, they place emphasis on the Middle Way.

Candrakīrti seems to believe that these two readings are necessary to understanding the full meaning of the Eight Negations, but he contends that the first reading invalidates the second reading, because a refutation of self-nature logically precedes the repudiation of any and all possible views contrasting with two extremes.<sup>129</sup> The priority of the first reading in relation to the second reading is reminiscent of Candrakīrti’s interpretation of *Kārikā* 24:18 where emptiness logically precedes the Middle Way.

However, as for the interpretation of the eight “Noes,” a question can be raised. The question is whether the eight “Noes,” i.e., non-arising and so on, can be reduced to “all things do not arise,” “all things do not cease,” and so on. In answer to this question, a well-known Japanese Mādhyamika scholar, Saigusa, contends that, given that Dependent Co-Arising is characterized as the eight “Noes,” Dependent Co-Arising is to be interpreted as meaning “all things do not arise,” and “all things do not cease,” etc.

According to him, expressions such as “Dependent Co-Arising does not arise,” and so on are nonsense.<sup>130</sup> In fact, Nāgārjuna himself gives us hints in favour of this position in the first verse of the *Kārikā* when he says: “Neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause, does anything (*bhāvāḥ*) whatever, anywhere arise.” In this verse, it is clear that Nāgārjuna repudiates the arising of a thing in view of the four possible types of arising. In the *Prasannapadā*, Candrakīrti also makes it clear when he says, “All existences [constituting the phenomenal world] do not arise (*anutpannā bhāvā*).”<sup>131</sup> Why then does Nāgārjuna omit the word indicating the substance of non-arising and so on? In order to properly answer this question, we need to introduce the concept of *dharma* and *dharmin*. In view of Indian realism represented by the Nyāya system, there is a clear distinction between the two. That is, *dharma* means the attribute of a thing while *dharmin* means the substance to which the attribute belongs. If we apply this concept to non-arising, then the phrase non-arising means *dharma*, where there is no *dharmin* to which *dharma* belongs.<sup>132</sup>



However, there is no evidence that Nāgārjuna, like the Indian realists, intends to distinguish between *dharma* and *dharmin*.

According to Musashi Tachikawa, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti do not distinguish *dharma* from *dharmin*. Tachikawa goes further to propose that, “This is why the eight ‘Noes’ are probably represented as they are.”<sup>133</sup> However, Nāgārjuna treats the phrase “non-arising” as a representative of the eight “Noes.” Candrakīrti comments on Nāgārjuna’s intent: “Nāgārjuna will now attempt to expound that dependent origination, which is characterized as ‘non-ceasing’ and so on. He takes up, first of all, the repudiation (*pratiṣedha*) of ‘arising’, knowing that if it is repudiated, ‘ceasing’ and the other characteristics are more readily repudiated.”<sup>134</sup> By taking non-arising as a representative of the eight “Noes,” I will demonstrate its doctrinal meaning, supporting Candrakīrti’s understanding of *Kārikā* 24:18. Candrakīrti proposes to demonstrate *sūnyatārtha* or the doctrinal meaning of *sūnyatārtha*.

### The Doctrinal Meanings of Non-Arising

#### *Niḥsvabhāva*

The first verse of the first chapter of the *Kārikā*, (“neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause, do existents (*bhāvāḥ*) whatever, anywhere arise”) is devoted to a refutation of reifying “arising” in the four types, i.e., from themselves, from another, from both, and from a non-cause. If we are to advance the existence of a thing, then it must have a self-nature, so we inevitably meet a metaphysical question, “In which ways is ‘arising’ possible?” The first

verse represents possible types of “arising” (“imputing a self-nature on arising”).

Nāgārjuna intends to show that the endeavor of imputing a self-nature to a thing is

flawed. Related to this, Candrakīrti mentions the organization of the *Kārikā*:

And so this first chapter is devoted to demonstrating that “things constituting the phenomenal world do not arise,” by repudiating the perverse imputing of a self-nature [on arising of the four types] (*viparītasvarūpādhyāropa*). The remaining chapters [of this treatise] are concerned with the repudiation of any and all reifying distinctions. They will be invalidated such that all reifying distinctions, such as “the mover,” “the point to be reached,” and “motion,” are not justified from the perspective of Dependent Co-Arising [represented as “nothing arises self-existentially”].<sup>135</sup>

Thus, Candrakīrti contends that a refutation of “arising” is to be taken as a central

theme for the sake of negating the concept of a self-nature. However, Candrakīrti

and Bhāvaviveka do not agree over the logical method for repudiating “arising.”

I will illustrate the main point of Candrakīrti’s criticism of Bhāvaviveka’s argument.

The point of Bhāvaviveka’s argument is, in order to achieve the strongest kind of negation (*prasajya pratiṣedha*), an argument is obliged to establish a proposition, reason and example. Otherwise, the opponent’s logical errors are not removed. A counter-thesis will emerge by implication (“things arise from another”), in contrast with “what we intend by ‘the denial expressed’ (*kṛtāntavirodha*),” or “things do not arise self-existentially.”<sup>136</sup> To prevent the denial expressed from this implication, Bhāvaviveka holds that an independent reasoning consisting of a proposition, a reason and an example.

In a response to this position, Candrakīrti argues that the expression, “things do not arise from themselves,” represents the *prasaṅga* reasoning which is devoted to unveiling an absurdity in the opponent’s argument. By this method, Candrakīrti intends to detect an absurdity in Sāṅkhya’s argument (“things arise from themselves”). That is, Sāṅkhya’s argument implies that an already existing thing is once more produced, and consequently it ends up with an infinite series of self-productions. Because it runs against the opponent’s own intention, his argument falls into self-contradiction.<sup>137</sup>

Bhāvaviveka has raised an objection that, if we maintain that “things do not at all arise from themselves,” it will follow that “they arise from another [by implication].” To this Candrakīrti replies, “No, it will not follow, since once a simple negation (*prasajya pratiṣeda*) is expressed, [then,] ‘things arise from another’ will likewise be denied.”<sup>138</sup>

Grammatically, the term *prasajya pratiṣeda* means “verbally bound negative”, while the term *paryudasa* means “nominally bound negative.”<sup>139</sup> As for the expression “things do not arise from themselves,” it can be said that it does not mean a denial of the nominal phrase “from themselves,” but rather it means a denial of the verb “arise.”

Candrakīrti clearly indicates that *prasaṅga* reasoning itself is the strongest kind of negation (or *prasajya-pratiṣeda*) without an independent argument, as proposed by Bhāvaviveka. But, Candrakīrti holds that “Bhāvaviveka indeed betrays a certain basis for independent reasoning (*svatantra anumāṇa*). He would

like an independent reasoning to be introduced at the wrong place.”<sup>140</sup>

Candrakīrti goes on to say that, “From the Mādhyamika’s perspective (*Mādhyamikasya*), no independent argument succeeds in establishing its own thesis, without admitting a contra-thesis.”<sup>141</sup>

Thus, according to Candrakīrti, the *prasaṅga* reasoning never establish a thesis. In this context, he quotes from Aryadeva’s *Catuhśataka* 16:25 and Nāgārjuna’s *Vigrahvyavartanī*, verses 29, 30 saying<sup>142</sup>:

“If one makes no claim that something is (*sat*), or is not (*asat*), or is not both, it will take a long time to refute him” (the *Catuhśataka* 16: 25).<sup>143</sup>

If I were to advance any thesis whatsoever, that in itself would be a fault; but I advance no thesis and so cannot be faulted.

If I cognized any object through perception and so on,<sup>144</sup> I would affirm or deny its existence; but as I do not do this I am not culpable. (the *Vigrahvyavartanī*, Verse 29, 30)

The point here is that, if we had an independent argument, we would commit the falsity of imputing a self-nature to it in order to negate a self-nature. But since the *prasaṅga* reasoning, showing the inner contradiction of an opponent’s argument, has no thesis, it can be free from a self-nature. In this regard, an opponent (Abhidharmikas) raises a question in the *Vigrahvyavartanī* (Verse 1) that, “If an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) to things (*bhāva*), whatever they may be, exists nowhere (*sarvatra na vidyate*), your [very] statement must be devoid of an intrinsic nature (*asvabhāva*).”<sup>145</sup> The opponent’s argument is based upon the belief that “a statement that does not exist cannot deny the intrinsic nature of all things.”<sup>146</sup> To reply, Nāgārjuna first restates his position that “all things are empty,” he then proceeds to

his opponent's objections from various angles. Of them, one of the most representative is stated in the *Vigrahvyavartanī* (Verse 63), "I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated."<sup>147</sup>

I have discussed that a refutation of the first type, "things do not arise from themselves" is taken to mean the *prasaṅga* reasoning interpreted by Candrakīrti. This indicates that all things are devoid of a self-nature without imputing a self-nature to one's own statement. Thus, I have shown that "non-arising," taken as representative in the expression "things do not arise from themselves," serves to demonstrate that all things are devoid of a self-nature.

#### Conventional Designation

In the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna intends to negate the inherent existence of things by using the term *śūnyatā*, while he uses the word *prajñaptirupādāya* to admit the existence of things in a conventional sense. Candrakīrti brings a simile to elaborate the relationship between *śūnyatā* and *prajñaptirupādāya*: "A vehicle is referred to as a vehicle in virtue of the assemblage of its parts. Whatever presupposes its own components, does not come to be inherently existent. It is *śūnyatā*."<sup>148</sup> This clearly shows that *śūnyatā* and *prajñaptirupādāya* are not two separate entities but two different perspectives. These two concepts respectively represent the doctrinal meaning of the words "non-arising" and "arising."

Chapter 1 of the *Kārikā* is devoted to verifying non-arising in the light of *niḥsvbhāva*, but Chapter 7 offers significant hints for understanding the counterpart of non-arising, i.e., conventional designation, while remaining

centered on a *niḥsvabhāvic* understanding of “non-arising.” Nāgārjuna takes this perspective to explain that non-arising does not mean “non-Being,” as opposed to “Being.” Nāgārjuna intends to prevent non-arising from being interpreted as “non-Being,” as when he says in the last verse of Chapter 7: “As an illusion (*māyā*), a dream (*svapna*), like a city of Gandharvas, so has arising, abiding, and ceasing been explained.” It is important here to note that “arising,” etc. are likened not to “non-Being” but to “illusion” and so on. Candrakīrti commenting upon this verse says:

The words “an illusion” and so on are devoid of a self-nature, i.e., “they do not really exist.” Nevertheless, what is said to be “an illusion” and so on, i.e., what is perceived to be “an illusion and so on,” is their existence in a conventional sense. Likewise, these words “arising” and so on are not inherently existent. They are nothing more than the mode which ordinary men perceive (*lokaprasiddhamātra*), on the basis of which the Buddha wishes to give ordinary men a benefit of salvation.<sup>149</sup>

Thus the relationship between non-arising and arising can be reduced to that between *śūnyatā* and *prajñaptir upādāya* as stated in *Kārikā* 24:18. As we have seen before, *śūnyatā* characterized as *niḥsvabhāva*, serves to endow *prajñaptir upādāya* with logical justification. That is, since the former is appropriate, so the latter is appropriate. Likewise, non-arising negates the inherent existence of arising, but it admits the existence of arising in the conventional sense. Thus, it can be assumed that for Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti logical relation between non-arising and arising is paired with that between *śūnyatā* and *prajñaptir upādāya*.

### Non-Arising as the Logical Foundation of the Middle Way

The doctrine of the Middle Way was highly esteemed by almost all the schools of Buddhism. Traditionally, it was interpreted as speaking of the detachment of the two extremes. The Middle Way can be enunciated from two perspectives, philosophical and practical. Philosophically, it means “detaching oneself from the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism,” while ethically, it is represented as “detaching oneself from the two extremes of self-indulgence (*kāmasukballikāmyoga*) and self-modification (*attakilamathānyoga*).<sup>150</sup> Traditionally, the Eight Noble Truths are expounded as referring to the practical Middle Way, however, Nāgārjuna tends to emphasize the more philosophical aspect of the Middle Way by representing it as the four sets of double negations.

We can find the idea of the Middle Way in the early Buddhist scriptures, where it is often connected with the doctrine of Dependent Co-Arising, but it has not yet developed to the extent that it is associated with the latter in a logical relation. It is Nāgārjuna that has endeavored to demonstrate the logical relation between the two. Related to this, in the *Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna says, “Whatever comes into being dependent on another is not identical to that thing, nor is it different from it. Therefore, it is neither nonexistence in time nor permanent” (18:10).

Nāgārjuna interprets Dependent Co-Arising as emptiness, and then he intends to demonstrate the logical relationship between emptiness and the Middle

Way. Nāgārjuna clearly shows that a self-nature is the main cause of two extremes when he says in *Kārikā* 15:11:

If it is maintained that “that which exists by its own essence (*svabhāva*) cannot be nonexistent,” then the error of eternalism would logically follow. If it maintained that “that which existed before does not exist now, then the error of nihilism would logically follow.

Contrary to this, Nāgārjuna believes that emptiness serves to justify relinquishing these two extremes in logical sequence, as stated by the following verses.

If all this is empty, then there is no arising or ceasing. By the relinquishing or ceasing of what does one wish *nirvāṇa* to arise? (25: 1)

Since all existents are empty, what is finite or infinite? What is finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite? (25: 22)

So, because all existents are empty, which views of permanence, etc. (i.e., permanence and impermanence) would occur, and to whom, when, why, and about what would they occur at all? (27: 29)

Thus, the Middle Way of relinquishing the two extremes is presupposed by emptiness.<sup>151</sup> Likewise, non-arising without a self-nature logically leads to non-ceasing. Consequently, the Middle Way is established as an expression “neither ceasing nor arising.” In this regard, Nāgārjuna states in *Kārikā* 17:21, “Action does not arise; it is seen to be without essence. Because it is not arisen, it follows that it is non-ceasing.”

Therefore, we have examined the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā* which is implied in the doctrinal equalization between the *pratītyasamutpāda*, *śūnyatā*, *prajñaptir upādya*, and the Middle Way as is indicated in *Kārikā* 24:18, based upon



Candrakīrti's interpretation on it. I have argued that "*śūnyatā* characterized as *niḥsvbhāva*" functions as a central concept for formulating these doctrines into one single unit. As part of such an attempt, Candrakīrti shows that the meaning of the Eight "Noes," i.e., non-ceasing, non-arising, non-permanence, non-annihilation, non-coming, non-going, non-distinction, and non-identity are identical with the internal absence of arising.

Thus the Eight "Noes" formulate the primary meaning of the Eight Negations, while the double negations described as "neither ceasing nor arising," "neither non-permanence nor non-annihilation," etc. refer to the secondary meaning. In other words, the *pratīyasamtpāda* as characterized in the Dedicatory Verse of the *Kārikā* is identical with the primary meaning of the Eight Negations, i.e., the eight "Noes," while the Middle Path—resulting from *śūnyatā* in logical sequence—is identical with the secondary meaning of the Eight Negations.

Our attempt in this chapter, of course, lies not in justifying Candrakīrti's reading of *Kārikā* 24:18, but in showing that Candrakīrti argues that Nāgārjuna was conscious of the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā* when he attempted to separate the term *śūnyatārtha* from the other two terms, *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprayojana*.

## CHAPTER 5

### ŚŪNYATĀ

#### Preliminary Remarks

Nāgārjuna intends to express the ultimate truth by the term *śūnyatā* by separating it from *śūnyatāprayojana* and *śūnyatārtha*. Some expressions associated with the ultimate truth are scattered in some parts of the *Kārikā*, but what we receive in these parts is nothing but some pieces of partial knowledge. However, Nāgārjuna's Two Truths offer an important clue to the interpretation of the ultimate truth. If we really understand the Two Truths, we can unveil what Nāgārjuna intended by *śūnyatā*.

Mādhyamika scholarship concerning the Two Truths has chiefly centered on examining the nature of division, the basis of division, and the relationship between the ultimate truth and the conventional truth. Some characterize the nature of division with the words "contradiction," "paradox," "irony," and so on; multiple voices have been pronounced by modern Buddhist scholars, as well as by ancient Buddhists, in an endeavor to illustrate the basis of division, but I will examine a different way by which to rethink the religious meaning of the Two Truths.<sup>152</sup> I understand that the Two Truths are one manner of expressing the two important forces in Mahāyāna Buddhism, i.e., Wisdom and Compassion.<sup>153</sup>

In terms of Wisdom, the Two Truths are characterized by a centrifugal relation, where the Two Truths mean distinctly different isolates. In other words, the ultimate truth is expressed in ideas such as “the conventional truth does not exist in the ultimate truth,” “what language expresses is nonexistent,” or “no dharma was taught by the Buddha,” and so on.<sup>154</sup> From this, it is not hard to recognize that the ultimate truth is incompatible with the conventional truth. In relation to this, Candrakīrti says:

The truth for a personal, everyday world (*lokasaṃvṛtyā satya*) is personal, everyday truth (*lokasaṃvṛtisatya*). The exhaustive totality of words and transactions which are based on the distinction between knowing and the thing known, naming and the thing named and so on, is what is meant by the truth of the everyday personal world. Such a world could not exist in the ultimate meaning (*paramāṛthārtha*).<sup>155</sup>

However, in terms of Compassion, the ultimate truth is compatible with the conventional truth. The Buddha, in his Compassion, descends into the conventional truth in order to lead ordinary people to the ultimate truth. The Buddha’s descent from the ultimate truth is directed toward the ascent of ordinary people to the ultimate truth. Here the worldly convention, language and teaching are required as the basis for descending and ascending, but the relationship between ultimate truth and conventional truth/language/teaching is presented differently in terms of descending and ascending. In other words, in descending, the ultimate truth is characterized by “the truth of the conventional truth,” “the truth-in-teaching,” “silence-in-language,” while in ascending it is represented by “the goal of worldly convention,” “teaching-for-the truth,” and “language-for-silence.”

Related to the structure of these contrasting expressions of Wisdom and Compassion, some scholars come to incorrect conclusions on the relationship between Wisdom and Compassion as “a paradox.” Guy Newland ascribes this assertion to Edward Conze, citing Conze’s statement: “A Bodhisattva is a being compounded of the two contradictory forces of Wisdom and Compassion [caps mine]. In his Wisdom, he sees no person; in his Compassion he is resolved to save them.”<sup>156</sup> Newland goes on to say that, “Western scholarship on Mādhyamika has changed in many ways in the years since Conze made this statement, but the majority of scholars still agree that, as David Eckel writes, ‘the element of paradox is essential’.”<sup>157</sup>

What is then the basis of this position? Needless to say, those who are in favor of it only examine the contradictory expressions of Wisdom and Compassion, while ignoring that the contradictory expressions are headed toward two different soteriological perspectives on Wisdom and Compassion. In relation to this, the Two Truths will provide an important clue for understanding the reciprocal relationship between Wisdom and Compassion, just as an investigation of Wisdom and Compassion aids in understanding the Two Truths.

My task here is to investigate the enterprise of the Two Truths not only in terms of Wisdom and Compassion, but also in terms of descending and ascending aspects of Compassion.

## An Investigation of the Two Truths in Terms of Wisdom

### The Ultimate Truth Expressed by Verbal Quiescence

The ultimate truth is expressed by the word “inexpressible,” but there is no way of expressing it except conventionally, since all expression is conventional. In *Kārikā* 18:7 Nāgārjuna conventionally expresses the ultimate truth or the inexpressible: “When the object of cognition (*cittagocara*) has ceased, that which is to be expressed (*abhidhātavyam*) has also ceased. Unborn and undying, like *nirvāṇa* is the nature of things.”<sup>158</sup> Also, it is stated in *Kārikā* 25:24: “The pacification of all objectification and the pacification of illusion; no *dharma* or the truth was taught by the Buddha at any time, in any place, to any person.”<sup>159</sup> Here we cannot find any conceptual expressions, except Nāgārjuna’s stressing of the “inexpressibility” of the ultimate truth. In *Kārikā* 18:9, however, Nāgārjuna explains this inexpressibility in terms of concepts.<sup>160</sup> It reads: “Not dependent on another (*aparapratyaya*), peaceful (*śānta*), and not designated by the designative function of language (*prapañcairaprapaṇcita*), beyond thought construction (*nirvikalpa*), without distinctions (*anānārtha*), that is the character of ‘thatness’ (*tattvalakṣaṇa*).” These conceptual explanations offer one aspect of Nāgārjuna’s view of the ultimate truth. I will focus on interpreting the meaning of each phrase of this verse, following Candrakīrti’s comments.

#### 1) “Not Dependent on Another”

Candrakīrti comments: “‘Not dependent on another’ means ‘not dependent on another in the ultimate truth’ (*nāsmiṃ parapratyayo ‘sti*).<sup>161</sup> That is, it means

‘not to be attained by the instruction of another’, but ‘to be realized for oneself’ (*svayam*).”<sup>162</sup> To illustrate this meaning in detail, Candrakīrti uses parables:

Because those with an optical defect see the substance (*rūpa*) of illusory hairs, gnats, bees which do not exist, even though instructed by those of sound vision, they are incapable of realizing the true nature as it is (*yathāvad avasthitam svarūpa*), or to be seen by the way of not-seeing (*adarśananyāyenādhigantavya*), as those of sound vision do. Rather they understand theoretically, from the instruction of those with sound vision, that “such things are optical illusions (*mithyā*).” When, however, those suffering from the defect become people with the eye of Wisdom, arisen from the “Wisdom of the way things truly are” (*tattvajñāna*), cured by the balm of “seeing with the absence of inversion that such things are emptiness” (*aviparītaśūnyatādharśana*), then they realize directly and for themselves that “the way things really are” (*tattva*) is “not to be attained” (*anadhigamana*). Thus the true nature of things (*sva-rūpa*) not being dependent upon one another [in a substantial sense], is the way things really are (*tattva*).<sup>163</sup>

Candrakīrti here uses the term *sva-rūpa*, but it is not identical with the concept of a self-nature, which became the target of Nāgārjuna’s criticism. Rather, Candrakīrti employs this term in order to identify it with *tattva*, meaning “the way things really are,” which can be realized from being free from the concept of a self-nature. What Candrakīrti really intends by using the term *sva-rūpa* is that not only is the ultimate truth the absence of an entity immanent or behind the conventional world (hairs and so on), but also it is to be realized directly and for oneself without depending upon another. Here the phrase “not dependent on another” is central to understanding the following words of *Kārikā* 25:24 that, “No *dharma* or the ultimate truth was taught by the Buddha at any time, in any place, to any person.” That is, these words imply that the ultimate truth can never be transmitted from person to person, rather it can only be realized directly and by

oneself. If the ultimate truth were something transmittable by one to another, it would have a self-nature. However, Nāgārjuna believes that the concept of self-nature comes from a conceptual construction.

## 2) Śānta or “At Peace”

The term *śānta* literally means “peaceful.”<sup>164</sup> Here Nāgārjuna uses the term as one manner of expressing the character of the ultimate truth, but in other places it is used as a predicate for the subject, for example, *śānta svabhāva*, or “the pacification of a self-nature,” *śāntautpatti*, “the pacification of arising” (*Kārikā* 7:16). In his comment on this word Candrakīrti interprets it as the emptiness of any self-nature or states.<sup>165</sup>

Elsewhere Nāgārjuna, intending the same meaning, uses some other terms, for example, *upaśama* (5:8), *prapañca upaśama* (the opening verse; 25:24), and *upalambha upaśama* (25:24). ”

## 3) “Not Designated by the Referential Function of Language”

This expression is not merely to duplicate the term *śānta*. Here Nāgārjuna warns of an attempt to conceptualize the pacification of the extending function of language, lest metaphysicians think that a language can designate something of its own self-nature. Candrakīrti interprets thus:

Verily, *prapañānca* means language. [That is,] *Prapañca* means ‘to explicate (*prapañcaya*) [the signified] by signifying (*kṛtvā*) the signified (*arthān*).’ Therefore, “not designated by the designative function of language” means “inexpressible by language” (*vāgbhir avyāhṛta*).<sup>166</sup>

Related to this are Nāgārjuna's words used in the exact same context: "Empty should not be asserted. Nonempty should not be asserted. Neither one nor both should be asserted. They are only used nominally." (22:11)

#### 4) "Beyond Thought Construction"

Throughout the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna uses the terms *vikalpa*, *nirvikalpa*, and *kalpanā* meaning the imaginative activity of mind. Nāgārjuna sees "a calming of the imaginative activity of mind" as one aspect of the character of the ultimate truth. In commenting upon this phrase Candrakīrti says:

It (the ultimate truth) is also beyond thought construction (*nirvikalpa*). Thought construction is the imaginative activity of mind (*cittapracāra*). Because the way things really are (*tattva*) is free of the activity of mind, it is beyond thought construction. As the *sūtra* says [in the answer to this question]: "What is the ultimate truth (*paramārtha satya*)?": "Where there is not even knowledge (*jñāna*), [i.e.—in the ultimate truth], how could there be any utterance of words (*akṣara*)?" Thus it (the ultimate truth) is beyond thought construction.<sup>167</sup>

Conceptual construction is one of the chief functions of reason, however, Nāgārjuna never destroy reason itself. Without having recourse to reason, his dialectic cannot be established. Reason has two different functions: one is reasoning based on conceptual construction, the other is reasoning based on emptiness. To borrow Nagao's words, the former is "truly reasoned understanding," while the latter is "knowledge based on criteria." Nagao writes:

Truly reasoned understanding is an intelligent examination (*yonisōvicāra*) of questions of being and non-being, arising and non-arising, relative to the things that constitute the content (*artha*) of that reasoning. Beings are not able to stand up under the weight of such an examination by true reasoning, [and] unable to maintain their essences, are revealed to be without essence and empty. In



contrast, “knowledge based on criteria” is the affirmation of being to conventional things.<sup>168</sup>

It is important to note that reason has two different functional aspects: one is reasoning based on conceptual construction, the other is reasoning based on emptiness. Nāgārjuna describes one aspect of the character of the ultimate truth as the negation of arising based on conceptual construction.

#### 5) “Without Distinctions”

Nāgārjuna never intends to express by these words that the ultimate truth is monism. Rather he considers it “to be free from ontological distinctions among all things.” As implied in Candrakīrti’s comment on the phrase, Nāgārjuna does not deny distinction, but warns that distinctions really exist.<sup>169</sup> However, Nāgārjuna’s expression, “without distinctions,” does not mean that non-distinction exists. What Nāgārjuna intends by the expression “without distinctions” is that the ultimate truth is neither that distinctions exist nor that non-distinctions exist. In his comment on this phrase, Candrakīrti understands the phrase, “without distinctions,” as the undifferentiate character of the ultimate truth.<sup>170</sup> He likens this character to “one taste” (*ekarasa*) which, according to him, is nothing more than *śūnyatā* or the “emptiness” of all things.<sup>171</sup>

### The Criticism of the Substantial View of the Ultimate Truth

#### The Criticism of the Substantial View of *Tathāgata*

*Tathāgata* is one way of speaking of the Buddha who has attained the ultimate truth. In so far as *Tathāgata*, “or the Buddha,” is a human, it cannot be

conceived separately from a personal existence, however, this does not mean that it presupposes an assumption of a self-nature.

According to the Buddhist tradition, a human consists of the five aggregates, i.e., material form, feeling, perception, disposition, and consciousness. In the first verse of Chapter 22, named “Examination of the Tathāgata,” Nāgārjuna declares that the concept of *tathāgata* can be nowhere found as a self-nature in relationship with the five aggregates: “Neither the aggregates, nor different from the aggregates, the aggregates are not in him, nor is he in the aggregates. The *Tathāgata* does not possess the aggregates.” Thus, Nāgārjuna criticizes the imputation of the concept of a self-nature to *Tathāgata*. Nāgārjuna here attempts to criticize a substantial view of *Tathāgata* by using logical arguments. The main points of his arguments are summarized below.

Nāgārjuna’s first argument begins with the following issue: If the Buddha existed as a self-nature, he would exist through “himself.” However, if the Buddha depends on another, it cannot be said that he exists through himself. The reason for this is that here “another” means an other-nature existent separately from itself. Hence, Nāgārjuna says, “If the Buddha depends on the aggregates, he would not exist through a self-nature?” (*Kārikā* 22:2) Nāgārjuna believes that the concept of a self-nature requires an other-nature as its counterpart in the conceptual construction. From this, he says that, “If there is no self-nature, how could there be an other-nature?” (22:4)

If that is the case, a metaphysical question might be, “Is it possible that the Buddha pre-exists in a state prior to his depending on the aggregates?” Being aware of this problem, Nāgārjuna says that, “If without depending upon the aggregates there were a *Tathāgata*, then he would be depending on them now. Therefore, he would exist through dependence.” (22:5) In his comment Candrakīrti adds a parable before this verse, as follows: “As Devadatta, who was pre-existent (*pūrvasiddha*), wholly separate from his wealth, takes possession of it as his own, so if without depending on the aggregates there were a *Tathāgata*, then now he would be depending on them.”<sup>172</sup> Thus we cannot consider a *Tathāgata* separate from dependence.

But there still remains a possible metaphysical question that a *Tathāgata* might be dependence itself. In the answer to this question, Nāgārjuna says, “Whatever dependence there is does not exist through a self-nature. And when something does not exist through itself, it can never exist through an other-nature.” (22:9) As far as this verse is concerned, Candrakīrti fails to give a clear explanation and only reiterates Nāgārjuna’s words. However, Nāgārjuna says in *Kārikā* 22:10, “ ‘The depending (*upādāna*)’ and ‘the one depended upon’ (*upādātṛ*) together are empty in every respect. How can an empty *Tathāgata* be known through the empty?” It is assumed that Nāgārjuna comes to this conclusion by applying the law of contradiction to the relationship between depending and the one depended upon. I believe that the reason why Nāgārjuna omitted this preliminary stage to make the conclusion is that he did not wish to

duplicate it because he has already applied this logic in other places. For example, in Chapter 8, in examining a relationship between action (*karma*) and the actor (*kāraka*), he uses this law to illustrate that we cannot find a self-nature in action or actor.

We have investigated Nāgārjuna's criticism of the substantial view of *Tathāgata*. However, the substantial view of *Tathāgata* causes two extreme views: *Tathāgata* "exists" after death and "does not exist" after his death. Related to this, in 22:13, Nāgārjuna says that, "One who grasps the view that a *Tathāgata* exists or does not exist, would think similarly even of one who has ceased (*nirvṛtasya*)." The answer to this question is simple, "Since he is by nature empty, the thought that the Buddha exists or does not exist after *nirvāṇa* is not appropriate." (22:14) However, if there is a devoted metaphysician, he would not neglect to raise the question of whether *nirvāṇa* exists or does not exist. Nāgārjuna deals with this matter in Chapter 25 in detail. I will now investigate the manner in which Nāgārjuna treats it.

#### The Criticism of the Substantial View of *Nirvāṇa*

*Nirvāṇa* is one manner of expressing the ultimate truth. For the devoted Buddhist *nirvāṇa*, as the final goal, is considered a practical matter, but for those concerned with ontology, there is no doubt that this matter poses issues for ontological debate. We cannot think of the concept of *nirvāṇa* without drawing from it the concept of relinquishing (*prahāṇa*) or ceasing (*nirodha*). From this,

metaphysicians would attribute the self-nature of *nirvāṇa* to the concept of relinquishing or ceasing.

Nāgārjuna's first argument begins with this matter. Nāgārjuna argues, in the *Kārikā* 25:1, "If all this is empty, then there is no arising or passing away. By the relinquishing or ceasing of what does one wish *nirvāṇa* to arise?" Next, Nāgārjuna refutes the enterprise of seeking the self-nature of *nirvāṇa* from the concepts of existence, nonexistence, or the combination of the two. If *nirvāṇa* is existent, Nāgārjuna argues, problems arise. These are: it must assume the characteristics of old age and death; it would be conditioned; and it would exist through dependence on the five aggregates. These consequences bother the metaphysicians who believe that *nirvāṇa* is a something else.

If *nirvāṇa* is nonexistent, Nāgārjuna argues, it would also exist through dependence, since no nonexistence can be nondependent. Further, he argues, if it is the combination of existence and nonexistence, it would raise the following problem. If that is the case, it would not be nondependent and would also trouble the metaphysicians because it would be conditioned.

Finally, the metaphysicians might think that *nirvāṇa* is neither existence nor nonexistence. In the answer to this question, Nāgārjuna argues, in the *Kārikā* 25:15, that, "The proposition that *nirvāṇa* is neither existence nor nonexistence could be established if and when both existence and nonexistence are established."

## An Investigation of the Two Truths in Terms of Compassion

The Buddha's teachings come from "his awareness of the ultimate truth (*tattva*)," but it cannot be transmitted directly to ordinary people. That is why he descends to the level of worldly convention, ordinary language. As explained before, the Two Truths are differentiated from each other in terms of Wisdom. In contrast, the ultimate truth is compatible with the conventional truth in terms of Compassion.

My purpose here is to investigate how the ultimate truth is compatible with the conventional truth from both the aspects of descent and ascent. Of course, Nāgārjuna never explicates the system of descending and ascending in the *Kārikā*, but it is not impossible to determine his intention on this issue through the text. The following three verses are all places where Nāgārjuna directly mentions the Two Truths in the *Kārikā*, but these three verses provide us with some significant clues for understanding the descending and ascending systems implied in the Two Truths. They read:

The Buddha's teaching of the *dharma* is based on the Two Truths: the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. (24:8)

Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these Two Truths do not understand the profound truth in the Buddha's teaching (*buddham dharmadeśana*). (24:9)

Without a foundation in the conventional [truth], the ultimate [truth] cannot be taught. Without realizing (*anāgamyā*) the ultimate [truth], *nirvāṇa* is not achieved (*nādhigamyate*). (24:10)

The first verse shows that the Two Truths are separate from each other, this division is the basis of the Buddha's teaching. In the second verse, Nāgārjuna

focuses on pointing out the relationship between ultimate truth and teaching.

Related to this, it is worthwhile to mention Nagao's words:

In point of fact, the Buddha did articulate a doctrine. He did venture to bring the inconceivable and ineffable ultimate realm to speech, and thus to establish worldly convention from an awareness of essence-free emptiness. His teaching represents the development of a verbal and reasoned doctrine (*dharma-deśana*), and the structure of the Two Truths [caps mine] builds on this articulation to present the logical form of the single, all-encompassing world.<sup>173</sup>

In the last verse, Nāgārjuna implies that the ultimate truth can be taught on the basis of conventional truth, that the conventional truth serves as the ascendant expediency for the ultimate truth. In other words, this verse indicates how ordinary people ascend to the ultimate truth.

My task here is to investigate the meaning of *śūnyatā* as the ultimate truth. To do so, it is required to understand the relationship between ultimate truth teaching and conventional truth.

### The Relationship between Ultimate Truth and Teaching

#### Teaching as the Manifestation of the Ultimate Truth

Throughout the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna discriminates between the words *tattva*, or “what things really are” and *buddhaśāsana* (or “the Buddha’s teaching”).

Related to this, in 15:6, Nāgārjuna says, “Those who see essence and essential difference and entities and nonentities, they do not see ‘the way things really are’ or the ultimate truth (*tattva*) in the Buddha’s teaching (*buddhaśāsana*).” Also in *Kārikā* 24:9, he says, “Those who do not understand this distinction drawn

between these two truths do not understand ‘the way things really are’ (*tattva*) or the ultimate truth in the Buddha’s teaching (*buddhaśāsana*).”

The ultimate truth is not compatible with teaching in terms of Wisdom, however, it re-engages teaching in terms of Compassion. The Buddha’s teaching is imbued with the ultimate truth of his Compassion. Related to this, citing from a passage from a *Sūtra*, Candrakīrti says:

A musical instrument makes sound—even subtle sound—by the wind, but there cannot be found the subject of the sound. Likewise, the Buddha’s words uttered (*īrita*) on the ground that they are free from a conceptual construction (*kalpanā*), are headed toward the desire (*āśā*) of all beings. [For example], just as the sound of words, like “desire,” and so on are established neither inside nor outside, so the words of the king (*narendra*) [or the Buddha] are established neither inside nor outside.<sup>174</sup>

Candrakīrti here clearly points out that the Buddha’s words are a full expression of ultimate truth itself because they are already free from a conceptual construction. Bernard Faure’s words are worthwhile to recall here:

If everything is a manifestation of Suchness (*tathatā*), if every being, sentient and nonsentient, possesses a Buddha nature, then any speech or writing is liable to express ultimate reality... Mazu Daoyi’s famous dictum, “The ordinary mind is the Dao,” might be taken to imply that even words uttered in a deluded frame of mind have ontological nobility.<sup>175</sup>

Although Faure’s words seem to be more cataphatic than the Madhyamikas’s language, nonetheless, these words illustrate that all expression of language is a manifestation of the ultimate truth in terms of descent. It is to be noted that there is not here any assumption of the existence of an absolute being. In relation to this, Nagao says, “Re-engagement in the world is not the unilinear descent of an absolute and transcendent self into the world, but the coming to be (a turning



toward us) of the other power, of the totally non-self—as suchness—without the slightest trace of continuity.”<sup>176</sup>

According to Frederick Streng, the mode of this religious apprehension is characterized as “dialectical,” contrasting it with mythical and intuitive modes which require a Reality in terms of the relationship between religious awakening and its verbal expressions. It is enough to note that Streng is aware that *śūnyatā* is distinguished from mystical and intuitive modes of religious apprehension in the sense that there is no metaphysical assumption in *śūnyatā*, but I do not agree that *śūnyatā* can be characterized as a dialectical mode. Of course, we can never ignore the significance of a dialectical aspect in *śūnyatā*, but it is only one of its various aspects. In other words, we cannot explain the relationship between the ultimate truth and language/teaching in terms of dialectic.

As we have seen before, we have investigated the relationship between the ultimate truth and teaching/language. My task, here, is to investigate the relationship between the ultimate truth and teaching in terms of descent. I have explained that teaching is “a manifestation of the ultimate truth” in which language is not seen as an imperfect tool but as a full expression of the ultimate truth itself, nevertheless, it is not used to refer to the ultimate truth (i.e., Reality).

#### Teaching as the Means of Entering the Ultimate Truth

The Buddha’s teaching has two different aspects. In descending the teaching is considered the manifestation of the ultimate truth. In ascending it

becomes a pedagogical means by which ultimate truth is achieved. Candrakīrti refers to the pedagogical character of the Buddha's teaching:

All the teachings taught by the world's patrons Buddhas, are designed as a means for "entering the immortal truth" (*tattvāmṛtāvātara*). Verily, all the *Tathagatas* never pronounce any word (*vākya*) if it is not useful for a pedagogical means. Because they wish to give benefits for the ordinary people, just as a medicine is properly prescribed to patients [by a doctor], they preach proper teachings to [the ordinary people].<sup>177</sup>

As the word "medicine" indicates, the Buddha's teaching is aimed to cure the disease of the ordinary people. For Nāgārjuna the disease is language or a referential function of language. Nāgārjuna seems to believe that all language is not possessed of an intrinsic nature, but the ordinary people are entrenched with the belief that language refers to objects. Nāgārjuna sees the possibility of both poison and remedy in this same language. In other words, in so far as language is used in order to refer to objects it is a poison, but it functions as a remedy for it. Throughout the *Kārikā* and the *Vigrahavyavartanī*, Nāgārjuna illustrates the function of language as a remedy:

Just as the teacher, by magic, makes a magical illusion, and by that illusion (*nirmitaka*) another illusion is created.

In that way are an agent and his action. That is to say, the agent is like the illusion; the action is like the illusion's illusion. (*Kārikā*, 17:31, 32)

Suppose that an artificial man should prevent other artificial things occupied with something (*kaśmimścid arthe vartamānam*), or that a magician created by a magician (*māyākāreṇa sṛṣṭaḥ*) should prevent something. There, the artificial man who is prevented is void, and he (the artificial man) who prevents is also void; the magician who is prevented is void, and he (the magician) who prevents is also void. (*Vigrahavyavartanī*, 2:23)<sup>178</sup>

These verses show clearly that Nāgārjuna, in terms of ascent, stresses the expedient aspect of language where language is likened to illusion. But, the Buddha's use of ordinary language is always adapted to those who are to be guided, in accordance with their capacity for Enlightenment. That is to say, because the Buddha's words are already purified from a conceptual construction, they can freely use words in order to lead ordinary people to Enlightenment. This character of the Buddha's words is depicted nicely in *Kārikā* 18:8 when Nāgārjuna says, "Every thing is real (*tathya*) and is not real, both real and not real." Candrakīrti cites the following passages from a *sūtra* in his commentary:

As the Buddha said: "The world fights with me, but I do not fight with it. What is accepted by the world is accepted by me. What is not accepted by the world is not accepted by me."<sup>179</sup>

Next, Candrakīrti gives a detailed commentary on each phrase of this verse. It can be summarized as follows: First, there are those who have aroused the desire to learn about (*śravaṇa*) distinguishing the substance (*svarūpa*) from the various elements (*bheda*) consisting of the meaning of words. For them, the Buddha taught that the aggregates (*skandha*) of personal existence, the senses and their objects (*āyatana*), and the types of consciousness (*dhātu*) are real. Second, the Buddha taught that "everything is not real" to those who had realized the omniscience of the Buddha. Third, because for the unenlightened everything in the world is real, for the enlightened it is not real, the Buddha taught that "Everything in the world is both real and not real." Fourth, for those who still possessed obstructions after they have practiced seeing "the way things really are," it is said that, "Everything is neither real nor not real."<sup>180</sup>

For his closing comment on each phrase of this verse, Candrakīrti says:  
“This is the teaching of the illustrious Buddha. It leads men from byways and establishes them on the right way. In the interests of gradual instruction and adapting to those who are to be led, the teaching is flexible.”<sup>181</sup>

### The Relationship between Ultimate Truth and Conventional Truth

#### The Descent of Ultimate Truth to Conventional Truth

As mentioned above, in terms of Wisdom, the ultimate truth is completely separate from the conventional truth, but in terms of Compassion, it re-engages worldly convention. The recovery of the conventional truth from the ultimate truth is implicitly stated in *Kārikā* 24:14. Nāgārjuna says that, “For him to whom emptiness is pertinent, all is proper. For him to whom emptiness is not pertinent nothing is proper.” Commenting on this verse Candrakīrti explains logically how the ultimate truth descends to worldly convention:

For him to whom emptiness is pertinent, Dependent Co-Arising is proper. For him to whom Dependent Co-Arising is pertinent, the Four Noble Truths are proper. Why is this? Because it is what arises in mutual dependence that constitutes suffering, not what does not arise in mutual dependence. What arises in mutual dependence, because not self-existent, is emptiness. Because suffering is pertinent, it makes sense that it comes to be, ceases to be and that there is a way leading to its cessation. So, the clear grasp of suffering, the elimination of its arising, the intuitive experience of its cessation and the inner relaxation of the way, all make sense.... Moral and immoral conduct and their consequences, spiritual well-being and downfall and all conventional habit of language (*vyavahāra*) will be pertinent.<sup>182</sup>

Here it is noted especially that Dependent Co-Arising is the descent from the ultimate truth, or emptiness descends to the conventional truth. It is worthwhile to note that Dependent Co-Arising should not be confused with “the other-dependent” in Yogācāra thought which is represented as the mixture of the imagined and the fully perfected natures of consciousness. Related to this, Nagao says:

Where the other-dependent pattern in Vijñaptimātra thought [or the Yogācāra thought] represents the totality of other-dependent arising as other-dependent, imagined, and perfected, (in Mādhyamika thought) the theme of dependent co-arising embraces the polarity of the two truths with their dynamic of mutual attraction and self-alienation. Thus, the complete otherness that sets off worldly convention from ultimate meaning is delineated clearly in Mādhyamika, while in the case of Yogācāra the identification of “Dependent Co-Arising” [caps mine] with the idea of the other-dependent pattern, as the basis for both illusion and awakening, makes it difficult to enunciate the otherness of ultimate meaning clearly.... In Vijñaptimātra, the otherness of ultimate meaning consists in the relationship between the three patterns and the three nonpatterns, which together make up “the basic truth.” The Mādhyamika thinkers shift the focus. In their structure of the two truths, they were always concerned with maintaining the ineffability and inconceivability of ultimate meaning as transcendent, while insuring that societal conventions, as products of culture, were given a logical and verbal formulation that relates them to the world.<sup>183</sup>

According to Candrakīrti, while the conventional truth appears real to ordinary people, it is only worldly convention for the sage. “Only worldly convention” means, the restoration of the conventional truth from the ultimate truth or the truth of the conventional truth which comes after the peace of the substantial view of the conventional truth.<sup>184</sup> Related to this, *Kārikā* 25:9, Nāgārjuna remarks: “That which, comes and goes the birth-death cycle,

(*ājvaṃjavībhāvā*) due to dependence (*upādāya*) or relational condition (*pratītya*), when that is free from [the substantial view of] dependence and relational condition, it is taught to be *nirvāṇa*.” Here Nāgārjuna means that the ultimate truth is not an entity, whether or not it is considered “beyond” or “immanent” in the language of conventional truth. It is nothing more than the truth of the conventional truth. Candrakīrti while commenting on this verse refers to *nirvāṇa* as follows:

In what manner is “not arising” (*apavṛtti*) of the cycle of birth and death, due to its being taken as “not-conditioned” (*apratītya*), [and] “not-dependent” (*amupādāya*), called *nirvāṇa*? But, what is nothing more than ‘not arising’ cannot be metaphysically conceived (*parikalpa*) as either existent or non-existent.<sup>185</sup>

Here “being taken as ‘not-conditioned’ (*apratītya*), [and] ‘not-dependent’ (*amupādāya*)” means “freedom from a substantial view of condition and dependence, on the basis of which the round of birth and death comes to be.” Further, Candrakīrti warns that “not-arising” means neither existent nor non-existent.<sup>186</sup> Candrakīrti’s comment shows clearly that *nirvāṇa*, or the ultimate truth expressed by “not-arising,” is not presented as an absolute being or an absolute nothing but as the truth of the cycle of birth and death when ultimate truth descends into worldly convention.

We have examined earlier how ultimate truth recovers conventional truth, and it is presented as the truth of conventional truth when it descends into conventional truth. It is time to illustrate how the ordinary people can ascend to ultimate truth on the basis of conventional truth. In Buddhist soteriology the

descent of the Buddha's teachings from the "level" of ultimate truth into worldly convention is intended so that ordinary people might ascend to ultimate truth.

### Conventional Truth as the Means to the Ultimate Truth

As we have seen before, in descending, the ultimate truth is depicted as the truth of the conventional truth. In contrast, in ascending, ultimate truth becomes the goal, and the conventional truth becomes a means to it. In the *Mādhamakāvātara*, Candrakīrti points out that "Conventional truth is the means (*upāya bhūta*). The ultimate truth is the goal (*upeya bhūta*). One who does not appreciate the distinction between these two treads a wrong path through his reified concepts."<sup>187</sup> Although Nāgārjuna does not mention this clearly as Candrakīrti does, he implies as much when he says in verse 33 of the *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* that, "Just as the Buddhas have spoken of 'my' and 'I' in pursuit of the goal (*kārya vaśāt*), thus they have also spoken of the aggregates, the sense fields and the elements in pursuit of the goal."<sup>188</sup> Furthermore, I believe that *Kārikā* 24:10 is very indicative in this respect, i.e.—"Without a foundation in the conventional truth, the ultimate cannot be taught. Without realizing the ultimate, *nirvāṇa* is not achieved." Commenting on this verse Candrakīrti says:

Here someone says: "If the ultimate truth exists as a reality (*svabhāva*) having been free from a referential function of language, then what is the purpose of the [five] aggregates, the [eighteen] elements, the [twelve] senses and sense fields, the [four] noble truths, dependent arising and so on which is not the ultimate truth (*aparamārtha*)?"<sup>189</sup> Surely what is untrue should be rejected; and why should that which is not to be rejected, be right?" We reply: "That is indeed true. However, unless the everyday world of the conventional habit of language (*laukika*

*vayavāhara*) characterized as naming and the thing named, knowing and the thing known and so on has been accepted as a base it is impossible to teach the ultimate truth. And if [the significance of] the ultimate truth is not taught, it cannot be realized; if it, the ultimate truth, is not realized, *nirvāṇa*, is not achieved.”<sup>190</sup>

This verse shows clearly that the teaching of the [five] aggregates and so on, is the means; *nirvāṇa* or the ultimate truth is the goal. Thus, *buddhaśāsana* (or “Buddha’s teaching”) is the means for entering the ultimate truth, while in descending it is presented as the manifestation of the ultimate truth.

As we have seen before, Nāgārjuna’s Two Truths gives us crucial clues for unveiling what he intended by the term *śūnyatā*. That is to say, what Nāgārjuna intends by the term *śūnyatā* is Wisdom of the Buddha. However, the Buddha, through Compassion, descends to the world and aids the ascent of ordinary people to Wisdom. The project of the theory of Two Truths aims to demonstrate the two soteriological axes of Mahāyāna Buddhism: Wisdom and Compassion.



## CHAPTER 6

### ŚŪNYATĀPRAYOJANA I: THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF PRĀPAÑCA

#### Preliminary Remarks

Nāgārjuna distinguishes the term *śūnyatāprajojana* or “the function of *śūnyatā*”<sup>191</sup> from *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatārtha* with a view to showing the functional value of *śūnyatā*. Candrakīrti while commenting on the term *śūnyatāprajojana* quotes from *Kārikā* 18:5: “Action (*karma*) and affliction (*kleśa*)<sup>192</sup> having ceased, there is *nirvāṇa*. Action and misery come from conceptual thought (*vikalpa*). This comes from the referential function of language (*prāpañca*).<sup>193</sup> This function ceases through *śūnyatā*.” This verse clearly implies that *nirvāṇa* is characterized as “the destruction of *prāpañca*.”<sup>194</sup> Therefore, the destruction of *prāpañca* is nothing else but the function of *śūnyatā*.

I will attempt in this chapter to examine the meaning of “the destruction of *prāpañca*.” The chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the meaning of *prāpañca* and its related concepts, such as *dr̥ṣṭi*, *vikalpa* or *kalpanā*, *karma*, *kleśa*, etc.. The second discusses Nāgārjuna’s understanding of the theory of *svabhāva*.

## The Meaning and Significance of the Concept of *Prāpañca*

In his *Chinmoku to kyōsetsu* Japanese scholar Teruyoshi Tanji attempts to give a critical analysis of Nāgārjuna's usage of the term *prapañca* in the six places of the *Kārikā*. He relies on Non-Buddhist sources as well as different commentaries on the *Kārikā*.<sup>195</sup> Nevertheless, it is strange that he does not mention the Sanskrit version of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* where are found some crucial indications as to the meaning of *prapañca*. Based on these two texts, the *Kārikā* and the *Ratnāvalī*, I will attempt to show what *prapañca* means in different contexts. A wide variety of translations of these six verses have been suggested by scholars, but these translations fail to point out that the Mādhyamika's concept of *prapañca* essentially involves language. Before proceeding to a discussion of my main arguments, I will suggest my understanding of these six verses in comparison with the translations by other scholars. In my translation I will translate "*prapañca*" as "the designative function of language."<sup>196</sup>

### Various Translations of the Six Verses of the *Kārikā* Related to the Term *Prapañca*

1) *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivaṃ/  
deśayāmāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām varam*// (Dedicatory  
Verses)

(My translation)

I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha, the best of teachers, who taught dependent co-arising characterized as "non-ceasing, non-arising, etc.," "the peace of any denoting," and "auspicious."

**(Kenneth K. Inada)**

I pay homage to the Fully Awakened One, the supreme teacher who has taught the doctrine of relational origination, the blissful cessation of all phenomenal thought constructions.

**(Frederick J. Streng)**

Omitted

**(Mervyn Sprung)**

Omitted

**(David J Kalupahana)**

I salute him, the fully enlightened, the best of speakers.... the dependent arising, the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious.

**(Jay L. Garfield)**

I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha, the best of teachers, who taught that whatever is dependently arisen is.... and free from conceptual construction.

**(Brian Bocking)**

To the one who can expound this matter of causality and completely extinguish all sophistries I bow my head in reverence: The Buddha, greatest of all teachers.

*2) yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ/  
prapañcayanti tāṃ jātīm tajjarāmaraṇaṃ ca kiṃ// (11:6)*

**(My translation)**

When arising of the prior, simultaneous, and posterior is not possible, how could denoting of birth, aging, and death be possible?

**(Kenneth K. Inada)**

Where states of anterior, posterior, and simultaneity (of *saṃsāra*) do not exist, how could the concepts of birth and old age-death be projected?

**(Frederick J. Streng)**

Since the past, future, and simultaneous activity do not originate, to what purpose, [do you] explain in detail [the existence of] birth, growing old and dying.

**(Mervyn Sprung)**

Omitted

**(David J Kalupahana)**

Whenever such method of (discriminating) the prior, the posterior and the simultaneous do not arise, why be obsessed by such birth and such decay-death.

**(Jay L. Garfield)**

When the series of the prior, simultaneous, and posterior is not possible, why are you led to posit this birth, aging, and death.

**(Brian Bocking)**

If you admit that beginning, end and simultaneity are all incorrect why do you (pursue) sophistries and say that there is birth, old age and death?

**3) *karmakleśakṣayānmokṣa karmakleśā vikalpataḥ/  
te prapañcātprapañcastu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate*// (18:5)**

**(My translation)**

Action (*karma*) and affliction (*kleśa*) having ceased, there is *nirvāṇa*. Action and misery come from conceptual thought (*vikalpa*). This comes from denoting (*prapañca*). The denoting ceases through *śūnyatā*.

**(Kenneth K. Inada)**

There is *mokṣa* (release or liberation) from the destruction of *karmic* defilements which are but conceptualization. These arise from mere conceptual play (*prapañca*)<sup>197</sup> which are in turn banished in *śūnyatā*.

**(Frederick J. Streng)**

On account of the destruction of the pains (*kleśa*) of action there is release; for pains result from phenomenal extension; but this phenomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.

**(Mervyn Sprung)**

From the wasting away of the afflictions and karmic action there is freedom. The afflictions and karmic action arise from hypostatizing thought and this from the manifold of named things. Named things come to an end in the absence of being.

**(David J Kalupahana)**

On the waning of defilements of action, there is release. Defilements of action belong to one who discriminates, and these in turn result from obsession. Obsession, in its turn, ceases within the context of emptiness.

**(Jay L. Garfield)**

Action and misery having ceased, there is *nirvāṇa*. Action and misery come from conceptual thought. This comes from mental fabrication. Fabrication ceases through emptiness.

**(Brian Bocking)**

When *karma* and afflictions are extinct, we call it liberation. *Karma* and afflictions are unreal penetrating emptiness, all sophistries cease.

4) *aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcairaprapañcitaṃ/  
nirvikalpamanānārthametattattvasya lakṣaṇam*// (18:9)

**(My translation)**

Not dependent on another, peaceful and not any denotatum (*prapañcita*) born from denoting (*prapañcaḥ*), beyond thought construction (*nirvikalpa*), without distinctions (*anānārtha*), that is the character of “thusness” (*tattvalakṣaṇa*).

**(Kenneth K. Inada)**

Non-conditionally related to any entity, quiescent, non-conceptualized by conceptual play, non-discriminative, and non-differentiated. These are the characteristics of reality (i.e., descriptive of one who has gained the Buddhist truth)

**(Frederick J. Streng)**

“Not caused by something else,” “peaceful,” “not elaborated by discursive thought,” “Indeterminate,” “undifferentiated”: such are the characteristics of true reality (*tattva*).

**(Mervyn Sprung)**

Not dependent on anything other than itself, at peace, not manifested as named things, beyond thought construction, not of varying form—thus the way things are really is spoken of.

**(David J. Kalupahana)**

Independently realized, peaceful, unobsessed by obsession, without discriminations and a variety of meanings: such is the characteristic of truth.

**(Jay L. Garfield)**

Not dependent on another, peaceful and not fabricated by mental fabrication, not thought, without distinctions, That is the character of reality (thus-ness).

**(Brian Bocking)**

To know for oneself, not following others, calm extinction, without sophistries, No differences and no distinctions; This is termed the “true character.”

*5) prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītamavyayaṃ/  
te prapañcahātāḥ sarve na paśyanti tathāgataṃ// (22:15)*

**(My translation)**

Those who resort to denoting in speaking of the Buddha, who has gone beyond such denoting and destruction, are impaired by denoting and fail to see Tathāgata.

**(Kenneth K. Inada)**

Those who resort wholly to provisional description in speaking of the Buddha, which is actually beyond description and destruction, are impaired by the descriptions themselves and cannot understand the *Tathāgata*.

**(Frederick J. Streng)**

Those who describe in detail the Buddha, who is unchanging and beyond all detailed description—Those, completely defeated by description, do not perceive the “fully completely” [being].

**(Mervyn Sprung)**

Those who assert names of the Buddha—who is beyond named things and is unchanging—are all victims of their own naming and do not see the perfectly realized one.

**(David J. Kalupahana)**

Those who generate obsessions with great regard to the Buddha who has gone beyond obsessions and is constant, all of them, impaired by obsessions, do not perceive the *tathāgata*.

**(Jay L. Garfield)**

Those who develop mental fabrications with regard to the Buddha, who has gone beyond all fabrications, as a consequence of those cognitive fabrications, fail to see the *Tathāgata*.

**(Brian Bocking)**

The Thus-Come transcends sophistries, yet men still produce sophistries. Sophistries destroy the eye of insight, such as these do not see the Buddha.

6) *sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ/  
na kva citkasya citkaściddharmo buddhena deśitaḥ*// (25:24)

**(My translation)**

Auspicious (*śiva*) is the peace of experience (*upalambha*), the peace of [its foundational condition, i.e.,] denoting. No Dharma was taught by the Buddha at any time, in any place, to anyone.

**(Kenneth K. Inada)**

All acquisitions (i.e., grasping) as well as play of concepts (i.e., symbolic representation) are basically in the nature of cessation and quiescence. Any factor of experience with regard to anyone at any place was never taught by the Buddha.

**(Frederick J. Streng)**

The cessation of accepting everything [as real] is a salutary (*śiva*) cessation of phenomenal development; No *dharma* anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anything.

**(Mervyn Sprung)**

Ultimate beatitude is the coming to rest of all ways of taking things, the repose of named things; no Truth has been taught by a Buddha for anyone, anywhere.

**(David J. Kalupahana)**

The Buddha did not teach the appeasement of all objects, the appeasement of obsession, and the auspicious as some thing to some one at some place.<sup>198</sup>

**(Jay L. Garfield)**

The pacification of all objectification and the pacification of illusion: No Dharma was taught by the Buddha at any time, in any place, to any person.

**(Brian Bocking)**

All dharmas are inconceivable. Extinguish all futile thoughts. There is no person, and no place and there is nothing taught by the Buddha.

### Nāgārjuna's View of *Prapañca*

Most Japanese Mādhyamika scholars agree that the term *prapañca* essentially involves language. Related to this, Teruyoshi Tanji's remarks are very significant: "The most primary meaning of *prapañca* is the expression of language."<sup>199</sup> According to him, the *Akutoḥhayā*, Nāgārjuna's self-commentary on the *Kārikā*, interprets *prapañca* as "the expression of language." Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti agree with the interpretation given in the *Akutoḥhayā*.<sup>200</sup> Here, *prapañca* means "the designative function of language," given the fact that, Nāgārjuna seems to believe that language tends to refer to things as real. In this sense, in *Kārikā* 22:11, Nāgārjuna warns his opponent, "Empty (*śūnya*) should not be asserted. Nonempty (*aśūnya*) should not be asserted. Neither both nor neither should be asserted. They are only used nominally."



Based on different commentaries on the *Kārikā*, Teruyoshi Tanji points out that the concept of *prapañca* is divided into three aspects: 1) *prapañca* as the foundation of *vikalpa*, 2) *prapañca* as identical with *vikalpa*, and 3) *prapañca* as coming from *vikalpa*.<sup>201</sup> Teruyoshi Tanji attempts to locate each case in the six verses above. Here I shall first discuss Nāgārjuna's notion of language reflected in the first and third cases, while dealing with the second in another section devoted to *prapañca* and its related concepts, such as *dr̥ṣṭi*, *vikalpa* (or *kalpanā*), *karma*, and *kleśa*, etc..

The first and third cases reflect Nāgārjuna's awareness of the two types of language, implicit and explicit. When *prapañca* functions as the foundation of *vikalpa*, it means "implicit speech." To the contrary, when *prapañca* comes from *vikalpa*, it means "explicit speech." Related to this, Teruyoshi Tanji asserts, quoting Candrakīrti's comment on *Kārikā* 22:15, that in this case *prapañca* means "explicit speech." It is equal to the second of the three types of *karma*, i.e., bodily, verbal, and volitional *karma*.<sup>202</sup> These two aspects of language will be better understood when we make a comparison with Bhartṛhari's notion of language.

In his book *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, Bimal K. Matilal comments upon Bhartṛhari's notion of language, pointing out "a striking similarity" between the argument of Bhartṛhari and that of the Buddhist idealist:

According to Bhartṛhari, there cannot be any cognitive state in this world without the imprint of words. Word, or rather 'the implicit

speech element', is the seed (*bīja*) which enlightens our consciousness of the object. The latent word in the speaker generates the cognition when he (is conscious of some object, and by expressing that word he) awakens the latent word in the mind of the hearer. In this way, the latter becomes conscious of that object [*sic*]. If consciousness were to operate without our linguistic potency, we would be left with an important consciousness which could not reveal any object.....Our overt speech may be looked upon as the phonological realization of covert or implicit speech.<sup>203</sup>

Here the interesting point of Bhartṛhari's notion of language is, implicit speech generates any cognition.<sup>204</sup>

In contrast, Nāgārjuna never makes a clear distinction between implicit speech and explicit speech, but as is indicated in *Kārikā* 18:5, where Nāgārjuna says that "*vikalpa* comes from *prapañca*," Nāgārjuna implies that *prapañca* functions as the basis for the generation of dichotomous concepts. If we limit ourselves to such cases, we might be able to say that *prapañca* and *vikalpa* correspond respectively to Bhartṛhari's notions of implicit speech and cognition. But in some cases, as in *Kārikā* 18:7, he implies that dichotomous conceptions presuppose language, thus Nāgārjuna remarks, "The denoting has ceased once what is in the domain of thinking has ceased, for dharma-nature is non-produced and non-destroyed, like *nirvāṇa*." Candrakīrti while commenting on this verse says:

Why is it said that there is nothing for any denoting? Because the domain of thinking does not exist. The domain of thinking means what thought (*citta*) has as its object (*gocara*). "Object" means the object grasped in thought. If there were such an object of thought, then, by imputing a specific character (*nimitta*) to it, speech would be able to function. When, however, no object of thought exists, how can a specific character be imputed by which speech would function.<sup>205</sup>

Candrakīrti's account here shows that speech is based on the functioning of mind/consciousness. Roughly speaking, speech in this context is similar to Bhartṛhari's notion of explicit speech. If we are forced to place this case into one of the three kinds of usage we have indicated above, it could be matched with the idea that "*prapañca* comes from *vikalpa*."

Thus Nāgārjuna never makes a clear distinction between implicit speech and explicit language in the same manner as Bhartṛhari does, but Nāgārjuna's notion of language as is indicated in the *Kārikā*, and in Candrakīrti's commentary, implies that Nāgārjuna was conscious of two different types of language as we have suggested above when he separates the term *prapañca* from its related concepts like *vikalpa*, etc. It is furthermore important to note that the significance of *prapañca* lies not in a surface meaning of language as the verbal expression of language, but in its implicit structure contained in language.

#### The Relationship between *Prapañca* and *Drṣṭi/Vikalpa/Kleśa*

The concept of *prapañca* is related to (or more exactly interpenetrates) those of *drṣṭi* or "false views," *vikalpa/kalpanā* or "conceptual construction," *karma* or "action," *kleśa* or "affliction," etc. Although Nāgārjuna does not make any specific remarks about the interpenetrating relation between these concepts, it is not impossible to find hints of this notion in his writings—even some explicit clues in the commentaries of the *Kārikā*. Here, I shall discuss how *prapañca* is identical with *drṣṭi/vikalpa/kleśa* in Nāgārjuna's usage of language. This will be

based on evidence found in the *Kārikā*, commentaries on the *Kārikā*, and the *Ratnāvalī*.

### The Identity between *Prapañca* and *Drṣṭi*

Nāgārjuna's usage of the term *drṣṭi* is reflected in *Kārikā* 27:1: "The views (*drṣṭayo*) that in the past 'I was (*abhūvaṃ*)' or 'was not (*nāvūvaṃ*)' and that the world is permanent, etc., [i.e., the world 'is permanent' or 'is not permanent'] are based upon the prior end (*pūrvāntaṃ*) [of existence]." Moreover, Nāgārjuna attempts to establish the identity between *prapañca* and *drṣṭi* in the *Kārikā*.

The first two verses of the *Kārikā* and *Kārikā* 27:30 correspond respectively to the dedicatory verse and the closing verse. All the Buddhist texts, except in some rare cases, begin with a dedicatory verse and end with a closing verse. The *Kārikā* follows this rule, though it places the closing verse into the last verse of Chapter 27. Traditionally, Buddhist authors tend to reveal their intentions in the dedicatory verse and the closing verse. Nāgārjuna is no exception to this point. In the dedicatory verse Nāgārjuna salutes the Buddha, who preached Dependent Co-Arising characterized as "the peace of *prapañca*," while in the closing verse he salutes the Buddha again, who taught the right teachings (*saddharma*) with a view to destroying all *drṣṭi* or "false views." In the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna never says anything about the relationship between *prapañca* and *drṣṭi*. Candrakīrti, however, makes this relationship clear by quoting from the

dedicatory verse in order to identify the right teachings with Dependent Co-Arising characterized as “the peace of *prapañca*.” A clearer identity between *prapañca* and *dr̥ṣṭi* is found in the two verses of the *Ratnāvali* ascribed to Nāgārjuna as follows.<sup>206</sup>

*evaṃ hetuphalotpādaṃ dr̥ṣṭvā nopaiti nāstikyam (nāstitām)/  
abhyupetyāsyā lokasya yāthābhūtyaṃ prapañcajam// (1: 50)*

(Translation)

Those who see the arising of cause-effect like this, do not develop [the view of] non-being, [and] rightly realize that [the arising of ] this world comes from the designative function of language.

*nirodhaṃ nirodhaṃ cāprapañcotthaṃ yāthābhūtyād upāgataḥ/  
nopayāty astitām tasmān mucyate ‘dvayaniśritaḥ// (1: 51)*

(Translation)

When they also realize that the ceasing [of this world] comes from the designating function of language, they do not develop [the view of] being. That is why those who do not depend on both [extreme views of being and non-being] receive freedom.

#### The Identity between *Prapañca* and *Vikalpa*

Nāgārjuna is conscious of a distinction between *prapañca* and *vikalpa/kalpanā* as is indicated in the *Kārikā* 18:5. Elsewhere, he also makes this distinction meaningless. For example, the concept of *prapañca* found in *Kārikā* 11:6 is not distinguished from that of *kalpanā* in 9:12.

*yatra na prabhavantiye pūrvāparasahakramāḥ/  
prapañcayanti tāṃ jātīm tajjarāmarāṇaṃ ca kiṃ// (11:6)*

When the arising of [what is] the prior, simultaneous, or posterior is not possible, how could the denoting of birth, aging, and death be possible?

*prāk ca yo darśanādibhyaḥ sāmpratam cordhvameva ca/  
na vidyate 'sti nāstīti nivṛttāstatra kalpanāḥ*// (9:12)

For whoever does not exist “prior to,” “simultaneous with,” or “after” seeing, etc., the discriminating of existence and nonexistence will cease.

According to Teruyoshi Tanji, F. Edgerton attempts to interpret *prapañca* as “vain fancy” and “false imaging” [as *vikalpa* or *kalpanā*] when quoting from Candrakīrti’s commentary on *Kārikā* 11:6.<sup>207</sup> Teruyoshi Tanji argues that of all the commentators of the *Kārikā*, Kumārajīva most clearly shows that *prapañca* is identical with *vikalpa* in this context: “*Prapañca* (Ch. *xilun*) is recollected thoughts, grasping of characteristics, distinguishing (Skt. *vikalpa* or *kalpanā*; Ch. *fenbie*) this from that.”<sup>208</sup> [T. no. 1564, 31a2]

Contrary to this, in the commentary on verse 9:11, the concept of *vikalpa* is placed by *prapañca*. The Chinese *fenbie* is available in the verse of 9:12, but in its commentary the term *xilun* is found instead. This fact shows that these two concepts *prapañca* and *vikalpa* or *kalpanā* are interchangeable with each other. Moreover, in the commentary on 4:6, *vikalpa* is clearly defined as *prapañca*: “*vikalpa* (Ch. *fenbie*) means that the ordinary people, bound by ignorance, desire and attachment to form, develop from their perverted views distinctions (*fenbie*) and vain argument (*xilun*), speculating that the effect inheres or does not inhere in the cause, and so on.”<sup>209</sup> [T. no. 1564, 7a1–4].

#### The Identity between *Prapañca* and *Kleśa*

As we have already seen in *Kārikā* 18:5, *prapañca* is distinguished from *karma* and *kleśa*, but elsewhere it is difficult to find clues for understanding a

relationship between *prapañca* and *kleśa*. However, Candrakīrti's commentary on *Kārikā* 25:24 clearly shows that *prapañca* is identical with *kleśa*. Candrakīrti while attempting to define "the peace of *prapañca* from the five different perspectives," maintains that "the peace of *prapañca*" (*prapañcopaśama*) is named "by the non-arising of *kleśa*" (*kleśānām apravṛtyā*) and "by the cessation of *kleśa*" (*kleśāprahāṇena*).<sup>210</sup>

We have discussed the relationship between *prapañca* and its related concepts such as *dṛṣṭi*, *vikalpa*, *karma*, and *kleśa* from two different perspectives: one is a discriminative perspective and the other is a perspective of identity. From the discriminative perspective we have discussed the two different aspects of *prapañca*, i.e., implicit speech and explicit speech. From the identical perspective we have emphasized the interpenetration of *prapañca*, *vikalpa* or *kalpanā*, *karma*, and *kleśa*. What I intend by investigating these contrasting aspects is not simply an uncovering of contradictory relations but rather to showing a reconciliation between these relations. Nāgārjuna was aware of the functional difference between concepts like *prapañca*, *vikalpa*, *karma*, and *kleśa*, but he never intends to discriminate between them in an ontological sense.

#### Nāgārjuna's Understanding of the Theory of *Svabhāva*

With insight into the *Kārikā*, we can find that the concepts of *prapañca*, *dṛṣṭi*, *vikalpa*/*kalpanā*, *karma*, and *kleśa*, as mentioned above, are based upon the theory of *svabhāva*. In the *Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna makes an attempt to criticize the concept of *svabhāva* under the categorically classified subjects, especially in

Chapter 15 where he devotes one whole chapter to refuting *svabhāva*. In 15:2 Nāgārjuna characterizes the concept of *svabhāva* as “not creative and not dependent on another” (*akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca*). In his commentary on this verse, Candrakīrti attempts to define directly the concept of *svabhāva* as “what is itself” (*svo bhāvaḥ svabhāva iti*), in order to characterize one’s nature as not only “not creative” and “not dependent on another,” but in addition as, “the being so” (*tathābhāva*), “unchangeable” (*avikāritva*), “permanently existent” (*sadaiva sthāyitva*), and “non-arising-in-all-the time” (*sarvadā 'nutpāda*).<sup>211</sup>

It is clear that the concept of *svabhāva* at issue in the *Kārikā* was propounded by a specific school, but it is very difficult to identify that school. Scholars basically agree that the concept of *svabhāva* found in the *Kārikā* is very close to that of Sarvāstivādins. David J. Kalupahana does not hesitate to affirm that Nāgārjuna attempts to counteract the Sarvāstivādin conception of *svabhāva*.<sup>212</sup> The concept of *svabhāva* has been one of the central subjects in Indian philosophy, and it has been interpreted differently not only by Buddhist schools and non-Buddhist schools. Hence, the Sarvāstivādin’s conception of *svabhāva* deserves to be examined along with how it can be distinguished from its counterparts found in other schools.

The origin of the Sarvāstivādin conception of *svabhāva* can be traced to an attempt to analyze and classify dharmas in the wake of the emergence of such pluralistic and realistic school as Vaiśeṣika, etc. The Sarvāstivādins attempt to



reduce all dharmas to the infinitesimal. Of course, it is true that such classification of dharmas as the five *skandhas*, or *rūpa*, etc. are found in Early Buddhism, but Early Buddhism was never engaged in reducing dharmas to a irreducible point in space-time. Rather, Early Buddhism was interested in denying the concept of Ātman by proving that it cannot be found in our experience, except in such sense data as the five *skandhas*.

The idea of the Sarvāstivādin conception of *dharma* is based upon the distinction between *dharma* as a phenomenon and the underlying substratum of the *dharma*. According to the Sarvāstivādins, *dharma* as a phenomenon is changeable while the underlying substratum is immutable. They seem to believe that a phenomenal *dharma* is “a moment in the minutest space-time” distinguishable from another moment. The phenomenal *dharma* is impermanent in the sense that when *dharma*, as a moment, disappears another *dharma* appears as the second moment, but the underlying *substratum* of the phenomenal *dharma*, which the Sarvāstivādins call *svabhāva*, is immutable.<sup>213</sup> The basic idea of Nāgārjuna’s criticism of the Sarvāstivādin concept of *svabhāva* lies in pinpointing an essential self-contradiction contained in the dualistic distinction between momentarily changing dharmas and their underlying substratum, which is consistent in all time. That is, Nāgārjuna argues that the concept of *svabhāva* is not compatible with the theory of moments.<sup>214</sup> Of course, it is admitted that Nāgārjuna uses the term *dharmatā* or “the nature of *dharma*,” but we cannot identify it with the latter. We cannot do so because *dharmatā* is equal to *śūnyatā*,

characterized as *niḥsvabhāva* or “the immanent absence of *svabhāva*.” Here we shall examine how Nāgārjuna recognizes the problems of the theory of *svabhāva*.<sup>215</sup> His argument can be examined from three perspectives:

Firstly, Nāgārjuna believes that the theory of *svabhāva* is itself involved in a logical absurdity. He asserts that the theory of *svabhāva* breaks the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle as used in the traditional Western logic. In his work *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, Richard H. Robinson has suggested the specific examples of these two principles from the *Kārikā*.<sup>216</sup> As for the examples of the law of non-contradiction Robinson points out the following two places in the *Kārikā*.<sup>217</sup>

For entity and negation of entity do not occur within a unity.  
(7:30)

For real and non-real, being mutually contradictory, do not occur  
in the same locus. (8:7)

And again, according to him, the law of the excluded middle is stated explicitly in the follow two places:

Other than goer and non-goer, there is no third one that goes. (2:8)

Other than goer and non-goer, there is no third one that stays.  
(2:15)

He who posits an entity becomes entangled in eternalism and nihilism, since that entity has to be either permanent or impermanent. (21:14)

Secondly, Nāgārjuna’s conception of the conventional habit of language is that it is never used to refer to a reality, but without it, the ultimate truth cannot be taught. In the *Ratnavālī*, Nāgārjuna emphasizes the significance of conventional

language when he says, “It is held to be appropriate that being would be able to change into nonbeing because it is applied when speaking of the cessation or destruction [of afflictions]. Without having recourse to the concept of being, how could such cessation and destruction be possible?”<sup>218</sup> Then, according to Nāgārjuna, Buddhist doctrines/practices as well as this conventional language are destroyed by the theory of *svabhāva*. Nāgārjuna presents some examples of this case in the *Kārikā* as follows:

For example: [if you are entangled in the theory of *svabhāva*] all conventional habits of languages would then be contradicted, without doubt. It would be impossible to draw a distinction between virtue and evil. (17:24)

If all this were nonempty, as in your view, there would be no arising and ceasing. Then the Four Noble Truths would become nonexistent. (24:20)

For you, one who through his essence was unenlightened, even by practicing the path to enlightenment could not achieve enlightenment. (24:32)

If the dependent co-arising and *śūnyatā* are rejected, this would contradict all of the conventional habit of language (*saṃvyāvahāra*). (24:36)

If emptiness itself is rejected, then action would be without profit. The act of ending suffering and abandoning misery and defilement would not exist. (24:39)

Thirdly, Nāgārjuna argues that the theory of *svabhāva* invokes a nihilistic view of *śūnyatā* itself. In the *Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna warns his opponents about the misunderstanding of *śūnyatā*. He states, “by a misperception of ‘emptiness’ a person of little wisdom is destroyed. Like a snake incorrectly seized or like a spell incorrectly cast.” (24:11) He goes on to say, “You have presented fallacious

refutations that are not relevant to emptiness. Your confusion about emptiness does not belong to me.” (24:13) It is not hard to see, through the *Kārikā*, that Nāgārjuna would demonstrate that the misinterpretation of *śūnyatā* has something to do with an ontological enterprise based on the theory of *svabhāva*. Some examples of this are:

How can the empty arise? How can the empty cease? This will hence also be the nonceased and nonarisen. (20:18)

It is untenable for the empty to become or to be destroyed. It is untenable for the nonempty to become or to be destroyed. (21:9)

Empty should not be asserted. Nonempty should not be asserted. Neither both nor neither should be asserted. They are only used nominally. (22:11)

Such a mistake in regard to *śūnyatā* is due to a belief that *śūnyatā* is nothing but a philosophical position, diametrically opposed to that of *svabhāva*. Although his arguments are clearly dependent on a refutation, he never creates his own or philosophical position against his opponent thesis. For Nāgārjuna “to do philosophy” is meaningful only when it is engaged in counteracting his opponents philosophy. In this context, J. N. Mohanty’s words deserve attention:

The Mādhyamika Buddhist critique then had a point, but the point was to radically transcend philosophy, for while doing philosophy one had to be within the epistemology-ontology structure of a system—a structure whose basic categorical framework remained an “*a priori*” relative to the system.<sup>219</sup>

In the *Kārikā* (Chapter 3), Nāgārjuna criticizes, to some extent, the problem of this very “epistemological-ontological structure” in the theory of *svabhāva*. He also focuses on this question in the *Vigrahavayvārtanī*. For

example, in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 2:45, Nāgārjuna argues against his opponent

Nyāya:

“The means of true cognition” exist only in relation to “the objects to be cognized,” then there is an interchange of *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*. Your *pramāṇas* become *prameyas*, because they are established by the *prameyas* (*prameyairḥ sādhitatvāt*). And the *prameyas* become *prameyas*, because they establish the *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇānaṃ sādhatvāt*).<sup>220</sup>

Thus Nāgārjuna shows that this ontological-epistemological enterprise is always presupposed by an absolute beginning. He goes on to say that an ontological/epistemological inquiry of an absolute beginning ends up with an infinite regress.

As we have seen above, Nāgārjuna is concerned to point out the problems of the theory of *svabhāva*, but what he ultimately intends is to show that the theory of *svabhāva* is destroyed through the realization of *śūnyatā*. I shall discuss this matter later.

## CHAPTER 7

### ŚŪNYATĀPRAYOJANA II: “THE PEACE OF PRAPŪCA”

#### Preliminary Remarks

As is indicated in *Kārikā* 18:5, *prapañca* can be destroyed through *śūnyatā*. As we have seen above, *prapañca* is related to *dṛṣṭi*, *vikalpa/kalpanā*, *karma*, and *kleśa*, therefore, the destruction of *prapañca* represents the destruction of the other related concepts. A question then arises, in what manner *śūnyatā* participates in destroying *prapañca*? This question presupposes that of determining the functional values of criticism, logic, dialectic, and *prajñā* in the Nāgārjunian system. Modern Mādhyamika scholarship does not seem to agree on the answers to these questions, but they may be reduced to three positions.

The first can be represented by scholars like Robinson. Robinson argues that as long as we limit the knowledge of Nāgārjuna’s system to the *Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna would not use any special means beyond intellectual and logical discourse. In this connection, he also claims that, “However mystical the cessation of misconceptions, or views of own-being, Nāgārjuna and his disciples talk about it in intellectual terms, in discourse whose structure is compatible with the logic of ordinary discourse.” Similarly, but more strongly, Musashi Tachikawa claims that, “It is clear that Nāgārjuna while remaining within logic

has tried to proceed to *śūnyatā* characterized as the destruction of language (*prapañca*)....Of course, at the culmination of his logical process he is aware that *śūnyatā* is the finality of such a logical process.”<sup>221</sup>

The second gives an absolute nature to dialectic where criticism/logic functions as a preliminary step to the knowledge of the Absolute, while the intuition of the Absolute culminates in *prajñā*. Murti who represents this position, unlike Robinson who relies on logical positivism, tried to distinguish between criticism/logic and intuition (*prajñā*), claiming that *prajñā* is the culmination of Nāgārjunian dialectic, while criticism/logic is a preliminary step.<sup>222</sup> According to Murti, “the dialectic, as *prajñāpāramitā*, is venerated as *nirvikalpam*, *prapañcopaśamam*, *śivam* in the Mādhyamika treatises.”<sup>223</sup>

The third argues that criticism/logic or dialectic does not participate in the realization of the ultimate but does participate in the manifestation of the ultimate truth. According to this position, *prajñā* is independent of logic or dialectic, but it can be said that it has a logical or dialectical nature only when it is manifested through logic or dialectic. This position is represented by De Jong. De Jong, like Murti, attempts to separate *prajñā* from criticism/logic, but he does not agree with Murti that it is the culmination of Nāgārjunian dialectic. De Jong attempts to limit the function of dialectic to criticism/logic, the validity of which is to correct an error immanent in the notion of a self-sufficient entity. He also makes a distinction between “Wisdom” (*prajñā*) and “mystical intuition” or “mystical awareness.” De Jong claims that, “To determine exactly the relations between

reason, (mystical) intuition and Wisdom in the Mādhyamika system is undoubtedly the crux of the problem.”<sup>224</sup>

In fact, the distinction between reason/logic/negative dialectic, intuition, and *prajñā* is noted in Streng’s work *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*. Of course, as De Jong points out, Streng has not succeeded in consistently explaining the distinction between dialectic, intuition, and *prajñā*, but there is no doubt that he was conscious of this distinction. The distinction between reason/logic/dialectic, intuition, and *prajñā* is illustrated below:

The faculty of religious knowledge which transcends both logic and mysticism is wisdom (*prajñā*); at the same time wisdom uses discursive mental structures together with a mystical awareness of the inadequacy of logical and empirical knowledge. (p. 159)

The distinction between reason and intuition is as follows:

It is only when emptiness prevails, i.e., when there is no independent self-existing essence or principle, that reason or intuition can be effective. (p. 147)

As regard the distinctions between reason and *prajñā* he says:

Wisdom reveals the Ultimate Truth. (p. 96)

Logic, therefore, is not a final appeal of knowing the truth. (p. 147)

Even the phenomenal world cannot be reduced to a single absolute logical explanation. To perceive the lack of any self-existence requires a leap out of our everyday intellectual habits which posit, often unconsciously, a self-existent reality for the objects of perception and mental distinction. In order to change these habits he who would perfect wisdom uses meditational exercises. (p. 147-148)

Related to this, J. W. De Jong very cautiously addresses his understanding of Streng’s position on this question as follows:



If I understand Streng correctly, he seems to be of the opinion that both reason (or logic or negative dialectic) and intuition can lead to the manifestation of the Ultimate Truth but that Wisdom transcends both. This seems to be clearly stated in the following passage, if one admits that the words “mysticism” and “mystical awareness” refer to mystical intuition: “The faculty of religious knowledge which transcends both logic and mysticism is wisdom (*prajñā*); at the same time, wisdom uses discursive mental structures together with a mystical awareness of the inadequacy of logical and empirical knowledge.”<sup>225</sup>

As the above analysis suggests, there is no doubt that Streng was aware of this distinction between the three concepts mentioned above, but Streng agrees with Murti that Nāgārjunian dialectic is to some extent “an effective force for revealing the Ultimate Truth” when he states:

Thus the dynamics of the dialectic is an effective force for realizing the emptiness of things.<sup>226</sup>

In Nāgārjuna’s negative dialectic the power of reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate Truth.<sup>227</sup>

In this connection Streng really quotes from Murti in order to illustrate the nature of Nāgārjunian dialectic as follows:

The dialectic is a passage, a movement, from concept to concept; it is at once creative of newer, more comprehensive and higher concepts. It is a negative and a positive function of Reason. It presses each concept (e.g., Being), squeezes out all its implications, as it were; and at this stage it becomes indistinguishable from its very opposite (Non-being). But through this negation there arises a new concept. And as this concept has been engendered by its opposite, it is richer in content, and includes the previous one. Negation is not total annulment but comprehension without abstraction.<sup>228</sup>

Also, Streng—like Murti—seems to believe that Nāgārjunian dialectic culminates in *prajñā* when he says that, “Wisdom is the presupposition for, and the culmination of, the negation of self-sufficient entities.” It is beyond our

concern to compare Streng's view of Nāgārjunian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic, but if we limit ourselves to the above statement, it would not be wrong to say that Streng is prone to Hegelian dialectic. In contrast, De Jong has tried to demarcate the distinction between *prajñā* and dialectic, *prajñā* and mystical insight:

In the Mādhyamika system the Ultimate Truth can only be apprehended by *prajñā* in the act of concentration [or *samādhi*]. The ultimate truth cannot be described with words or concepts, but the insight gained in concentration, enable the Yogin to use his dialectical reason on the *saṃvṛti* in order to demonstrate the unsubstantiality of all dharmas, *Nirvāṇa* included. The negative dialectic does not lead to the understanding of the Ultimate Truth but prepares the ground for the true insight to be gained through concentration. *Prajñā* transcends reason and can only, if imperfectly, be described as a mystical intuition which sees by way of not seeing (*adarśanayogena*).<sup>229</sup>

This statement clearly shows that, in the Mādhyamika system, *prajñā* is relative to the realization of *śūnyatā*, while the validity of reason and intuition is limited to the manifestation of *śūnyatā* only for soteriological purposes.<sup>230</sup>

According to De Jong, the function of reason is to correct errors based on an improper inference as to any absolute nature of things, while intuition serves to point out the inadequacy of reason/logic/dialectic in the apprehension of Ultimate Truth.

One topic in which we particularly need a separate and detailed inquiry is the relation between *prajñā* and dialectic. I contend that this would throw light on a most important consideration, whether it is *prajñā* or refutation that directly participates in destroying *prapañca*.<sup>231</sup> My task here is to determine the functional value of *prajñā* and refutation in Nāgārjuna's system.

### *Prajñā and the Peace of Prapañca*

As already indicated, in the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna never use the term *prajñā*, but he instead uses the term *jñāna*. In *Kārikā* 26:11 Nāgārjuna uses the term *jñāna* when he says, “With the cessation of ignorance, actions (*saṃskārāṇām*) will not arise. The cessation of ignorance occurs through the practice of Wisdom (*jñāna*).” Again, in *Kārikā* 22:12, Nāgārjuna uses the term *śānta* which, I think, is nothing else but an expression of *jñāna*.<sup>232</sup> In the *Ratnavālī*, more clearly, Nāgārjuna instead uses the term *śāntajñāna* or “peaceful wisdom.”<sup>233</sup> In fact, in the *Ratnavālī* we can find evidence that Nāgārjuna uses *jñāna* and *prajñā* to mean the same thing.<sup>234</sup> What, then, is the nature of *prajñā* and *jñāna*? In a commentary on *Kārikā* 25:16 Candrakīrti indirectly characterizes *jñāna* as “the nature of being beyond *prapañca* (*sarvaprapañcātītarūpatvājñāna*).”<sup>235</sup> In the *Ratnavālī* Nāgārjuna himself clearly says that, “All attachments can be destroyed by *prajñā*” (3:31), “Freedom (*mokṣa*) can be attained by *dhyāna* and *prajñā* (4:81),” and “All human afflictions are destroyed by *prajñā*.” (5:93) Then Nāgārjuna holds that *prajñā*, in this context, does not mean merely a philosophical insight but the fruition of religious practice, called the perfection of Wisdom. Therefore, in order to understand fully the meaning of the destruction of *prapañca* it is essential to proceed to the examination of the question of the perfection of Wisdom.

The central idea of the *Prajñāpāramita Sūtras* is considered to be the perfection of *prajñā*. According to Chinese tradition, Nāgārjuna wrote a

commentary on the *Prajñāpāramita Sūtra* of 25,000 Verses entitled *Dazhidu lun* (San. *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra*).<sup>236</sup> As its title indicates, the main topic of this treatise is the perfection of Wisdom, through reliance on which Bodhisattvas realize, “things as they really are,” or *śūnyatā*. There is no doubt that the *Prajñāpāramita Sūtras* underlie Nāgārjuna’s view of *prajñā*, but I would like to emphasize the significance of the *Ratnavālī* and the *Suhṛllekha* as far as *prajñā* is concerned. The reason being, I believe that Nāgārjuna demonstrated the nature of *prajñā* in the *Ratnavālī* and the *Suhṛllekha*. In contrast, Nāgārjuna almost exclusively devotes the *Kārikā* and the *Vigrahavyavārtanī* to dialectic.

Nevertheless, it is true that the *Ratnavālī* and the *Suhṛllekha* have not been highlighted by scholars with reference to the question of *prajñā*.<sup>237</sup> Therefore it is worthwhile to study any possible continuity or discontinuity between the *Prajñāpāramita Sūtras* and these two texts with regard to *prajñā*.

When comparing the *Ratnavālī* and the *Suhṛllekha* with respect to the nature of *prajñā*, the former offers more systematic information than does the latter. Moreover, the *Ratnavālī* is extant in a Sanskrit original while the *Suhṛllekha* is not. Here, we rely on the *Ratnavālī* exclusively in dealing with this question. In the *Ratnavālī* the perfection of *prajñā* represents the final stage of the Bodhisattva Path technically called *pāramitā*.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism *pāramitā* refers to the practice of the Bodhisattva Path through which the Bodhisattvas progress.<sup>238</sup> The most frequent list of *pāramitā* is giving (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), effort (*vīrya*),

meditative concentration (*dhyāna*), and Wisdom (*prajñā*), but the number is not fixed. Nāgārjuna, while mentioning six *pāramitā* in one place, adds to them Compassion (*karuṇa*) in other places.<sup>239</sup> Of these seven, *śīla*, *dhyāna*, and *prajñā* correspond to the Abhidharma Buddhist triad of *sīla* (Skt. *śīla*), *samādhi* (or *dhyāna*), and *pañña* (Skt. *prajñā*).

According to the *Visuddhimagga*, *pañña* is closely related to *sīla* and *samādhi*; it is presupposed by the latter. Related to this, the *Visuddhimagga* says:

Now the things classed as aggregates (*khandhas*), bases (*āyatana*s), elements (*dhatu*s), faculties (*indriya*), truths (*sacca*), and dependent origination (*paṭiccasamupāda*), etc., are the soil of this understanding (*pañña*), and the [first] two purifications, purification of virtue (*sīla*) and purification of consciousness (*samādhi*), are its roots.<sup>240</sup>

Similarly, for Nāgārjuna, as De Jong points out, “first comes *śīla*, then *samādhi* and finally *prajñā*.”<sup>241</sup> Although Nāgārjuna never affirmed this statement, Nāgārjuna’s view of such relations is reflected in the *Ratnavālī* where he mentions the Ten Stages of the Bodhisattva Path (*daśa bodhisattvavyāsa bodhisattvabhūmayāḥ*).<sup>242</sup> Here it is necessary to observe the Ten Stages of the Bodhisattva Path (hereafter this shall be noted as the “Ten Stages”) contained in the *Ratnavālī*:

- 1) The Joyous (*pramuditā*): *Dāna pāramitā* or “the practice of charity.”
- 2) The Immaculate (*vimalā*): *Śīla pāramitā* or “the practice of morality.”
- 3) The Luminous (*prabhākar*): The attainment of *dhyāna* and higher mental faculties (*abhijñā*) after having been in the light of a peaceful Wisdom (*śāntajñānaprabhāvat*) representing the initial

stage of Wisdom.

4) The Radiant (*arciṣmati*): The intensive cultivation of thirty-seven kinds of ancillaries to awakening (*bhāvanād bodhipakṣāṇām*).

5) The Unconquerable (*sudurjayā*): The comprehension of the profound intrinsic nature of the (Four) Noble Truths; the destruction of afflictions (*kleśa*) and false views (*dṛṣṭi*) in which all heretics (*tīrthakara*) are engaged.

6) The Directly Facing (*abhimūkhī*): the practice of concentration (*śama*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*); not backsliding to the stage of *Śrāvakas* (the disciples of Hīnayāna school); the conquering of *abhimānika* (those who have a self-pride).<sup>243</sup>

7) The Far Advanced (*dūraṅgamā*): Entering into cessation (*nirodham*) [of dualistic thought]; the realization of the (Four) Noble Truths (*āryasatyābhisama*).

8) The Immovable (*acalā*): The overcoming of the dualistic mind (*niścara*)

9) The Unerring Intellect (*sādhumatī*): The attainment of the [four] completely pure intrinsic qualities (*svaguṇas*) of analytic knowledge; the generation of superior Wisdom.

10) The Cloud of Dharma (*dharmameghā*): The perfection of the incomprehensible Wisdom<sup>244</sup>

As we have seen above, at the second stage (*vimalā*) the Bodhisattva practices the *śīla pāramitā*, then at the third stage (*prabhākarī*) he attains *dhyāna*

and a supranormal power (*abhijñā*) after attaining the initial stage of Wisdom. At the ninth stage (*sadhumati*) he attains “a superior Wisdom,” and finally at the tenth stage he accomplishes “the incomprehensible Wisdom.” The foregoing account clearly shows that Nāgārjuna believes that the perfection of *prajñā* at its zenith is followed by *śīla* and *dhyāna* practices.

Thus Nāgārjuna’s triad of *śīla*, *dhyāna*, and *prajñā* can be paired with the Abhidharma triad of *sīla*, *samādhi*, and *pañña*, but it does not seem to be the case that the former is exactly equivalent to the latter in its content. Rather, Nāgārjuna attempts to reinterpret the Abhidharma triad of *sīla*, *samādhi*, and *pañña* from the Mahāyāna perspective. Some of the essential differences between the triads of Nāgārjuna and Abhidharma may be summarized as follows:

First, whereas the Abhidharma notion of *sīla* (Skt. *śīla*) refers to a self-restraint, Nāgārjuna notion of *śīla* means “to give the benefit to other people” (*śīlaṃ parahitakriyā*), as is indicated in the *Ratnavālī* 5:36.<sup>245</sup>

Second, it is noted that, according to Nāgārjuna, *dhyāna* occurs to the Yogin who attained to the state of Wisdom, the third of the Ten Bodhisattva Practices (*daśa tathā bodhisattvasya bhūmayah*). This concept of *dhyāna* is not found in the Abhidharma notions of *samādhi*.

Third, whereas Abhidharma’s view of *pañña* (Skt. *prajñā*) has “the characteristic of penetrating the individual essences of states” (*dhammasabhāvapaṭivedhalakkhaṇā pañña*),<sup>246</sup> Nāgārjuna’s view on *prajñā* means, “to see things they really are.”

In *Ratnavālī* 5:37 Nāgārjuna defines *prajñā* as, “to ascertain the meaning of truth” (*prajñā satyārthanīścaya*).<sup>247</sup> In some other place where he shows the relationship between Faith and *prajñā*, Nāgārjuna implies the notion of “to see things as they really are.” Thus he says, “Having resorted to Faith (*śraddhā*) we can accept *dharma*s, having resorted to *prajñā*, we can see *dharma*s as they really are. Of the two, *prajñā* formulates the core while Faith presupposes *prajñā*.”<sup>248</sup> Elsewhere he says, “to see things as they really are” does not mean “to see the inherent nature of things” but “to see the absence of entity in things,” or *śūnyatā*.<sup>249</sup> Here “the absence of entity in things” does not mean that “a preexisting entity is destroyed for the present” but that “entities do not intrinsically exist.”<sup>250</sup>

Thus Nāgārjuna dissolves the concept of the Abhidharma triad of *śīla*, *samādhi*, and *pañña* into Ten Stages of the Bodhisattva Path, where the perfection of *prajñā* is the culmination of the Ten Stages. Thus, *prajñā* culminates in the fruition of religious practice.<sup>251</sup> Needless to say, the perfection of *prajñā* directly participates in destroying *prapañca*. Just as darkness disappears with light, so *prapañca* disappears with the light of *prajñā*.

### The Function of Nāgārjunian Refutation

As we have observed above, it is not refutation but *prajñā* that directly participates in destroying *prapañca*. What, then, is the function of Nāgārjunian refutation? To answer this question properly, we require two steps: to investigate the nature of Nāgārjunian refutation, and to examine the effectiveness of



Nāgārjunian refutation. We have already dealt with these questions to some extent, when we introduced Streng and De Jong's views. However, our task here is to examine this question through Nāgārjuna's own voice, chiefly relying on the *Kārikā* and the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, two basic texts for the understanding of his refutation.

### The Nature of Nāgārjunian Refutation

It is clear that Nāgārjunian refutation functions in forms of negation and logic. Thus, “negation” and “logic” make up the warp and woof of the fabric of this refutation. The leading commentators of the two main branches of the Mādhyamika school, Bhavaviveka and Candrakīrti, agree with the nature of negation in Nāgārjunian refutation, but they do not agree about the nature of logic. Bhavaviveka and Candrakīrti agree that Nāgārjunian refutation is engaged in “absolute negation” (*prasajya pratiṣedha*). They do not agree upon whether an independent logical reasoning is required in order to make absolute negation—for Bhavaviveka the answer is “Yes,” for Candrakīrti it is “No.”

As already indicated, Indian grammarians note two types of negations, “nominally bound negation” (*prasajya pratiṣedha*) and “verbally bound negation” (*prasajya pratiṣedha*). According to this distinction, the former type of negation is “relational negation” while the latter is “absolute negation.” They determine these two types of negation from a semantic distinction between “a(n)” and “na +a verb,” or a syntactical distinction between “nominally bound negation” and “verbally bound negation.” Related to this, Musashi Tachikawa argues that

Nāgārjuna was clearly aware of this distinction between *prasjya pratiṣeda* and *prasajya pratiṣedha*, though he never mentioned these terms in his works.<sup>252</sup>

Moreover, in order to prove his argument Tachikawa presents some evidence from two verses of the *Kārikā* as follows:

*na kāraṇasya sadṛśaṃ kāryamityupapadyate/  
na kāraṇasyāsadṛśaṃ kāryamityupapadyate// (4:6)*<sup>253</sup>

The assertion that the effect and cause are similar is not acceptable. The assertion that they are not similar is also not acceptable.

*sthitasya tāvabhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate/  
nāsthitasyāpi bhāvasya nirodha upapadyate// (7:27)*<sup>254</sup>

The cessation of what is “static” is not tenable. Nor is the cessation of something “not static” tenable.

According to Tachikawa the word “*na*” in the first verse functions as a “verbally bound negation” (*prasajya pratiṣedha*) while the word *asthita* (a +*sthita*) in the second verse functions as “nominally bound negation” (*prasjya pratiṣeda*).<sup>255</sup> However, in Bhavaviveka and Candrakīrti, let alone in Nāgārjuna, it does not seem that these two types of negations are determined exclusively from a grammatical point of view. Rather, they seem to distinguish between these two from a logical point of view. As already mentioned, Candrakīrti believes that absolute negation is possible by *prasaṅga*. In this way one can point out a self-contradiction immanent in an opponent’s thesis without having established a proposition. In contrast, Bhavaviveka holds that we need an independent logical reasoning constituted of the triad of proposition, reason and simile, arguing that *prasaṅga* is insufficient for absolute negation.

According to Bhavaviveka, for example, the proposition that all things have no the intrinsic nature is made from the point of view of the ultimate truth, while they seem to be existent from the point of view of the conventional truth. Thus, the proposition based on the ultimate truth seems to somehow be beyond a formal logic. In this sense, Tachikawa characterizes this proposition as “logic beyond logic.” However, Candrakīrti rejects this position, arguing that “the immanent absence of an entity in all things” is applicable to both the conventional truth and the ultimate truth.

In the development of Mādhyamika Buddhism the Prasaṅgikas has been dominant and apparently more faithful to Nāgārjuna. Although Nāgārjuna never mentioned a specific logical method, he seems to support *prasaṅga* in *Kārikā* 4:8 where he distinguishes his refutation from his opponent’s counter-refutation when he says: “When a refutation (*vigraha*) is made through *śūnyatā*, if someone counter-refutes it, (since his refutation will presuppose what is to be proved [as a self-sufficient entity]), everything is known to be unrefuted.” Here Nāgārjuna seems to believe that, “to establish a proposition” presupposes “what is to be proved as a self-nature,” so that the affirmation or negation of a proposition falls into contradiction, in the sense that all affirmation presupposes negation while all negation presupposes affirmation. Murti comments on this saying:

It may be held that “all affirmation is negation”; because, to affirm that “this is a triangle” is to deny that it is a square, etc. Likewise, negation may be taken as affirmation; for, to deny the existence of a thing is to affirm its presence elsewhere or in some other form.<sup>256</sup>

As is indicated in the foregoing verse, Nāgārjuna holds that since his refutation or *prasaṅga* is made through *śūnyatā*, he is free from affirming a proposition. Here the expression “refutation made through *śūnyatā*” is the very idea that Nāgārjunian refutation is manifested through *śūnyatā* or *prajñā*. Since we have already discussed the nature of *śūnyatā* as *prajñā*, it is not necessary to duplicate it here, but we shall just mention that it is free from an antinomical conflict. Related to this, Nāgārjuna says in the *Kārikā*:

Unrelinquished, unattained, unannihilated, not permanent,  
un arisen, unceased: This is how *nirvāṇa* [or *śūnyatā*] is described.  
(25:3)

Since all existents are *śūnyatā*, what is finite? What is infinite?  
What is both finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite?  
(25:22)

How could the *tetralemma* of permanent and impermanent, etc.  
[both permanent and impermanent, and neither permanent nor  
impermanent] be existent in quiescence (*śānta*)? (22:12)

This nature of *śūnyatā*, free from an antinomical conflict, clearly contrasts with the following verses of the *Kārikā* where Nāgārjuna refutes his opponent's:

If one accepts an existing thing (*bhāva*) [as an entity], an  
eternalistic or nihilistic point of view would follow. For that  
existent thing would be either permanent or impermanent. (21:14)

The views that “I existed in the past,” “I didn't exist,” both or  
neither are untenable. (27:13)

If nothing is permanent, what will be impermanent, both  
permanent and impermanent, or neither? (27:20)

This being the case, what is the relation between *śūnyatā* and Nāgārjunian refutation? Nāgārjuna seems to believe that since his refutation is made through

*śūnyatā*, it is able to refute an opponent's argument.<sup>257</sup> As we can see here, there is no doubt that Nāgārjunian argument is refutational, but if we ignore this relation between *śūnyatā* as Wisdom and *śūnyatā* as a refutation based on Wisdom, we will fail to understand the nature of Nāgārjunian refutation.

### The Goal/Scope of Nāgārjunian Refutation and Its Soteriological Effectiveness

In chapter 5 we discussed the Two Truths from the point of view of the relationship between *tattva* (or “the things as they really are”) and *buddhaśāśana* (or the Buddha's teaching). However, we will now take up this problem again in order to explain the relationship between *prajñā* and Nāgārjunian refutation. This relation is reflected in *Vigrahavayāvartanī* 2:28, where Nāgārjuna quotes a verse related to the theory of the Two Truths from the *Kārikā*, “The ultimate truth cannot be taught without having recourse to the conventional truth. [And] *Nirvāṇa* cannot be attained without realizing the ultimate truth.”<sup>258</sup> That is, Nāgārjunian refutation is not justified to awaken the ultimate truth, but in terms of the conventional truth his refutation is justified for sake of its soteriological function. This interpretation can be supported by Nāgārjuna's remarks in

*Vigrahavayāvartanī* 2:23:

Suppose that a person, artificially created (*nirmitaka*), should prevent (*pratiśedhayeta*) another artificial person, or that a magician (*māyāpuruṣa*) should prevent another man created by his own magic (*svamāyayā sṛṣṭam*) [from doing something]. This negation would be of the same nature (*pratiśedho 'yaṃ tathaiva syāt*).<sup>259</sup>

Of course, this simile is already stated in *Kārikā* 17:32, but the point here is to characterize Nāgārjunian refutation. Whereas the opponent's proposition is compared to an artificial man, Nāgārjunian refutation is likened to another artificial man. This simile shows that Nāgārjunian refutation is not concerned with the realization or awakening of the ultimate truth but with the manifestation of the ultimate truth. In other words, whereas *prajñā* directly participates in destroying *prapañca* through the realization of the ultimate truth, Nāgārjunian refutation aims to disillusion opponents who take pride in their theses by pointing out a logical absurdity in those theses.

Throughout Nāgārjuna's authentic works, we never find any evidence that his refutation directly participates in awakening the ultimate truth. In contrast, some text like the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, which is devoted to the refutation of Nyāya logic, limits the scope of Nāgārjunian refutation to criticism of an opponent's thesis. In the first verse of the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, Nāgārjuna says that, "The *Vaidalya* [*prakaraṇa*] is to be explained in order to eliminate the arrogance of those who are eager to debate on account of the arrogance (produced in them) by their knowledge of logic."<sup>260</sup>

Nāgārjunian refutation is an attempt to point out a logical absurdity in the opponent's proposition by resorting to a linguistic function in the forms of negation and logic. As is indicated in the foregoing simile, negation and logic contribute to a soteriological means of curing the opponent's deep-seated tendency for reification. Thus, Nāgārjuna seems to believe that the function of

negation and logic is to stimulate an opponent's consciousness in order to liberate the opponent from a tendency for reification. However, if the opponent will not accept a logical error in his thesis, after it is pointed out by Nāgārjunian refutation, then he is unable to be liberated from such a tendency, with the result that it blocks the way to the awakening of Ultimate Truth. In the *Prasannapadā* Candrakīrti acrimoniously criticizes these kinds of persons who do not feel shame (*nirlajjatā*) at having a self-contradiction in their thesis.<sup>261</sup>

However, when it comes to Chan Buddhism, Nāgārjunian refutation having resorted to ordinary language is maintained no more. Chan Buddhism, like Mādhyamika, agrees that the referential function of language is considered the fundamental problem lying at the root of all our suffering and ignorance. But what separates Mādhyamika from Chan Buddhism is that the former discloses the problem of language by using ordinary language in the form of negation and logic, while the latter uses the means of non-ordinary language, such as *gongan* (Kor. *kong'an*; Jan. *koan*), shouting, hitting, strange gestures, etc. As is indicated in the Chan's famous motto, "the path of language is cut off." However, it is not the case that Chan Buddhism attempts to establish any special language independent of the ordinary language. Rather, non-ordinary language contributes to driving the putting aside of ordinary language by awakening doubt about it. Mādhyamika does not admit any other means than ordinary language for the sake of soteriological purposes, but Chan Buddhism rejects the notion that ordinary

language can play an active role in disabusing audiences of a tendency toward reification.



**PART III**  
**UNDERSTANDING ŚŪNYATĀ DOCTRINE IN THE LIGHT OF ONE**  
**MIND DOCTRINE**

## CHAPTER 8

### A REVIEW OF THE PROJECT OF THE TWO TRUTHS IN THE LIGHT OF THE TWO GATES

#### Preliminary Remarks

We experience dissonance at all levels in daily life and try to resolve it. If we fail to find a resolution, then we fall into a dilemma. However, our cognition of dissonance in our religious life serves as the main force by which we can recognize any ultimate question we confront—for example, life/death—and resolve it.

Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths represents one way of cognizing and resolving dissonance. In regard to this, Guy Newland says:

Both the doctrine of the Two Truths [caps mine] itself and the *process* through which it is reformulated and presented by the Geluk-ba textbook authors can be understood as attempts to resolve contradiction in order to create/discover a coherent world.<sup>262</sup>

However, the nature of dissonance in the theory of the Two Truths can never be simply identified with “contradiction” between ultimate truth and conventional truth. In order rightly to understand the basic nature lying behind the dissonance in the Two Truths, it is necessary to be aware of the specific context in which it is used. For the nature of a dissonance appears differently according to different contexts. In the famous Kantian conception of the phenomena and *noumena*, for example, dissonance means two different ways of

considering an object. For instance the phenomena or appearances are considerations of things as they appear under sensible conditions, while things in themselves or *noumena* are considerations of the same things independent of the conditions under which they appear.<sup>263</sup>

To turn to Buddhism within the Abhidharmic context, the cognition of dissonance is viewed as a dichotomy of the phenomenal world and the substantial entities underlying it. As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of the Two Truths in Mahāyāna Buddhism, like the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, and Mādhyamika Buddhism, results from the criticism of the Abhidharmic dichotomy.

Of course, it is based on a hypothesis which suggests that the Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths is in line with a period of Buddhist history in which Wisdom and Compassion were thought of as an exceptionally important tools for understanding Buddhist doctrines. Surprisingly, however, it is clear that the project of the Two Truths aims to expose the strategy of Wisdom and Compassion by way of the dynamic relation between ultimate truth and conventional truth. That is, the centrifugal relation between the two truths is one way of expressing Wisdom, while the centripetal relation is one way of expressing Compassion.

It is interesting to observe, then, that the project of the Two Gates in *Dacheng qixin lun* can be thought of as expressing the strategy of Wisdom and Compassion through the dynamic relation between the Two Gates. Furthermore, it can help us to understand more clearly the project of the Two Truths. Perhaps, it might be said that the Two Gates was influenced directly by the Two Truths, but for the present I am not concerned with jumping into this question.<sup>264</sup> Rather, our

purpose here is to review the project of the Two Truths in light of the Two Gates. My main concern is to examine how the project of the Two Gates shows the possibility of using cataphatic language to expose the strategy of Wisdom and Compassion. This is opposed to the Two Truths in which an apophatic language serves as the most powerful and effective means for the same purpose.<sup>265</sup> Thus, I will investigate the Two Truths from the perspective of the Two Gates focusing on language.

#### A Review of the Project of the Two Truths with Regard to Wisdom

The Two Truths show that Wisdom is expressed in a way in which the ultimate truth and conventional truth are separate from each other. As is suggested in *Kārikā* 24:8, “The Buddha’s teaching of *dharma* is based on the Two Truths: the conventional truth and the ultimate truth.” In a similar way, the Two Gates are contrasted with each other in terms of Wisdom in the *Dacheng qixin lun*. In this regard, the *Dacheng qixin lun* says: “There are Two Gates (or Aspects) of One Mind: One is the Gate (or Aspect) of One Mind in terms of *tathatā* and the other is the Gate (or Aspect) of One Mind in terms of Arising-Ceasing Gate.”<sup>266</sup>

As one of the most powerful ways of expressing the centrifugal relation between the Two Truths (the ultimate truth and conventional truth), the Two Gates (the *tathatā* Gate and the Arising-Ceasing Gate), each employs liminological strategies of language. In this context, *Kārikā* 18:7 presents a good example, i.e.—“When the object of cognition (*cittagocara*) has ceased, that which

is to be expressed (*abhīdhātavyam*) has also ceased. Unborn and undying, like *nirvāṇa*, is the nature of things (or the ultimate truth).” The same liminological strategy of language is found in some places of the *Dacheng qixin lun*:

That which is called *citta tathatā* or “One Mind in terms of the ultimate truth” is the essence (*tī*) of “the totality of One Dharma” and the Gate entering into [One] Dharma.... Therefore, all things from the beginning are free from all verbalization, description, conceptualization and ultimately, they become undifferentiated, free from alternation and indestructible. They are nothing but One Mind. Hence they are named *tathatā* or “Suchness.”<sup>267</sup>

What is to be noted here is that such a liminological strategy of language, unlike the case of the Two Truths, is associated with cataphatic concepts such as One Mind, One Dharma, and so on.<sup>268</sup> There is no doubt that this cataphatic expression is one of the essential elements belonging to the Two Gates and is a means by which we can make a distinction between the Two Truths and the Two Gates. However, this is not to say that these expressions presuppose an ontological assumption. As we have seen before, Wonhyo rejects imputing the concept of the Absolute onto these concepts.

What then is the justification for these cataphatic concepts? They are grounded on the belief that it makes sense to use all possible forms of verbal expressions for soteriological purposes; the reason being, they are already free from the theory of a self-nature. In this context, the *Dacheng qixin lun* says:

All forms of verbal expressions are provisional and have no attributes [as a self-nature], for they rest merely on illusions. So, [consequently] it is impossible to obtain them. Suchness has no attributes and the expression, “Suchness,” [just] indicates the limit of what can be verbalized. An expression [like Suchness] is used to put an end to expressions [rooted in the theory of self-nature]. But the essence (*tī*) of Suchness, itself [inexpressible], cannot be

put an end to, for all things are real; nor is there anything which is to be established [separately], for all things are equal [in view of the essence of Suchness]. It should be understood that all things are incapable of being verbally explained or thought. Hence, they are named Suchness.<sup>269</sup>

The above statement shows clearly that cataphatic expression, such as “the essence of Suchness,” is not incompatible with the liminological strategy of language.

Some scholars might argue that this *cataphatic* way of expression proves how far One Mind doctrine deviates from the doctrine of *śūnyatā*. But this assertion is no more than a naïve level of understanding the cataphatic strategy of One Mind. In this context, it is worthwhile to recall that Candrakīrti, who was traditionally believed to be an authentic commentator, faithful to Nāgārjuna’s thought, tried to interpret *śūnyatā* by using cataphatic expressions of “*svabhāva*” and “*svarūpa*.” Nāgārjuna uses *śūnyatā* as identical with *niḥsvabhāva* or “the absence of *svabhāva*,” but, as we have mentioned earlier, Candrakīrti uses the same word *svabhāva* in order to effectively express the concept of *niḥsvabhāva* in a cataphatic way. Interestingly enough, these two opposite words are compatible with each other. Correlatively, the *Dacheng qixin lun* employs opposite words such as *kong* (*śūnya*) and *bukong* (*aśūnya*) to explain *tathatā* or “Suchness” in a conceptual manner. The text reads:

Next, Suchness is explained conceptually in terms of two aspects. What are the two? One is [expressed by] *śūnya*, for [Suchness] ultimately can reveal what is real. The other is [expressed by] *aśūnya*, for [Suchness] in itself is endowed with the virtues of undefiled qualities.<sup>270</sup>

Here, the words like *sūnya* and *asūnya* manifest themselves as two different aspects of the same thing. Needless to say, the use of these words come with the awareness that a word is unable to refer to the immanent nature of things.

The cataphatic languages like One Mind, One Dharma, etc. are associated with a holistic strategy. The *Dacheng qixin lun* explains this strategy from two different perspectives, i.e., One Mind and Two Gates. In terms of One Mind, it is expressed as, “This Mind (the Mind of ordinary people) embraces all the dharmas of the mundane world and superamandane”;<sup>271</sup> in terms of Two Gates it is expressed in the statement, “These Two Gates embrace all the things.”<sup>272</sup>

Thus, holistic language is considered the highlight of the *cataphatic* way in the doctrine of One Mind. However, the holistic language used here has nothing to do with monism or holism. Rather, it is used as one powerful way of expressing Wisdom in a soteriological sense.<sup>273</sup>

#### A Review of the Project of the Two Truths with Regard to Compassion

In chapter 5 we tried to demonstrate the project of the Two Truths with regard to Compassion which can be explained as either descending or ascending. Although I have stated previously the basic idea of the system of descending and ascending, it is necessary to remind readers once again that, the Buddha vows to descend to the conventional truth in order to manifest the ultimate truth; the ordinary people desire to ascend to the ultimate truth through the conventional truth. Thus, in terms of Compassion, the ultimate truth and the conventional truth interact with each other in a centripetal relation. The same manner of explanation

can be applied to understanding the project of the Two Gates in regard to Compassion. The systematic and theoretical understanding provided by the Two Gates is helpful for understanding the Two Truths. In what follows I will try to review the project of the Two Truths with regard to Compassion and in light of the Two Gates.

### A Review of the Project of the Two Truths in Terms of Descent

In terms of descent, the Two Gates show in what manner *tathatā*, or “Suchness” for the *tathatā* Gate, descends to the Arising-Ceasing Gate. The *Dacheng qixin lun* explains metaphorically how Suchness opens up the *tathatā* Gate to manifest itself into the Arising-Ceasing Gate. Also, endeavoring to show the project of the Two Gates with regard to Compassion, the text contrasts categorical terms like *ti* (or “the essence of Mahāyāna or Suchness”), *ziti* (or “the essence of *Mahāyāna*” or “Suchness in the Arising-Ceasing Gate”), *xiang* (or “the manifestation of Suchness into the Arising-Ceasing Gate”) and *yong* (or “an external function of Suchness through the Arising-Ceasing Gate”). Related to this, the text itself says that, “Suchness for the *tathatā* Gate represents the *ti* or ‘essence of Suchness’, while Suchness for the Arising-Ceasing Gate is expressed as (*ziti*)*xiang* and *yong*.” I contend that the right understanding of these three concepts offers keys for demonstrating the descending system of Compassion. Regarding this question the following will be essential issues for our main discussion: 1) What does the distinction between the *ti* and *ziti* of Suchness represent? 2) What is the meaning of (*ziti*)*xiang* of Suchness? 3) What is the



meaning of *yong* of Suchness? We shall examine each of these issues relying on Wonhyo's views.

1) What does the distinction between the *ti* and *ziti* of Suchness represent?

Wonhyo takes note of the difference between the *ti* and *ziti* of Suchness.

He points out:

What the *ziti* of *Mahāyāna* (or Suchness) stands for is the Mind of the Original Elightenment for the Arising-Ceasing Gate, which is the essence and cause of the Arising-Ceasing. Therefore, it is placed onto the Arising-Ceasing Gate. But there are some reasons for distinguishing between the *ti* of *Mahāyāna* and the *ziti* of *Mahāyāna*. The reasons will be automatically revealed in the midst of the explanation below.<sup>274</sup>

Wonhyo seems to believe that the *ti* of Suchness is distinguished from *ziti* of Suchness in that the latter is associated with its *xiang* or "Attributes." In this context, Wonhyo maintains that, "Even though there is the *ziti* [of Suchness] in the Arising-Ceasing Gate, I did not mention it separately since it is associated with *xiang* or 'Attributes.'"<sup>275</sup>

Also, the distinction between the *ti* and *ziti* is reflected in Wonhyo's commentary on the Two Gates. Here he attempts to seek for its doctrinal source from two contrasting phrases of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, "One Mind is called *tathagatagarbha*," and "The peace of Mind is called One Mind." I believe that the first phrase represents the *ti* of Suchness, while the second phrase represents the (*ziti*)*xiang* of Suchness, where One Mind and *tathāgatagarbha* correspond respectively to *ziti* and *xiang* of Suchness.

Throughout, we find that the text replaces the *tathatā* Gate (*zheru men*) by the phrase "Attributes of Suchness" (*zheru xiang*) and the Arising-Ceasing Gate

(*shengmie men*) by “Attributes of Arising-Ceasing” (*shengmie xiang*). This might seem strange because the term “Attributes” here is used to describe Suchness in the *tathatā* Gate. Some might suggest that this fact weakens Wonhyo’s view of the distinction between *ti* and *ziti* by whether or not it is associated with “Attributes.” Yet, it is clear that the word “Attributes,” as in the case of “Attributes of Suchness,” is different from that in “Attributes of the *ziti* of Suchness” belonging to the Arising-Ceasing Gate. The former could correspond to a conceptual expression of the ultimate truth. As is indicated in *Kārikā* 18:9, “Not dependent on another, peaceful, and not designated by the designative function of language, beyond thought construction, without distinctions, that is the character of thatness (*tattvalakṣaṇa*).” As we can see here, this characteristic of the ultimate truth is a conceptual expression which represents the centrifugal relation between ultimate truth and conventional truth.

In conclusion, it is the *xiaing* for the Arising-Ceasing Gate that is associated with the *ziti*, not the *ti*. The text distinguishes *ziti* from *ti* in order to express the essence of Suchness in terms of descending.

## 2) What is the meaning of the (*ziti*)*xiaing* of Suchness?

The text itself speaks of the (*ziti*)*xiaing* of Suchness:

“The (*ziti*)*xiaing* of Suchness” knows no increase or decrease in ordinary people, the Hinayanists, the Bodhidattvas, or the Buddhas. It was not brought into existence in the beginning, nor will it cease to be at the end of time; it is eternal through and through. From the beginning, the *ziti* [of Suchness] is fully provided with all excellent qualities; namely, it is endowed with the light of great Wisdom, [the qualities of] illuminating the entire universe, of true cognition and a mind pure in its self-nature; of eternity, bliss, Self, and purity; of refreshing coolness,

immutability, and freedom. It is endowed with the inconceivable Buddhadharmas whose number is greater than the sands of the Ganges, which are inseparable, indivisible, and indistinguishable from [the *ziti* of Suchness]. Since it is endowed completely with all these, and is not lacking anything, it is called the *tathāgatagarbha* and also the *dharmakaya* of the Tathāgata.<sup>276</sup>

As has been shown, a variety of expressions are used to describe the (*ziti*)*xian*g of Suchness. The (*ziti*)*xian*g of Suchness is designed to manifest Suchness into the Arising-Ceasing Gate in terms of descent.

According to Wonhyo, there are two aspects with regard to the manifestation of Suchness into the Arising-Ceasing Gate. One is characterized as the immeasurable virtues immanent in the nature of *tathāgatagarbha* or “the womb of *tathāgata*”<sup>277</sup> and the other appears to be impure, though it is pure by nature, for it is impure only by the perfume of Ignorance.<sup>278</sup> The text introduces the concept of *ālayavijñāna* or “Storehouse Consciousness” in order to describe the manifestation of Suchness mixed with impurity. In this regard, the text defines *ālayavijñāna*: “What is called Storehouse Consciousness is that in which ‘neither arising nor ceasing’ diffuses harmoniously with ‘arising and ceasing’, and yet in which both are neither identical nor different.”<sup>279</sup>

As indicated earlier, the terms like *sūnya* and *asūnya* are expressed conceptually in order to describe that aspect of Suchness in terms of the Suchness Gate. They are in contrast to the term *tathāgatagarbha* which represents a conceptual expression of Suchness for the Arising-Ceasing Gate. The main concern in our discussion here are the fundamental differences between the two ways of expressing Suchness—the former stressing “Suchness free from

language” (*liyan zhenru*), the latter stressing “Suchness tied with language” (*yiyan zhenru*).

Thus, the (*ziti*)*xiang* of Suchness represents “the manifestation of Suchness into the Arising-Ceasing Gate,” which is distinguished from *ti* (or Suchness for the Suchness Gate). In other words, *ti* descends to the Arising-Ceasing Gate through *xang*.

### 3) What is the Meaning of the *Yong* of Suchness?

The text intends to present the way in which Wisdom manifests itself into the Arising-Ceasing Gate by the (*ziti*)*xiang* of Suchness, but here it aims to show how Wisdom itself operates in the Arising-Ceasing Gate by the *yong* of Suchness.

The text describes the *yong* of Suchness:

What the *yong* of Suchness means is that the Buddha-Tathāgatas, while in the stages of Bodhisattvahood, exercised great Compassion, practiced *pāramitā* and accepted and transformed sentient beings.... Spontaneously performing incomprehensible activities, exercising manifold functions, they pervade everywhere in their identity with Suchness.<sup>280</sup>

Thus, the *yong* of Suchness, along with the (*ziti*)*xiang* of Suchness represents one axis of the descending system of Compassion in the Two Gates.

In terms of Wisdom, Suchness is itself inexpressible, but its function can be spoken of in terms of descendent. In this context, the text says:

Because the Buddha-Tathāgatā are not other than the Dharmakaya itself, the embodiment of Wisdom, [therefore] they are free from any conventional activities. And yet, because of the fact that sentient beings receive benefit through seeing and hearing about them, the function of Suchness can be spoken of.<sup>281</sup>

As we have seen before, the text explains the descending system of Compassion in the Two Gates by way of the *(ziti)xiang* and *yong* of Suchness. Thus, the idea of the *(ziti)xiang* and *yong* of Suchness serves as an essential element for expounding the descending system of Compassion.

Interestingly, the relationship between the *(ziti)xiang* and *yong* of Suchness is simplified into the *ti/yong* relationship in the *Dacheng qixin lun*, where the *ti/yong* relationship is interlocked with the theory of perfume. I believe that this point is one of the most distinctive characteristics of the text that cannot be paralleled with other Buddhist texts. However, as far as this question is concerned, I will leave it for the following chapter wherein I will review the similarities and differences between the *ti/yong* relationship and *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship.

#### A Review of the Project of the Two Truths in Terms of Ascent

As mentioned earlier, the project of the Two Truths in terms of ascent shows that the conventional truth is the means; the ultimate truth is the goal. The Two Gates can be viewed similarly as the relation of the means and the goal, as is stated in the *Dacheng qixin lun*: “Next, how to enter into the *tathatā* Gate from the Ceasing-Arising Gate will be illustrated.”<sup>282</sup>

The ascending system of the Two Gates is illustrated in the text by technical phrases such as “to conform to” (*suishun*) and “true insight” (*zhenggan*). The text says:

Question: If such is the meaning [of the principle of Mahāyāna], how is it possible for men to conform themselves to and enter true insight?

Answer: If they understand that, concerning all things, though they are spoken of, and thought of, there is neither that which thinks, nor that which can be thought of, then they are said to have “conformed to it.” And when they are free from their thoughts, they are said, to have “entered into true insight.”<sup>283</sup>

It is clear that “to conform to” and “to enter into true insight” represent the ascending system of the Two Gates wherein the former is the means, and the latter is the goal. In this regard, Wonhyo interprets “to conform to” as “provisional insight” and “to enter *tathatā* Gate” as “true insight.”<sup>284</sup> That is to say, here Wonhyo regards “to conform to” as the means for “entering true insight.”

The text specifies the ascending system represented by “to conform to” and “to enter into true insight” as “the three kinds of the awakening of Mind (*faxin*),” i.e., 1) the awakening of Mind through the perfection of Faith, 2) the awakening of Mind through understanding and deeds, and 3) the awakening of Mind through the realization of Wisdom. I believe that the first two represent “to conform to,” the last represents “to enter into true insight” or “to enter into the *tathatā* Gate.” In fact, any specific ways of ‘to conform to’ are discussed in the first two and not in the last.<sup>285</sup>

The text adds “the correction of erroneous attachments” to this ascending system as a preliminary stage of “to conform to,” suggesting the two types of erroneous attachments and the correction of such erroneous attachments. The way of correction is to be aware oneself that erroneous attachments are

immanently free from any delusive thoughts. Therefore, “to correct erroneous attachments” does not mean that erroneous attachments are removed in an ontological sense, as is in the case of Nāgārjunian refutation, wherein refutation is provisional without its own self-nature. Similarly, the *Dacheng qixin lun* says:

Next, one should know that what is completely free from erroneous attachments has no particular marks of its own-being that can be designated; the pure dharmas [free from erroneous attachments] and the defiled dharmas (erroneous attachments) are dependent upon each other.<sup>286</sup>

Unlike the case of Nāgārjunian refutation, wherein a wide variety of categorical issues are targeted, “the correction of erroneous attachments” is devoted to only two kinds of erroneous attachments which are rooted in two kinds of false views. One is the false view rooted in the belief that there is a self, the other is the false view that all things have their own self-nature. The first type of false view is held by ordinary people who are not free from the belief that such concepts as *tathatā*, *Tathāgata*, and *tathāgatagarbha* presuppose *ātman*. The second type is held by Hīnayānists who believe that the five aggregates really existent and erroneously imagine *nirvāṇa* in the same ontological sense.<sup>287</sup>

The correction of these two types of false views may be paired with Nāgārjuna’s refutation on the substantial views of dharmas, but there appears to be an important difference between “the way to correct false views” and Nāgārjuna’s refutation. As we have seen before, Nāgārjuna’s refutation aims to point out logical errors contained in an opponent’s thesis. But “the correction of false views” treads a different path from Nāgārjunian refutation. In this regard,

Wonhyo suggests three stages, i.e., 1) the reasons for the occurrence of erroneous attachments, 2) the types of adherence to erroneous attachments and 3) to uproot this adherence.<sup>288</sup>

Throughout the text the expression “to enter the *tathatā* Gate” is often replaced by “to enter true insight,” or “returning to *tathatā*.” Of course, such expressions as “entering” and “returning” here do not imply any ontological assumption. They are simply one way of expressing the realization of Wisdom. As is indicated in the text itself: “ ‘The sphere that transcends delusive thoughts’ means the realization [of Wisdom].”<sup>289</sup> It is needless to say that for both the Two Truths and the Two Gates the ultimate goal means the realization of Wisdom.

As we have seen before, it is clear that both projects of the Two Truths and the Two Gates represent two different ways of expressing the soteriological strategy of Wisdom and Compassion. Compared with the former, however, the latter uses the cataphatic, self-explanatory and analytical language. Thus, there appears to be continuity and discontinuity between the Two Truths and the Two Gates. I believe that the question of the continuity/discontinuity between the two offers a good case study for the understanding of continuity/discontinuity between the doctrine of *śūnyatā* and One Mind.



## CHAPTER 9

### UNDERSTANDING THE ŚŪNYATĀ/ŚŪNYATĀPRAYOJANA RELATIONSHIP THROUGH THE TI/YONG PARADIGM

#### Preliminary Remarks

The pair of the *ti/yong* is one way of analyzing a thing in terms of essence and function. There is no evidence that it is a native Chinese way of thinking, but it became popular in Chinese, Korean and Japanese Buddhism in the 6th C.E. According to Kashiwagi Hiroo, the *ti/yong* paradigm was developed into the triad of *ti*, *xiang*, and *yong* by adding the concept of *xiang* to it.<sup>290</sup> Kashiwagi Hiroo seeks for the prototype of this triad, but he has no specific reference to the *ti/yong* paradigm, except for arguing that it is of Buddhist origin.

Suprisingly enough, the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship resembles the *ti/yong* paradigm. However, I do not intend to suggest here that the *ti/yong* paradigm is derived directly from the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship. I am not yet ready to pronounce my own view on the origin of the *ti/yong* paradigm, but one thing I may safely say is that the *ti/yong* paradigm is in line with the *cataphatic* way of expression in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

My main concern here is to reconstruct the relationship between *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprayojana* after the *ti/yong* paradigm and to investigate the

similarities and differences between the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship and the *ti/yong* paradigm.

In order to pursue successfully our task, it is necessary to understand what is the *ti/yong* paradigm. As I have mentioned in the Introduction, the *ti/yong* paradigm here is limited to the *Dacheng qixin lun*. However, we have very limited knowledge in so far as the *ti/yong* paradigm is concerned. This is based on two thematic issues:

One, the *ti/yong* paradigm was traditionally understood via the water-and-waves metaphor in the text, though the text itself has no direct reference to the relationship between this simile and the *ti/yong* paradigm. In what follows, I dare to argue that the traditional water-and-waves metaphor has problems representing the essential aspect of the *ti/yong* paradigm. Two, the authentic commentators like, Wonhyo and Fazang, paid special attention to the *ti/yong* paradigm and used it as the tool for the interpretation of the title *Dacheng qixin lun*. I will attempt to respond to current modern scholarship with regard to the translation and interpretation of the title *Dacheng qixin lun*, while pronouncing my own understanding of Wonhyo and Fazang's views on the interpretations of the title, *Dacheng qixin lun*.

#### Critical Review of the Traditional Water-and-Waves Metaphor Applied to the Understanding of the *Ti/Yong* Paradigm

The *ti/yong* paradigm has been traditionally compared to the water-and-waves relationship. A Korean monk, Chinul, applied the water-and-waves metaphor in understanding the non-distinction between *ti* and *yong* in the *ti/yong*

paradigm. There is no doubt that Chinul's idea of this metaphor is borrowed from the *Dacheng qixin lun* regarding this metaphor.<sup>291</sup> However, not only does the *Dacheng qixin lun* itself have no specific reference to the relationship between the *ti/yong* paradigm and the water-and-waves metaphor, but also the metaphor has problems in itself in representing the *ti/yong* paradigm. The text uses a metaphor in order to explain the pure nature of Mind in relation to its defiled states due to the permeation of Ignorance:

Question: If the Mind ceases to be, what will become of its continuity? If there is continuity of mind, how can you explain its final cessation?

Answer: What we speak of as "cessation" is the cessation of the marks of [the deluded] Mind only and not the cessation of its essence. It is like the case of the wind which, following the surface of the water, leaves the marks of its movement. If the water should cease to be, then the marks of the wind would be nullified. The wind would be nullified, and the wind would have no support [on which to display its movement]. But since the water does not cease to be, the marks of the wind may continue. Because only the wind ceases, the marks of its movement cease accordingly. This is not the cession of water. So it is with ignorance; on the ground of the essence of Mind there is movement. If the essence of Mind were to cease, then people would be nullified, and they would have no support. But since the essence does not cease to be. The mind may continue. Because only stupidity ceases to be. The marks of the [stupidity of the] mind cease accordingly. It is not that the wisdom [i.e. the essence] of Mind ceases (Hakeda translation).<sup>292</sup>

As we can see in this metaphor, the movement of water (i.e., the waves) is used, not in order to describe the active function of water (i.e., Wisdom) but to describe the deluded state of Mind permeated by Ignorance.

However, the traditional water-and-waves metaphor has some limits in terms of describing the *ti/yong* paradigm. My position can be supported by

another statement of the *Dacheng qixin lun* in which the same metaphor is used, not in order to describe the *ti/yong* paradigm but to illustrate the pure characteristics of Wisdom (*zhijingxiang*) in relation to the deluded state of Mind. The text attempts to explain Original Enlightenment (*benjue*) from two perspectives. One is an analysis of Original Enlightenment in relation to the deluded mind. The other is an analysis of Original Enlightenment by nature. To borrow Wonhyo's terminology, the former is "Original Enlightenment as analyzed in relation to the defiled mind" (*suiran benjue*), and the latter is "Original Enlightenment as analyzed by nature" (*xingjing benjue*). According to the text, "Original Enlightenment as analyzed in relation to the defiled mind" is spoken of as having two attributes, i.e., the pure characteristics of Wisdom (*zhijingxiang*) and the characteristics of the inconceivable action [of Wisdom] (*busiyi yexiang*). On the other hand "Original Enlightenment as analyzed by nature" is called "the characteristics of the essence of Enlightenment" (*juetixiang*). The water-and-waves metaphor in this context is then applied to describing "the pure characteristics of Wisdom." In demonstrating the meaning of "the pure characteristics of Wisdom," the text brings the metaphor:

.... This is like the relationship that exists between the water of the ocean [i.e., enlightenment] and its waves [i.e., modes of mind] stirred by the wind [i.e., ignorance]. Water and wind are inseparable, but water is not mobile by nature. If the wind stops the movement [of water] ceases, but the wet nature remains undestroyed. Likewise, man's Mind, pure in its own nature, is stirred by the wind of Ignorance. Both Mind and ignorance have no particular forms of their own, and they are inseparable. Yet Mind is not mobile by nature, and if Ignorance ceases, then the continuity [of deluded activities] ceases. But the essential nature

of Wisdom [i.e., the essence of Mind, like the wet nature of the water] remains undestroyed [Hakeda translation].<sup>293</sup>

As we can see here, the above simile centers on representing the *ti* of Wisdom at the expense of *yong* which is described well in “the characteristics of inconceivable action of Wisdom” when the text says:

“The characteristics of inconceivable action” means that Wisdom is capable of creating all manners of excellent conditions because it is pure. The manifestation of its numberless excellent qualities is incessant; it accommodates itself spontaneously to the capacity of ordinary people, reveals itself in manifold ways, and benefits the ordinary people.<sup>294</sup>

Thus, “the pure characteristics of Wisdom” and “the characteristics of inconceivable action,” consisting of Original Enlightenment as analyzed in relation to the defiled mind, represent respectively the *ti* and *yong* of Wisdom.

Nevertheless, the water-and-waves metaphor does not demonstrate the active function of Wisdom, and this has been given little attention by Buddhist scholars, until Prof. Sungbae Park presented an article entitled “Christian Faith as Seen through the *Mom/Momchit* Paradigm of Buddhism.”<sup>295</sup> We can assume that he was not satisfied with the traditional understanding of the *ti/yong* paradigm, and it forced him to create the new terminology of the *mom/momchit* paradigm in order to reinterpret the *ti/yong* paradigm from a soteriological/existential perspective.

It is arguable whether the Korean word *mom/momchit* is appropriate as an alternative way of expressing the *ti/yong* paradigm, but it must be admitted that the *mom/momchit* paradigm is suitable for representing the essential aspects of the *ti/yong*. First of all, the *mom/momchit* paradigm seems to be successful at

expressing the external function of inner Wisdom which formulates the basic idea of the *ti/yong*. The Korean word *mom* means the foundation and whole of all human mental and physical activities; *momchit* represents all human mental and physical activities. Thus, the word *mom* possesses a holistic mode, as in the case of *ti*, and the word *momchit* is appropriate to express an external function of *mom* (or inner Wisdom), as in the case of *yong*. In fact, this manner in which the function of Wisdom is likened to human activities in every day life does not seem to be strange to Chan Buddhist tradition. In an attempt to describe an external function of inner Wisdom, Chinul says:

Therefore, all human activities in a daily life—i.e., benefiting others; coming and going between East and West; eating a meal and wearing clothes; using a spoon and chopsticks; turning our eyes to left and peeping right—all represent “a subtle function of True Mind” (Kor. *Chinshim myoyong*, Chi. *zhen xin miao yong*). However, ordinary people move around in search of the attributes of every activity, recognizing the fact that they are wearing clothes when they wear clothes and that they are taking a meal when they take a meal, because they are ignorant [of the fact that those are all unitary activities of True Mind].<sup>296</sup>

If we understand the above statement in the *mom/momchit* paradigm, the subtle function of True Mind is represented by the *momchit* of *mom*, but ordinary people do not see *mom* in the unitary mode of *momchit*. Thus, it can be said that the *mom/momchit* paradigm is more effective than the water-and-waves metaphor in elucidating the essential aspects of the *ti/yong* paradigm.<sup>297</sup>

The *Ti/Yong* Paradigm as Described in the Title *Dacheng qixin lun*

Response to Modern Scholarship on the Translation  
and Interpretation of the Title *Dacheng Qixin lun*

The title *Dacheng qixin lun* has been translated as “the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna” by many scholars. This problem of the translation of the title, therefore, is closely related with that of the interpretation of the general idea of the text. Hakeda, translated the title as *The Awakening of Faith* or *The Awakening of the Faith in Mahāyāna*. However, this translation became a target of criticism by Sungbae Park. In his work, *Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment*, Sungbae Park champions a new translation, *The Awakening of Mahāyāna-Faith*, demonstrating the relationship between *ti/yong* and *Dacheng/qixin*, and insisting that Hakeda’s translation could mislead one into a dualistic view of Mahāyāna and Faith.

Sungbae Park’s translation, *The Awakening of Mahayana Faith* is based on the belief that the *neng/suo* formula<sup>298</sup> could be misunderstood as a dualism between Mahāyāna and Faith. In this regard, he writes:

Clearly, then, the translation of the title of the treatise as *The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna*, reflects the dualistic *neng-suo* [subject-object] formula as expressed in “the faith in-----” construction.” This, in turn, gives rise to a seriously misleading interpretation of Mahāyāna Buddhism in general and Mahāyāna-Faith in particular.<sup>299</sup>

As one example of such a case, he introduces Hakeda’s interpretation of the title of the text saying,

It should be noted that the term “Mahāyāna” here is not used in the usual sense of the word, that is, Mahāyāna versus Hīnayāna. According to the definition given in the discussion immediately

following, Mahāyāna designates Suchness. The title of the text, *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, should therefore be understood as “the Awakening of Faith in the Absolute,” not in Mahāyāna Buddhism as distinguished from Hīnayāna Buddhism.<sup>300</sup>

The above comments, no doubt, are in danger of being misunderstood as a dualism of Mahāyāna and Faith because the word “Absolute”<sup>301</sup> is regarded as “a metaphysical Absolute” by Sungbae Park.<sup>302</sup>

Sungbae Park goes further in support of his translation, *The Awakening of Mahāyāna-Faith*, by employing his knowledge of Chinese grammar along with evidence from the text. Thus he says:

Our criteria for judging the correctness of the translation of the *Dacheng qixin lun* as Awakening Mahāyāna-Faith instead of Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna should be those established internally within the text itself. Let us begin by noting that in classical Chinese a verb rarely follows its object except in poetry, in which case rules of grammar are neglected. Therefore, the most likely relationship between *dacheng* and *qixin* is not that of a verbal phrase (*qixin*) and its object (*dacheng*) but rather that of a qualifier (*dacheng*) and that which it qualifies (*qixin*). This gives strong support to the translation of the title as Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna-Faith. The last line of the Invocation—*qi dacheng zhengxin*, “awakening right Mahāyāna-Faith”—and the line following it—*you fa nengqi moheyang xingen*, “There is a dharma which can arouse the root of Mahāyāna-Faith”—also support this translation. In these two lines the term “Mahāyāna” functions grammatically simply to qualify “Faith,”; it is thus highly improbable that “Mahāyāna” in the title is to be taken as the object of “faith.” In fact, of the fifty-four occurrences of the term *xin*, or “faith,” in the treatise, it is used as a transitive verb requiring an object only twelve times; in every other instance it is used as a noun obviously not requiring an object.<sup>303</sup>

The expression the “Awakening of Mahāyāna Right-Faith”<sup>304</sup> (*dacheng zhengxin*), as Sungbae Park indicates, is actually found in some places in the text.



According to the text, the *faxin* or the Awakening of Mind<sup>305</sup> arises from [Mahāyāna] Right-Faith.<sup>306</sup> Deep understanding arises from Right-Faith too,<sup>307</sup> however, the text distinguishes the types of Faith according to the capacity of sentient beings. That is to say, the *faxin* is targeted for the sentient beings who have already attained the Right-Faith, in contrast to the case in which sentient beings of lower capacity for Enlightenment are encouraged to practice Faith (*xinxin xiuxing*).<sup>308</sup> Although there is no evidence that the commentaries on the *Dacheng qixin lun* regard grammatical differences in the usage of the Chinese word *xin* as crucial criteria for determining the nature of Faith, it deserves attention that the *neng/suo* formula is used in relation to a technical method by which Faith can be practiced. With regard to the *neng/suo* formula, the following words of the third part of the *Dacheng qixin lun*, The Practice and Faith, provides one good example:

Briefly, there are four kinds of faith. What are the four? The first is the faith in the Ultimate Source [i.e., Mahāyāna]. It is called so because a wo/man comes to meditate with joy on the *suchness-dharma* [or the One Mind]. The second is the faith in the numberless excellent qualities of the Buddhas.... The third is the faith in the great benefits of the *Dharma*.... The fourth is the faith in the *Sangha* (Buddhist Community) whose members are able to devote themselves to the practice of benefiting both themselves and others.<sup>309</sup>

The above statement shows clearly that the *neng/suo* formula is used as no less an important soteriological tool than the *ti/yong* formula in the text.

Sungbae Park also seeks evidence from Wonhyo's commentary to support his supposition. He notes Wonhyo's comment on the title:

To conclude: Mahāyāna is the essence of the doctrine of this treatise; “awakening faith” is its efficacious function. [Thus], the title is composed [in such a way as] to show the unity of essence and function, hence the words, “Treatise on Mahāyāna Awakening the Faith.”<sup>310</sup>

Sungbae Park regards Wonhyo’s words above as clear evidence for expounding the relationship of *ti/yong* of *dacheng* and *qixin* in the title. He goes on to say: “According to Wonhyo, *dacheng* is not the object of *qixin*. Rather, Mahāyāna meaning ‘great carrier’ or ‘great vehicle’, represents *ti*, or ‘the internal essence’, whereas Faith represents *yong*, or ‘the external function.’” Thus, Sungbae Park believes that “the *ti/yong*” formula and “the *neng/suo* formula” are not incompatible. However, I contend that Wonhyo was endeavoring to reconcile the *ti/yong* formula and *neng/suo* formula. That is, he succeeds in making a reconciliation between *faxin* and “the Four Faiths and Five Practices.” According to Wonhyo, the two are targeted for sentient beings as different “vessels of *dharma*” for Enlightenment. He goes on to say,

If sentient beings of lower capacity for Enlightenment come to accomplish the Right-Faith, then they again proceed toward the three types of *faxin*. [Thus] there is something in common between the two in that, both aim at advancing the determined—though they differ in their function.<sup>311</sup>

It is safe to say, therefore, that the formula “the faith in ---,” or the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna targets sentient beings of lower capacity, helping *faxin* or “the awakening of the Mind” in them.

As we have seen before, the point of Sungbae Park’s criticism of Hakeda is that Hakeda attempts to apply the *neng/suo* formula to the translation of the title which, according to Sungbae Park, is not compatible with the *ti/yong* formula.

Sungbae Park argues that *neng/suo* formula or “the formula of the faith in ---,” implies a Cartesian dualism. I agree with Sungbae Park’s position that Hakeda’s translation has serious problems. Nevertheless, I do not agree with Sungbae Park in his identification of the *neng/suo* formula with Cartesian dualism. My position is supported by Fazang’s interpretation of the title *Dacheng qixin lun*.

Although Wonhyo tries to interpret the title *Dacheng qixin lun* exclusively in terms of the *ti/yong* paradigm, this does not prove that Wonhyo viewed *neng/suo* to be diametrically opposed to *ti/yong* without consideration of context. Rather, Fazang’s commentary on the text, which was influenced by Wonhyo, shows clearly that *ti/yong* and *neng/so* serve as equally important tools for the interpretation of the title. This does not mean that Wonhyo and Fazang disagree on the interpretation of the title. I would rather say that Fazang’s interpretation of the title is a supplement to Wonhyo’s interpretation.

#### Fazang’s Interpretation of the Title and Further Considerations on Wonhyo’s Interpretation of the Title

Fazang regards *ti/yong* and *neng/so* as equally important for interpreting the title *Dacheng qixin lun*. In his work *Dacheng Qixin lun bieji*, Fazang illustrates the relationship between Mahāyāna and Awakening Faith in terms of Two Gates, i.e., *xin/jing men* (or the Gate of Mind-object) and *ti/yong men* (or the Gate of essence-function). Each Gate has two meanings. The *xin/jing men* illustrates the relationship between Mahāyāna and Awakening Faith, demonstrating both the awakening (*nengqi*) vis à vis the awakened (*suoqi*) and the subject of faith (*nengxin*) vis à vis the object of faith (*suoxin*). *Ti/yong men*

represents the relationship of *ti/yong* to Mahāyāna and Awakening Faith by emphasizing 1) that the Awakening Faith (*yong*) is not separated from Māhāyana (*ti*), the Awakening Faith plays a role in returning to Mahāyāna and 2) the awakening faith is “the *karmic* function [of Māhāyana].”<sup>312</sup>

The project of the *ti/yong men* and *xin/jing men* is to show the respective relationships between *ti/yong* and *neng/suo*. In Chinese Buddhist texts the *neng/suo* formula is generally used to denote the state of a deluded mind as opposed to the mind of non-discrimination, but for Fazang it is an essential element in interpreting the title *Dacheng qixin lun*, along with the *ti/yong* formula. In his interpretation of the title Fazang attempts to treat the *ti/yong* formula and the *neng/suo* formula as equally essential elements. To him, the *neng/suo* formula demonstrates the dynamic structure of the *ti/yong*, i.e., *ti*’s *yong* and *yong*’s *ti*. That is, in terms of the *ti/yong men*, Fazang illustrates the dynamic structure of the *ti/yong* paradigm, i.e., *yong*’s *ti* (or “returning into Mahāyāna”) and *ti*’s *yong* (or “the *karmic* function of Mahāyāna”). In terms of *xin/jing men*, he shows that Mahāyāna (*suoxin*) becomes the object of Awakening [Mahāyāna-] Faith (*nengxin*) and that the understanding of Mahāyāna (*nengqi*) brings about Awakening Faith (*suoqi*). Thus, the idea of the *ti/yong men* and the *xin/jing men* characterizes Fazang’s unique way of interpreting the title *Dacheng qixin lun*.

This mode of analysis is not found in Wonhyo’s interpretation of the title. Wonhyo attempts to apply the *ti/yong* formula to the interpretation of the title, but, as we have seen before, he does not give a specific reference to the dynamic

relationship between *ti* and *yong*, let alone the *neng/suo* formula. This does not mean, however, that Wonhyo and Fazang differ in their interpretation of the title of the text. Throughout Wonhyo's works it is not difficult to find hints of the *neng/suo* formula. First of all, when commenting on the phrase from the *Dacheng qixin lun*: "There is a *dharma* (the essence of Mahāyāna, i.e., One Mind) which can arouse the root of Mahāyāna-Faith," he says, "If one has only to understand this *dharma* well, then one, in turn, is able to arouse the immense root of Mahāyāna-Faith." This comment is reminiscent of the relationship between *nengqi* (or "the understanding of One Mind") and *suoqi* (or "the immense root of Mahāyāna-Faith").

Next, when commenting on "Awakening [Mahāyāna-] Faith," Wonhyo suggests: "Faith, 'to believe that something is absolutely right', means to believe that [One Mind-] *Dharma* really exists, to believe that the practice can be obtained, [and] to believe that there are the limitless benefits thereof..."<sup>313</sup> There is no doubt that this comment implies Fazang's idea of *nengxin* and *suoxin*. However, "to believe" here is not confused with "Faith in the Absolute," because it is identical with "returning into Suchness."

Next, as mentioned earlier, Wonhyo makes no direct reference to the dynamic relationship between Mahāyāna and Awakening Faith in applying the *ti/yong* paradigm to the interpretation of the title *Dacheng qixin lun*, as does Fazang. To Fazang the *ti/yong* paradigm is applied to explain the dynamic relationship between Māhāyana and Awakening Faith in terms of *ti*'s *yong* and

*yong*'s *ti*. The *neng/suo* formula is devoted not only to explaining *ti*'s *yong* (or "Mahāyāna awakening Mahāyāna-Faith") but also to explaining *yong*'s *ti* (or "The returning to Mahāyāna"). Thus, *ti*'s *yong* and *yong*'s *ti* constitute two axes of the *ti/yong* formula. Fazang, unlike Wonhyo, emphasizes the dynamic relationship between Mahāyāna (*ti*) and the Awakening Faith (*yong*) in the title. However, this does not mean that Wonhyo and Fazang disagree on their view of the *ti/yong* paradigm. Although Wonhyo has nothing to say about the dynamic relationship between *ti* and *yong* in his interpretation of the title *Dacheng qixin lun*, it is clear that Wonhyo is aware of the significance of the relationship. Related to this, Sungbae Park emphasizes the significance of the dynamic relationship between *ti* and *yong* in the interpretation of the preface of the *Kūmgang samme kyōng non* which is closely related to *So*.<sup>314</sup>

#### Fundamental Differences between the *Śūnyatā*/*Śūnyatāprayojana* Relationship and the *Ti/Yong* Relationship

Surprisingly enough, the manner in which Nāgārjuna separates *śūnyatā* from *śūnyatāprayojana* is reminiscent of the *ti/yong* paradigm where a parallel contrast between essence and function represents one of the elements of the *ti/yong* paradigm. There is no doubt that Nāgārjuna is keenly aware of a mode of analysis in which the essence of a thing is separated from its function. Nevertheless, there appears to be a fundamental difference between the *śūnyatā*/*śūnyatāprayojana* relationship and the *ti/yong* relationship. I will try to discuss the fundamental difference between them from the two perspectives.

1) The *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship and the *tī/yong* relationship disagree with regard to the meaning of “function”

As mentioned earlier, Candrakīrti does speak about the concept of “essence” using *svabhāva*. Although, Candrakīrti does not go so far as to maintain that the term *svabhāva* implies a holistic mode of expression as in the case of the concept of *tī*. Nevertheless it can be paralleled with the concept of *tī* in the sense that it can be considered one way of cataphatic expression of Wisdom.

Simply given the externals, the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship resembles the *tī/yong* relationship. However, the fundamental difference between the two is that the terms *śūnyatāprayojana*, or “the function of *śūnyatā*,” and *yong*, or “the external function of inner Wisdom,” do not agree over the meaning of “function.” That is to say, the term *śūnyatāprayojana* is identical with the destruction of *prapañca* or “the referential function of language.” It is said that the main concern in the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship is to show that *śūnyatā* or Wisdom participates directly in destroying *prapañca*. According to Nāgārjuna, the destruction of *prapañca* is not identical with the destruction of the conventional language, rather it is identical with conventional designation (*prajñaptir upādāya*). Of course, it is admitted that the conventional designation may include a conceptual expression of the ultimate truth or Wisdom, but we can find no evidence that the conceptual expression of Wisdom is engaged in expressing the external function of Wisdom itself.

In contrast, the *ti/yong* relationship can be represented by the relationship of inner Wisdom to its external function, where an emphasis is not on the therapeutic function of Wisdom in form of “the destruction of ---” but on the external function of inner Wisdom. The basic idea of this *ti/yong* relationship is reflected in Wonhyo’s commentary on the *Dacheng qixin lun*.

In his commentary on the invocation in the *Dacheng qixin lun*, Wonhyo divides the invocation into three great parts, i.e., devotion to the Buddha, the Dharma (Buddhist Teaching), and the Sangha (Buddhist Community). He further sub-divided the devotion to the Buddha into three parts, i.e.—praising the excellence of Buddha’s mind (*xinde*), praising the excellence of Buddha’s form (*sede*), and praising the person. Wonhyo employs the *ti/yong* paradigm in the interpretation of the first two of these subdivisions. Against praising the excellence of Buddha’s mind Wonhyo interprets the phrases “omniscient” (*bianzhi*) as *ti* and “most excellent deeds” (*zuishengye*) in all the ten directions as *yong*. Against praising Buddha’s form he interprets the phrase “unimpeded” (*sewuai*) as *ti* and “omnipotent” (*zizai*) as *yong*. Elsewhere in the same text, Wonhyo identifies *yong*, the “inconceivable function” of *tathāgatagarbha* (*mulaizang busiyi yeyong*), as *ti* and “the pure function” (*jingyong*) [of Suchness] as *yong*.<sup>315</sup>

More important, the *Dacheng qixin lun* presents the concept of *yong* as the external function of inner Wisdom in relation with the Buddhist notion of the three Buddha-bodies, i.e.—“*dharma*-body” (*dharma kāya*), “transformation-body” (*nirmānika kāya*), and “enjoyment-body” (*sāmbhogika kāya*). That is, the external function of inner Wisdom (*yong*) is identical with the last two,



“transformation-body” (*nirmānika kāya*) and “enjoyment-body” (*sāmbhogika kāya*).<sup>316</sup>

It is generally believed that the Buddhist notion of the three Buddha-bodies was developed from the Buddhist notion of the two Buddha-bodies, i.e., *dharma kāya* and *rūpa kāya*. The Buddhist notion of the three Buddha-bodies is found in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* belonging to the Yogācāra tradition and in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* belonging to Tathāgatagarbha tradition. According to Jōkō Takeuchi, the Yogācāra notion of three Buddha-bodies is associated with transformation (*āśraya parāvṛtti*) as an ascent from ordinary people to the Buddha, while the Tathāgatagarbha notion of the three Buddha-bodies is associated with transformation as a descent from Buddha to ordinary people. Given that the theory of the three Buddha-bodies in the *Dacheng qixin lun* contributes to demonstrating *ti*’s *yong* in terms of descent, it seems to be influenced directly by the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, rather than by the Yogācāra tradition.<sup>317</sup>

Thus, it is clear that the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship is a kind of mode of analysis in which the essence is separated from its function. However, it violates the basic spirit of the *ti/yong* relationship, which is the relationship between inner Wisdom and the external function.

2) The *Śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship is hard to apply to the theory of permeation

In the Buddhist tradition, the light-and-darkness metaphor serves as an effective tool for explaining the relationship between Wisdom and Ignorance—

the light of Wisdom is covered up with the darkness of Ignorance, the darkness of Ignorance disappears with the light of Wisdom. However, the *ti/yong* relationship in the *Dacheng qixin lun* differs from the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship with regard to the relationship between Wisdom and Ignorance. In what follows I will examine how differently the *ti/yong* relationship explains the relationship between Wisdom and Ignorance through “the theory of permeation” and in what sense the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship cannot be read as the *ti/yong* relationship.<sup>318</sup>

The main idea of the theory of permeation is that Suchness or Wisdom permeates Ignorance with the force of perfume (*zhenmu xunxi*) and Ignorance permeates Suchness with the force of perfume (*wuming xunxi*). According to this theory, on the one hand, a deluded mind, resulting from Ignorance permeating Suchness, permeates Ignorance. On the other hand, the deluded mind is able to permeate Suchness by the force of the causes and conditions of Suchness which are identical with the two-fold forces of perfume, i.e., the force of *ziti xunxi* (or “permeation through self-essence/attributes of Wisdom”) and *yong xunxi* (or “permeation through Compassion”). These two-fold permeations are technically called “*ti/yong* perfume” in the *Dacheng qixin lun*.

Thus, the text attempts to express the traditional principle of Wisdom and Compassion through the theory of the *ti/yong* permeation. The *ti/yong* perfume shows not only *ti*’s *yong* (the external function of inner Wisdom) but also *yong*’s *ti* (the returning to Wisdom itself). Whereas the *ti*’s *yong* represents the Buddha’s

descent, the *yong*'s *ti* represents the ascent of those who have yet been awakened to Wisdom.

According to the text, the *ti/yong* permeation is divided in two according to the types of recipients.

One is yet to be united [with Suchness]. Ordinary men, the Hīnayānists, those Bodhisattvas who have just been initiated devote themselves to religious practices on the strength of their faith, being permeated by Suchness through their mind and consciousness. Not having obtained the indiscriminate mind, however, they are yet to be united with the essence [of Suchness], and not having obtained [the perfection of] the disciple of free acts, they are yet to be united with the essence [of Suchness]. The other is already united [with Suchness]. Bodhisattvas who realize *Dharmakaya* have obtained the undiscriminating mind and are united with the essence of the Buddhas. They, having obtained free acts, are united with the influence of the Wisdom of the Buddhas. They singly devote themselves, with spontaneity, to their religious disciples on the strength of Suchness within; permeating into Suchness [so that Suchness will reclaim itself], they destroy Ignorance.<sup>319</sup>

As we have seen before, the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship cannot be reduced to the *ti/yong* relationship in that it does not represent the external function of inner Wisdom, the key for understanding the *ti/yong* relationship. Furthermore, the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship itself cannot admit the theory of permeation.

## CHAPTER 10

### CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I have tried to provide a new approach to the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā*. I have suggested that Nāgārjuna was aware of a "system" when he speaks of *śūnyatā*. Of course, there is no evidence that Nāgārjuna was empathetic in explicating and analyzing the system. However, in the *Kārikā* when he warns his opponents, wishing to prevent them from misunderstanding the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, he shows indirectly the significance of this soteriological system by separating the doctrine of *śūnyatā* from the three perspectives, i.e., *śūnyatārtha*, *śūnyatā*, and *śūnyatāprayojana* which are considered the three aspects of *śūnyatā*. I have proposed that they themselves reflect a system in which Nāgārjuna exhibits his project of *śūnyatā*. I borrowed this idea of viewing a Buddhist doctrine as a system in which it exhibits its own project of Buddhist salvation. This consideration suffices to show the inadequacy of some Western methodology applied to the interpretation of the doctrine of *śūnyatā* as nihilism, absolutism, positivism, etc.

These three aspects of *śūnyatā* are interrelated with each other in a single unit and any one of them aids to clarify the rest. I have tried to 1) demonstrate the soteriological meaning of this system relying on Candrakīrti's comments. For

convenience, I started to investigate what Nāgārjuna intends by the term *śūnyatārtha*. Supported by Candrakīrti's comments on this term I interpreted the term *śūnyatārtha* as the doctrinal meaning of *śūnyatā*. I have tried to suggest that *Kārikā* 24:18 shows clearly that *śūnyatā* plays a mediating role in this identification of fundamental early Buddhist doctrines. What does Nāgārjuna intend to show through this presentation? This is closely related to the question of understanding the historical/doctrinal context of Nāgārjuna's concept of *śūnyatā*, the main task of Chapter 2. As I have mentioned in the Introduction, this is the reason I gave priority to the term *śūnyatārtha* over *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprajojana* in the order of discussion. Historically, this is to say, not only was the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* in a danger of being misunderstood as a causal sequence, but also the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, which appeared to cure this misreading of the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*, was also in danger of being misunderstood as nihilism. Therefore, what Nāgārjuna seemed to intend by that doctrinal identification is to show that *śūnyatā* helps in interpreting the right meaning of fundamental Buddhist doctrines and that it obtains a doctrinal justification from the fundamental doctrines. Thus, it is interesting to note that Nāgārjuna sees the neglect of the significance of this doctrinal identification as one of the main causes of the misunderstanding of his soteriological enterprise.

Next, in attempting to illustrate the soteriological meaning of the term *śūnyatā*, I have suggested that Nāgārjuna attempts to explore the essence of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, which is identical with "the ultimate truth" (*paramārtha*

*satya*) no matter what it is called. The ultimate truth has no assumption of an Absolute, independent of the phenomenal world. In the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna attempts to demonstrate the ultimate truth through the theory of the Two Truths. There are, of course, a number of other interpretations of this theory, but I intend to suggest that the two soteriological forces of Mahāyāna Buddhism, i.e., Wisdom and Compassion underlie the theory of the Two Truths. Wisdom and Compassion are not separable from each other, but for convenience I have tried to separately demonstrate the relationship between the Two Truths in terms of Wisdom and Compassion. I believe that Nāgārjuna's account in *Kārikā* 24:8-9,10, which is the direct source of the theory of the Two Truths and represents the theory of the Two Truths in different perspectives, supports my own position on the Two Truths. I attempted to interpret these three verses as representative of the Two Truths 1) in terms of Wisdom, 2) the descendent and 3) the ascendent of Compassion.

In terms of Wisdom, the ultimate truth and the conventional truth are in a centrifugal relation where the former is not compatible with the latter. This is in the sense that the conventional truth cannot participate directly in realizing the ultimate truth. In contrast to this, in terms of Compassion, the ultimate truth and the conventional truth are in a centripetal relationship. The ultimate truth is compatible with the conventional truth in that the conventional truth is a congregating point where the Buddha's descending and ordinary people's ascending meet. In descending, the ultimate truth manifests itself in the conventional truth, while in ascending, the ultimate truth becomes the goal and

the conventional truth the means by which ordinary people ascend to the ultimate truth.

Thirdly, Nāgārjuna intends to show the functional value of the doctrine of *śūnyatā* by the term *śūnyatāprayojana*. The Sanskrit term *prayojana* possesses a perennial meaning like purpose/function/utility, but I represent it as “function.” I do this in reference to the term *śūnyatāprayojana* based on Candrakīrti’s comment where the term is used clearly as meaning the function of *śūnyatā*, more specifically “the destruction of *prapañca*.” I have suggested that the term *prapañca* means primarily the referential function of language and is closely related to terms like *dṛṣṭi*, *vikalpa*/*kalpanā*, *karma*, and *kleśa*, etc. which are not separable from each other in many cases. I have tried to suggest that it is not refutation but Wisdom itself which participates in destroying *prapañca* and its related concepts like *dṛṣṭi*. The main point of my discussion here is that Wisdom plays a role in correcting the referential function of language with which ordinary people are afflicted.

Thus, I have tried to interpret the three aspects of *śūnyatā* as a Nāgārjunian scheme exhibiting his own project of *śūnyatā*. However, the highlight of the present study is to review Nāgārjuna’s project of *śūnyatā* in light of the doctrine of One Mind. I attempt to bring in the doctrine of One Mind to the evaluation of Nāgārjuna’s project of *śūnyatā*, focusing on two significant issues. One is to review the project of the Two Truths in light of the Two Gates, and the other is to review the *śūnyatā*/*śūnyatāprayojana* relationship in terms of

the *ti/yong* paradigm. As for the first issue, I have argued that the Two Truths and the Two Gates are both designed to explore the two soteriological forces of Wisdom and Compassion. The differences between the two projects lie in their different linguistic strategies. That is to say, in contrast with the project of the Two Truths, that of the Two Gates uses cataphatic language in expressing the ultimate truth. More importantly, the project of the Two Gates is of a self-explanatory and analytical character. This is lacking in the project of the Two Truths. I noted the distinction between *ti* and *ziti* and pointed out that this distinction shows clearly the centrifugal and centripetal relationship between the Two Gates. Nevertheless, here, lies a doctrinal continuity between the Two Truths and the Two Gates in the sense that both agree that the use of language is meaningful only for soteriological purposes. It would not be wrong to say that this view of language is common to all Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriological concepts. With regard to the second issue, I have tried to show how Nāgārjuna's distinction between *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprayojana* can be reproduced in the pair of the *ti/yong*. I argued that the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship may be paralleled with the *ti/yong* paradigm in the sense that it can be reduced to essence and function, but I suggested that this fails to demonstrate the essential idea of the *ti/yong* paradigm. First of all, the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship and the *ti/yong* paradigm disagree on the meaning of "function." That is to say, the basic idea of function in the *ti/yong* paradigm lies in emphasizing the external exposure of the inner essence. This idea is lacking in the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship. Moreover, the *śūnyatā/śūnyatāprayojana* relationship fails to



explain the dynamic relationship between the two concepts, unlike the case of the *ti/yong* paradigm.

It is arguable that, for most Buddhist scholars, the doctrine of *śūnyatā* and One Mind are incompatible with each other. However, I have proposed that there is a doctrinal continuity between *śūnyatā* and One Mind as important Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriological concepts, though differences appear in their soteriological strategies.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> I owe my understanding of the three interpretations of *śūnyatā* to Andrew P. Tuck, *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 31-73.

<sup>2</sup> It is agreeable to scholars that the nineteenth-century European Buddhist scholarship is responsible for the nihilistic interpretation of *śūnyatā*. See *ibid.* 31-37.

<sup>3</sup> Jay L. Garfield, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 302, footnote 114.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew P. Tuck, *op.cit.*, 36.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 49-51.

<sup>9</sup> “*yo na kiñcid api paṇyam dāsyāmyuktaḥ sa ced dehi bhos tadeva mahyam na kiñcin nāma paṇyam iti brūyāt sa...*” See Candrakīrti, *Mūlamadhyamakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā de Candrakīrti*, ed. Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Bibliotheca, Vol. IV (hereafter this shall be abridged into “*Prasannapadā*”) (St.-Péterberg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1913), 247 l. 5-248 l. 1. I owe the English translation to Nayak. See G. C. Nayak, *The Mādhyamika Attack on Essentialism: A Critical Appraisal*, *PEW* 29, no. 4 (Oct 1979), 479.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew P. Tuck, *op.cit.*, 64.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 56-57.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 61-63.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>15</sup> Hsuehli Cheng, "Phenomenology and 'T'ien-tai and Hua-yen Buddhism." In *Phenomenology of Life in a Dialogue Between Chinese and Occidental Philosophy*, ed., Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. 17 (Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984), 224-225.

<sup>16</sup> Harsh Narain gathers together many of the current conflicting interpretations on *śūnyatā* in the recent Mādhyamika scholarship. See Harsh Narain, *The Mādhyamika Mind* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1997), 49-66.

<sup>17</sup> I borrowed this methodology from Streng. See Frederick J. Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning of Śūnyatā* (Nashville: Abington Press, 1967), 21-22.

<sup>18</sup> For more detail, see *ibid.*, 155-169.

<sup>19</sup> In Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* the word *śūnyatāprayojana* comes first, *śūnyatā* comes second, and *śūnyatārtha* comes third in the order of a sentence. However, in Piṅgala's commentary *śūnyatā* is followed by *śūnyatāprayojana*, which is followed by *śūnyatārtha*. For convenience, I will deal with *śūnyatārtha* first, then *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatāprayojana*. In so doing, I intend to deal with *śūnyatārtha* in the extension of the discussion over the historical/doctrinal background of *śūnyatā*. The understanding of *śūnyatā* is essential for understanding *śūnyatāprayojana*.

<sup>20</sup> The dissimilarity between the nature of Christian soteriology and Buddhist soteriology is evident in many respects. First of all, since the Christian soteriology essentially presupposes God and involves a relationship with Him, there can be no possibility of a strict parallel between Christian soteriology and Buddhist soteriology. For more detail on these issues see Tissa Weerasingha, "Salvation in Buddhist Contexts" in *Salvation: Some Asian Perspectives*, edited by Ken Gnanakan (Bangalore: Asia Theological Association, 1992), 155-156.

<sup>21</sup> Whalen Lai, *The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana—A Study of the Unfolding of Sinitic Mahayana Motifs* (Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1975), 124-133.

<sup>22</sup> In the *Agamas* the term "*śūnyatā*" is often followed by *anātman* (No-self) or precedes it in a logical sequence, that sequence being "Impermanence," "Suffering," "No-self" and *śūnyatā*. For examples of the former case, see *Zaahan jing*, T. no. 99, 219c4; T. no. 125, 702b18-21 and 715c12-16. For examples of the latter case, see *Zaahan jing*, T. no. 99, 92b18-19, 153a11, 315b21, etc.

<sup>23</sup> The term “*prajñā*,” which is reckoned as one of the fundamental concepts of Mahāyāna tradition is found in several places in the Sanskrit text of the *Ratnāvalī*, for example, 1:4; 1:5; 2:38; 2:40; and 5:37. See Nāgārjuna, *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī*, ed. & trans. Michael Hahn (Bonn: Indica et Tibertica Verlag, 1982).

<sup>24</sup> See David J. Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 7-8; 11-16.

<sup>25</sup> In his work *Ratnavālī* Nāgārjuna criticizes Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Jaina who develop the views of *pudgala* or “Self” and *skandha* or “Aggregates.” See “*sasāṃkhyaulūkyanirgrantha pudgalaskandhavādinam/ prccha lokam yadi vadaty astināstiviyatikranam*”// (1:61). According to Chr. Lindtner, Nāgārjuna is familiar with non-Buddhist traditions like Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, Nyāya, Lokāyata, Īśvaravāda, etc. as well as Tripiṭaka. Chr. Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 250-251.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 261.

<sup>28</sup> For a comprehensive understanding of the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures I recommend Mitsuyosi Saigusa, “*Hannya kyō no seiritsu*,” in *Hannya shisō*, ed. Akira hirakawa, Kajiyama Yūichi, and Takasaki Jikidō, *Kōza taizō bukkyō* vol. 2, (Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, 1983), 87-122.

<sup>29</sup> These belong to a later period of the groups of Shorter and Larger Verses respectively.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Maurice Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), 301-304.

<sup>31</sup> I do not agree with Hajime Nakamura that the *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures simply employed the concept of *śūnyatā* in reaction to the theory of *svabhāva*. I believe that *śūnyatā* is basically “silence” or “the realization of the ultimate truth” anterior to a linguistic expression. The *Prajñāparamitā* scriptures underscore that silence is identical with Bodhisattva’s Enlightenment and can never be the object of a normal cognition. In this relation, Mitsuyoshi Saigusa says that Hajime Nakamura’s argument is not fully satisfactory. See Mitsuyoshi Saigusa, *Hannya kyō no shinri*, Gendaijin no bukkyō-Butten 5 (Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, 1971), 23 and 46.

<sup>32</sup> Hajime Nakamura, *Yongsu ūi sam kwa sasang*, trans. by Jaeho Lee (Seoul: Pulkyo sidae sa, 1993), 169. He claims also that the order of the historical development of these three concepts appears to be diametrically opposed to that of their logical relation. According to him, in their logical relation, *niḥsvabhāva* is followed by the *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is followed by *śūnyatā*.

<sup>33</sup> The *Middle Treatise*, which is not extant in Sanskrit and was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva. This text has traditionally been believed to be Nāgārjuna's commentary on the *Kārikā*, but modern scholarship is suspicious of Nāgārjuna's authorship. According to Musashi Tachikawa, the *Middle Treatise* is one of the oldest commentaries on the *Kārikā*, second only to the *Akutoḥhayā*. He has also presumed that Piṅgala's commentary uses the *Akutoḥhayā* for its basis, by pointing out a similarity in the way of writing between the two. See Musashi Tachikawa, *Chūron no shisō* (Kyōto: Hōzōkan, 1994), 19.

<sup>34</sup> I followed Brian Bocking's translation of the text, except for some words with my own. See Brian Bocking, *Nāgārjuna in China: A Translation of the Middle Treatise* (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), 104-105.

<sup>35</sup> “*na ca mādhyamikasya svataḥ svatantram anumanaṁ kartum*”, *Prasannapadā*, 16, l. 2.

<sup>36</sup> I owe this interpretation to Candrakīrti: “*atha kiṁ punaḥ śūnyatāyaṁ prayojanaṁ...*” Ibid., 490, l. 15-491, l. 15.

<sup>37</sup> Chr. Lindter holds that, “If we had to condense his system in all its aspects to one single term we should choose *bodhisādhana* (not e.g. *śūnyatā* or *pratītyasamutpāda*).” Chr. Lindter, op.cit., 249. I disagree with him about this matter. I believe that not only does Nāgārjuna attempt to present his soterological enterprise through *śūnyatā* but also *śūnyatā* suffices for *bodhisādhana*.

<sup>38</sup> It has come to my attention that the terms “positive” and “negative” may confuse my readers if I fail to first demonstrate in which context I am using the term “positive.” Some scholars seek a negative position for *śūnyatā* from the logic of the *Prāsaṅgika* Mādhamikas. Others hold that *śūnyatā* has a positive position by following that of the *Svatantrika* Mādhamikas. Apart from this matter, the terms have a tendency to be used in relation to the interpretation of *śūnyatā*, i.e.—whether it is nihilism or absolutism. Here I use the term “positive” to point to Nāgārjuna's enterprise of *śūnyatā*.

<sup>39</sup> See Yoshio Nishi, “*Shinzoku niteisetsu no kōzo*,” in *Bukkyō no konbon shinri*, ed. Shonson Miyamoto (Tōkyō: Sanseido, 1957), 198.

<sup>40</sup> In relation to this, Kōsai Yasui holds that *samvṛtti satya* is language while the *paramārthā satya* is *anātman* or silence. He does so by quoting some phrases from “*Renqi jing*” in *Zaahan jing*. See Kōsai Yasui, op.cit., 47-48.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>44</sup> Loc.cit.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 67. This phrase is paired with *Kārikā* 24:8, “The Buddha’s teaching of the *dharma* is based on the Two Truths: *samvṛtti satya* and *paramārthā satya*.” Yasui holds that the Two Truths of these passages, found in both the *25,000 Verses* and the *Kārikā*, denotes the forms of teaching rather than the form of truth. I do not agree with him about this matter. He seems to believe that the verb “teach,” grammatically, has two objects, i.e., *samvṛtti satya* and *paramārthā satya*, which thereby means two kinds of teachings. But these two sentences clearly show that the teaching is based on the Two Truths rather than to teach *samvṛtti satya* and *paramārthā satya*. More basically, it is not reasonable to say that the *25,000 ślokas* and the *Kārikā* would suggest two kinds of Two Truths, i.e., the form of teachings and the form of truths as Kōsai Yasui says.

<sup>46</sup> The *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*, T. no. 231, 702 c 28-29.

<sup>47</sup> In a commentary on the *Kārikā*, Piṅgala states that the *Kārikā* was written in order to criticize those Abhidharma Buddhists who clung to the early Buddhist doctrines, like the Twelve Links, the Five Aggregates, the Twelve Bases, and the Eighteen Realms.

<sup>48</sup> I do not agree with Yasui on the interpretation of *Kārikā* 24:18. He regards *śūnyatā* and *prajñāptirupādāya* as a criticism of Non-Being and Being respectively and the middle as the middle position of these two. See Kosai Yasui, op.cit., 211. However, I would suggest that *śūnyatā*, *prajñāptirupādāya*, and the Middle Way should be understood as an identical relation. I would also say that that *śūnyatā* is the criticism of the realistic view of Dependent Co-Arising while *prajñāptirupādāya* is a criticism of the nihilistic view of *śūnyatā*. On this matter Paul L. Swanson supports my position. See Paul L. Swanson, *Foundation of T’ien-Tai Philosophy* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 5.

<sup>49</sup> The *Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing*, T. no. 231, 703a28-29.

<sup>50</sup> A prevalent point of view within Japanese scholarship admits that Nāgārjuna intended to add chapter 26, dealing with the Twelve Links to the *Kārikā*, in order to contrast it with the Mahāyāna doctrine of Dependent Co-Arising of Non-Arising. In this regard, Hajime Nakamura legitimizes this position by quoting Jizang's *Zhonglun shu*:

What the Buddha intends is, to negate the Twelve Links by teaching it. That what is not the Twelve Links became the Twelve Links, is called the conventional truth. That what is the Twelve Links becomes what is not the Twelve Links, is the ultimate truth.... To know that the Twelve Links are emptiness is nothing else but the ultimate truth." (See Hajime Nakamura, op.cit., 136)

Most Western scholars would not agree with this position. It seems to me that Jizang means to demonstrate the real meaning of the Twelve Links rather than to disparage it. In relation to this, Jizang says, "Hināyāna enters into the Ultimate Truth by depending on the Arising-Ceasing-Gate of the Twelve Links while Mahāyāna enters into the ultimate truth by realizing the Non-Arising/Non-Ceasing of the Twelve Links." See *Zhongguan lunshu* (10 zhuan), T. no. 1824, 6a16-17.

<sup>51</sup> *The Shentien wang banruo bolomi jing*, T. no. 231, 690c17-18.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 697b9-14.

<sup>53</sup> *Zaahan jing*, T. no. 99, 67a1-15.

<sup>54</sup> The title *Dacheng qixin lun* presents a problem. In Asian textual traditions, the title of a text is often seen as representing the central idea of the text. The problem of the translation of the title, therefore, is closely related to that of the interpretation of a general idea of a text. The *Dacheng qixin lun* has been translated as "the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna" by many scholars. Hakeda follows this translation. However, this translation became a target of criticism for Sungbae Park. In his work, *Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment*, Sungbae Park champions a new translation, "the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith", by insisting that Hakeda's translation may mislead one into a dualistic view of Mahāyāna and Faith. I think that Sungbae Park's translation is effective in demonstrating the relationship of *ti/yong* between *dacheng* and *qixin*. In Chinese translation, the terms *ti* or "essence" and *yong* or "function" represent the two aspects of oneness. That is, *ti* refers to the essential aspect of oneness, whereas *yong* refers to its functional aspect. Thus *ti* and *yong* are not two distinct entities but two different aspects of oneness. In this sense, I think Sungbae Park touches on a more essential matter with his translation. Nevertheless, Sungbae Park fails to understand that the formula "the faith in Mahāyāna," which is devised as an

expedient means for sentient beings of lower capacity, is no less important to Buddhist faith than is the *ti/yong* formula. Throughout the text, it is clear that the terms *dacheng* and *qixin* are not only two essential topics but they also reflect the formula “the faith in Mahāyāna” as well as the relationship of *ti/yong*. Therefore, I suggest an alternative translation, “The Treatise on the Mahāyāna/the Awakening of Faith.” Related to this, I have presented an article to AAR Regional Conference (Feb. 25, 1999) in Arlington, Virginia, entitled “A Critical Study of the Translation and Interpretation of the Title of the *T’a-ch’eng ch’i-hsin lun* [*Dacheng qixin lun*].” I shall come back to this in Chapter 9.

<sup>55</sup> For a recent study of the authorship of the text, see William H. Grosnick, “The Categories of *T’i*, *Hsiang*, and *Yung*: Evidence that Paramārtha Composed the Awakening of Faith,” *JIAS*, 12, no 1 (1989): 65-92.

<sup>56</sup> Hiroo Kashiwagi, *Daijō kishin ron no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, 1981), 180.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

<sup>58</sup> In the text the term Mahāyāna is explained in two ways, i.e., *fa* (Skt. *dharma*) or “the principle of Māhāyana” and *yi* or “its significance.” The principle of Mahāyāna is identified with One Mind, the latter being divided into its two aspects, i.e.—its Suchness aspect and Ceasing-Arising aspect. The significance of Mahāyāna is again expressed by the categories of *ti* or essence, *xiang* or its appearances and *yong* or its functions.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 467.

<sup>60</sup> Hiroo Kashiwagi illustrates the various views on this matter well. *Ibid.*, 144-177.

<sup>61</sup> In so far as this point is concerned, Hiroo Kashiwagi fails to recognize the significance of Wonhyo’s perspective by simply identifying it with Wonhyo’s remarks in *Pyŏlgi*, where he characterizes the text as the reconciliation of the confrontation of Mādhyāmika and Yogācāra.

<sup>62</sup> Fazang is considered a precursor who seeks to find the central thought of the *Dacheng qixin lun* in the *tathāgatagarbha* thought. In his four-fold classifications of teaching he regards the *Dacheng qixin lun* as belonging to the Tathāgatagarbha school. Furthermore, in his *fanjiao* system, the Five Teachings and Ten Schools, the *Dacheng qixin lun* and *Laṅkāvatara Sūtra* are grouped into the Actual, Final and Sudden Teachings of Three Vehicles, while *Heyan Sūtra* is grouped with the Comprehensive Teaching of One Vehicle. Many scholars,



influenced by Fazang, still attempt to characterize the text as *tathāgatagarbha* thought.

<sup>63</sup> Pyŏngraee Lee, “Yŏraejang sŏl kwa wonhyo,” *Wonhyo yŏnku non ch’ong* (Seoul: Kukt’ot’ongilwonjosasil, 1987), 479. In the same article, he intends to legitimate his argument by comprehensively introducing the views of authoritative Japanese scholars sharing the same position.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 482.

<sup>65</sup> *So*, 703c19-21.

<sup>66</sup> Loc.cit

<sup>67</sup> T’aewon Park, *Taesŭng kishillon sasang yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Min’jog sa, 1994), 74. Sungbae Park and Taewon Park agree on this matter, but they have different motivations. Sungbae Park aims to criticize Jonghong Park’s view that, “Wonhyo means to reconcile Sanlun and Weishi by the logic of *hwajaeng* (Ch. *hezhen*) or harmonization of doctrinal controversy,” whereas T’aewon Park argues against Ikchin Ko and Jŏnghŭi Ūn’s views that, “Wonhyo attempts to associate *Zhongguan lun* and *Weishi lun* with the Two Gates by reconciling their doctrinal controversy.”

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p. 83.

<sup>69</sup> In the immediately following section, I will come back this matter.

<sup>70</sup> T’aewon Park, op.cit., 111. Yoshihide Yoshizu holds that Fazang attempts to criticize Wonhyo’s reconciliation between Yogācāra thought and the *Dacheng qixin lun* by emphasizing the relationship between *tathāgatagarbha* and the *Dacheng qixin lun*. Nevertheless, he would not go so far as to hold that Yogācāra thought is Wonhyo’s position regarding a central thought in this text. Yoshizu characterizes Wonhyo’s perspective on the *Dacheng qixin lun* as “Mahāyāna of One Vehicle,” where the text reconciles all other Mahāyāna Sūtras, like *Heyan jing*, etc. According to him, Fazang’s *Dacheng qixin lun yiji* is aimed at criticizing Wonhyo’s “Mahāyāna of One Vehicle.” See Yoshihide Yoshizu, *kegon ichijō shisō no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Daitō shuppansha, 1991), 518; 520.

<sup>71</sup> *Pŏylgi*, 679c19-680b2.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 682a2-9.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 681c18-682a9.

<sup>74</sup> T'aewon Park, op.cit., 124.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>76</sup> *So*, 707c16-708a 6.

<sup>77</sup> Ikchin Ko, "*Wonhyo ŭi kishillon so pyŏlgi rŭl t'onghae bon chinsok wolyung muae kwan kwa kŭ sŏngnip iron*," *Pulgyo hakpo*, vol. 10 (Seoul: Dongguk University, 1973), 290. However, as I have already mentioned above, this passage is only available in *Pyŏlgi* and is omitted in *So*.

<sup>78</sup> Ikchin Ko, *Han'guk kodaie pulgyo sasang sa* (Seoul: Dongguk University Press, 1989), 193.

<sup>79</sup> See Ikchin Ko, "*Wonhyo ŭi hwaŏm sasang*," *Han'guk hwaŏm sasang yŏn'gu*, Pulkyo yŏn'guso p'yŏn (Seoul: Dongguk University Press, 1982), 60. Ikchin Ko claims that the Two Gates exactly match Madhyāmika and Yogācāra, in fact they form their own doctrinal system by transforming the original teachings of these two schools. According to T'aewon Park, Ikchjin Ko is probably the first scholar who attempts to relate the two systems with the Two Gates of One Mind. See T'aewon Park, op.cit., p. 70.

<sup>80</sup> Ikchin Ko (1989), op.cit., 195-196.

<sup>81</sup> Loc.cit

<sup>82</sup> Here my argument is indebted to T'aewon Park. See T'aewon Park, op.cit. 133-134.

<sup>83</sup> In this regard, Wonhyo says that, "In the following words there is an important reason as to why the *ti* or "essence" of Mahāyāna is said to be in the *tathatā* Gate and *ziti* or "self-essence" is said to be in the Arising-Ceasing Gate. It will be revealed in the subsequent interpretation."

<sup>84</sup> In this sentence Ikchin Ko translates the *ziti* of Mahāyāna into the *ti* of Mahāyāna itself.

<sup>85</sup> T. no. 1666, 575c16-17.

<sup>86</sup> *Pyŏlgi*, 678a19-b 26; *So*, 698b20-c29.

<sup>87</sup> *So*, 704a8-14.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 698c7-10.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 701b14-c6.

<sup>90</sup> T. no. 1666, 575 b23-24.

<sup>91</sup> So, 702b11-15.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 705a14-16.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 703b23-24.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 703b2-c1. Hiroo Kasiwagi takes note of the relationship between the *Dacheng qixin lun* and the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra*, but he fails to relate the idea of One Voice to One Mind. See Hiroo Kasiwagi, op.cit., 443-444.

<sup>95</sup> So, 704c20-705a3. It seems clear that Wonhyo seeks for the doctrinal source of the Two Gates in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Hiroo clearly rejects this position on the grounds that the Sanskrit counterparts of the Chinese translations can never be read in such a manner. As crucial evidence of his position, Hiroo Kasiwagi quotes the following phrase in the Sanskrit original of this text: “*ekāgrasyāitad [praśamaṃ] adhivacanam tathāgatagarbha-svapratyātmāryajñāna gocarasyaṭit praveśo....*” If our interpretation should be limited to only this phrase, it is implausible to read it in the same manner as Wonhyo interprets it. However, if we look to the immediately antecedent phrase, we can never exclude the possibility of an interpretation such as Wonhyo’s, i.e.—the text reads: “*atra svavikalpa grahaṇam pratigṛhya dharma adharma prativikalpayanti / na ca dharma adharmoḥ prahāṇena caranti vikalpayanti na praśamaṃ / ekāgrasya etad [praśamaṃ] adhivacanam tathāgatagarbha-svapratyātmāryajñāna gocarasya etad [ekāgra] praveśo yad samādhiḥ paramā jāyata iti //* (For convenience, I split the Sanskrit sentences word by word). See *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, ed. Bunyiu Nanjio (Kyōto: The Otani University Press, 1923), 20-21.

D. T. Suzuki’s translation of this phrase is:

People grasping their own shadows of discrimination uphold the discrimination of *dharma* and *adharma* and, failing to carry out the abandonment of the dualism, they go on discriminating and never attain tranquility [*praśamaṃ*]. By tranquility [*etad*] is meant [*adhivacanam*] oneness (*ekāgra*), and oneness [*etad*] gives birth to the highest *Samādhi*, which is gained by entering into the womb of Tathagatahood [*tathāgatagarbha*] the realm of noble wisdom realized in one’s inmost self.

Here Suzuki translates the Sanskrit term *ekāgra* into English as “Oneness.” See *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, trans. D. T. Suzuki (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, 1968), 21. I prefer “One Mind” to “Oneness” for the word *ekāgra*. Not only is the term *ekāgracitta* available in *Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra*, but it is used in the same manner as *ekāgra*. See *Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra Manuscripts Found in Gilgit*, ed., Shoko Watanabe (Tōkyō: The Reiyukai, 1975), 10, l. 26. Also, the term *citta ekāgratā* is seen in other Buddhist texts. See Hajime Nakamura, *Bukkyo go daijiden* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō shoseki, 1984), 591c; 764a.

<sup>96</sup> *Prasannapadā*, p. 491, ll. 9-10.

<sup>97</sup> Swanson makes a too hasty conclusion that the Chinese translation of this line means “Dependent Co-Arising.” According to Hajime Nakamura, this translation does not transmit the original meaning of the Sanskrit term *pratītyasamutpāda* or “Dependent Co-Arising.” He says that it has been changed into “that which arises through causes and conditions” in the Tiantai and Sanlun schools. He goes on to say that the latter translation is closer to the Sanskrit original. I think that both of these two Chinese translations fail to explore the meaning of “mutually dependent arising” as presented in the Sanskrit original. See Paul L. Swanson, op.cit., 4.

<sup>98</sup> Qingmu (Piṅgala), *Zhonglun* (4 *zhuan*), T. no. 223, 33b15-19. For this English translation I credit partially Brian Bocking with a minor change. See Brian Bocking, op.cit., 346.

<sup>99</sup> Paul L. Swanson, op.cit., 3.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 4. Swanson does not make an attempt at a critical analysis of the Sanskrit original of this verse, except to render Sanskrit counterparts next to the Chinese translation of each line by means of parenthesis.

<sup>101</sup> Nakamura holds that the first three interpretations are close to Tien tai’s interpretation and the interpretation which is popular at the present time. See Hajime Nakamura, op. cit., p. 175. The first three interpretations stress the mediating role in the relation to the three-fold components of emptiness, conventional designation, and the middle, while the last interpretation emphasizes the integration of the four-fold components into a single unit, where “the things that arise through causes and conditions” play a central role in intergrating the other three components into one.

<sup>102</sup> *Zhongguan lunshu*, T. no. 1824, 152 a5-15.

<sup>103</sup> For a more detailed analysis on Jizang’s theory of the four levels of the Two Truths, see Paul L. Swanson, op.cit., 112-114.

<sup>104</sup> *Zhongguan lunshu*, T. no. 1824, 152a15-b1.

<sup>105</sup> Loc.cit., b 4-7.

<sup>106</sup> Loc.cit., b10-22.

<sup>107</sup> Swanson L. Paul, op.cit., 38.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, 13-14..

<sup>109</sup> The preface of *Mohe zhiguan* written by Guanding mentions three types of Cessation and Contemplation: 1) Perfect and Immediate Cessation and Contemplation (*yuandun zhiguan*), 2) Flexible Cessation and Contemplation (*buding zhiguan*), and 3) Progressive Cessation and Contemplation (*jianci zhiguan*). See *Mohe zhiguan*, T. no. 1911, 1c1-2. These three types of Cessation and Contemplation represent respectively the main ideas of the *Mohe zhiguan*, the *Cidi chan men*, and *Liu miaofa men*. See Yoshirō Tamura and Takeshi Umehara, *Zettai no shinri: <Tendai>*, Bukkyō no shisō 5, 3rd ed. (Tōkyō: Kadokawa shoten, Heisei 9 [1997]), 160.

<sup>110</sup> Swanson does not agree with the position that Zhiyi or the works attributed to Zhiyi rely on Jizang. In order to justify his position, he has suggested that Zhiyi is older than Jizang, and more importantly, that the similiarity between many passages in major works attributed to Zhiyi is as the result of Guanding, Zhiyi's disciple and scribe. See Ibid., 98; 270 footnote 5.

<sup>111</sup> *Prasannapadā*., 504, ll. 14-15.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 503, l. 12-504, l. 11.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 5, ll. 1-6.

<sup>114</sup> Th. Stcherbatsky translates the term *vīpsārtha* as “generalization.” Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Concept of Buddhist Nirvāna*, trans. Jaideva Singh (Varnasi: B. H. U. Press, 1968). I think that “generalization” could be a possible translation of this term in the sense that the repetition of appearance and disappearance contains the meaning of generalization.

<sup>115</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 5, l. 7- 8.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 6, l. 1-7, l. 5.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, 7, ll. 6-7.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, 8, // 1-4.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 7, / 7-8, / 1.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 8, // 5-9.

<sup>121</sup> Loc.cit., 8, // 10-11

<sup>122</sup> Loc.cit., 8, / 11-9., / 1.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 9, // 2-6.

<sup>124</sup> Loc.cit, // 7-8. “Bhāvaviveka here partly returns to the interpretation already contained in the Hīnayānists (e.g. Majjima Nikāya III 63), but of course its meaning is quite changed. Formerly, it referred to real elements (dharmas), now it means *śūnyatā*, or unreal dharmas.” See Th. Stcherbatsky, op. cit., 130, footnote 1.

<sup>125</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 9, / 8-10, / 1.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 10, / 3.

<sup>127</sup> Loc.cit., // 4-6.

<sup>128</sup> Loc.cit, // 6-9.

<sup>129</sup> In this point, Candrakīrti’s interpretation disagrees with the traditional Chinese way of characterizing the Eight Negations as “the Middle Path of the Eight Negations,” implying that, here, the Eight Negations are read as referring to four sets of negations consisting of two contrasting extremes.

<sup>130</sup> See Musashi Tachikawa, op. cit., 209; 230, footnote 4.

<sup>131</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 58, / 10.

<sup>132</sup> According to Musashi Tachikawa, the two phrases, “non-identity” and “non-difference”, represent *dharmin*, while the remaining phrases represent *dharma*. Hence, the former is the case in which *dharma* is omitted, while the latter is the case in which *dharmin* is omitted. He speaks of that reason as follows. The phrases non-identity and non-difference presuppose two or more things, but in the *Kārikā* the expression non-identityness (*anekāarthatva*) and non-differenceness (*anānārtthatva*) are only applicable to a single object, which is never found. Ibid, 216; 223.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 225.

<sup>134</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 12, ll. 8-10.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 58, ll. 10-13.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid, 14, l. 4-15, l. 2.

<sup>137</sup> We shall come back to this matter later.

<sup>138</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 13, ll. 4-6.

<sup>139</sup> Bimal K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 163.

<sup>140</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 16, l. 1.

<sup>141</sup> Loc.cit, l. 2.

<sup>142</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 16, ll. 7-10.

<sup>143</sup> Loc.cit., ll. 4-5.

<sup>144</sup> Here “perception and so on” refers to the four *pramāṇas* or “the four means of knowledge”, i.e, perception (*pratyakṣād*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*) and analogy (*upamāna*). In a self-commentary of verse 30, Nāgārjuna argues that these *pramāṇas* are devoid of a self-nature. See *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartanī)*, ed. E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, and trans. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978., 25.

<sup>145</sup> Nāgārjuna (1978), 5.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>148</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 504, ll. 9-10.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 177, ll. 6-8.

<sup>150</sup> David J. Kalupahana tends to explain the Middle Way from the two aspects, the philosophical and the practical perspectives, but in this division “philosophical” may mistakenly be identified as “theoretical” and opposed to

“practical.” See David J. Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 1. It is fair to say, that the Middle Way has both philosophical and ethical aspects in the practice of the Middle Way.

<sup>151</sup> With regard to this position some Japanese scholars agree with me. See Yūichi Kajiya & Shumpei Ueyama: *Kū no nonri: Chūkan*, Bukkyō no shisō (Tōkyō: Kadokawa Shoten, Heisei 11 [1999], 266-267.

<sup>152</sup> The following are assumed to be three important and representative assertions about the basis of division: 1) The Two Truths are two types of objects of knowledge; 2) The Two Truths are two different types of perspectives; 3) The Two Truths are two types of teachings.

<sup>153</sup> In the *Kārikā* Nāgārjuna never uses the terms *prajñā* (“Wisdom”) and *karuṇa* (“Compassion”). Instead, he uses *jñāna* and *amukampā* in order to achieve the same meaning as we see in the following verses.

When the fully enlightened ones do not appear, and when the disciples have disappeared, the Wisdom (*jñāna*) of the self-enlightened ones will arise completely without a teacher (18:12).

I prostrate to Gautama who through compassion (*amukampā*) taught the true doctrine, which leads to the relinquishing of all views (27:30).

When Candrakīrti comments on the first verse, he interprets *jñāna* as *tattva* or “thatness,” then he stresses the practice of *prajñā* for its realization. (See *Prasannapadā*, 378 l. 12-379 l.5). Also, in the *Prasannapadā* Candrakīrti uses the term *tattvajñāna* in some places, which is used in exactly the same manner as *prajñā*. Furthermore, in his comment on the second verse he uses both the words *amukampā* and *mahākaruṇa* at the same time with the same meaning “...*jagatām amukampām upādāya mahākaruṇām eva āśritya priya eka putra adhiṣṭatara prema pātra sakala tribhuvana jana....*” (See *ibid.*, 592, l. 10-593, l.1).

<sup>154</sup> I believe that *Kārikā* 18:9 is a representative example of expressing the ultimate truth in terms of Wisdom. It reads: “Not dependent on another (*aparapratyaya*), peaceful (*śānta*), and not designated by the designative function of language (*prapañcāraprapaṇcīta*), beyond thought construction (*nirvikalpa*), without distinctions (*anānārtha*), that is the character of ‘thatness’ (*tattvalakṣaṇa*).”

<sup>155</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 493, ll. 5-7.



<sup>156</sup> Guy Newland, *The Two Truths* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1992), 15.

<sup>157</sup> Loc.cit.

<sup>158</sup> Candrakīrti interprets *cittagocara* as the object or reference of mind's cognitive function or what is designated by mind's referring function. See *Prasannapadā*, 364, ll. 7-8. “*cittasya gocaraḥ cittagocaraḥ gocaro viṣaya ārambaṇam ity arthaḥ.*”

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 364, ll. 16-17.

<sup>160</sup> This method is reflected in the Sanskrit term *samāropata* meaning, “the extension of concept.” *Prasannapadā*, 372, ll. 7-13.

<sup>161</sup> The pronoun *asmin* or “here” denotes *tattva* or the ultimate truth.

<sup>162</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 373, ll. 1-2.

<sup>163</sup> Loc.cit., ll. 2-7.

<sup>164</sup> Nāgārjuna uses the term *upaśānta* instead of *śānta*. See *Kārikā* 23:15.

<sup>165</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 373 l. 8.

<sup>166</sup> Loc.cit., l. 9-10.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 374 ll. 1-3.

<sup>168</sup> Gadjin Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 125.

<sup>169</sup> Candrakīrti says that, “The meaning of distinctions (*nānārtha*) means that the meaning of distinctions exist (*nānāarthāsyeti*).” *Prasannapadā*, 374, l. 4.

<sup>170</sup> “*paramārthaḥ samaḥ sarvadharmāḥ*” (In the ultimate truth all things are undifferentiated). Loc.cit., l. 16.

<sup>171</sup> “*tat evam anānārtthā tattvasya lakṣaṇam deditavyam śūnyatayaikarasa tavā*” (In this sense, “without distinctions” is to be understood as a characterization of the ultimate truth. For all things are “one taste” with emptiness). Ibid., 375, l. 7.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid, 438, ll. 6-8.

<sup>173</sup> Gadjin Nagao, op.cit., 122.

<sup>174</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 366, l. 8-367, l. 4. Also, in the *Ratnāvalī* (4:96), it is said that Buddhist teaching is based on *śūnyatā* (*prajñā*) and Compassion (*karuṇa*), that is, “*dvayānīśritam ekeṣāṃ gambhīraṃ bhīrubhīṣaṇam/ śūnyatā karuṇāgarbham ekeṣāṃ bodhisādhanaṃ*”//

<sup>175</sup> Bernard Faure, *Chan Insights and Oversights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 202.

<sup>176</sup> Gadjin Nagao, op.cit., 59.

<sup>177</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 372, ll. 1-3.

<sup>178</sup> Cited from Nāgārjuna (1978), op.cit., 18.

<sup>179</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 370, ll. 6-8.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., 369, l. 14-370, l. 5.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 371, ll. 13-14.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 500, l. 13-501, l. 5.

<sup>183</sup> Gadjin Nagao, op.cit., 85-86.

<sup>184</sup> Nagao holds that “Bhāvaviveka’s assertion that a true understanding of worldly convention is not clouded or occluded and does represent an attempt to validate some reality in worldly convention, [but] it fails to explain the restoration of true worldly convention or re-engagement with the world.” He represents “true understanding of worldly convention” as “ultimate meaning enunciated (*vyavahriyate*) within the world of experience” and “ultimate meaning manifesting itself and establishing (*vayavasthāpayati*). Moreover, Nagao asserts that it is these points that differ from Candrakīrti’s notion of “clouded occlusion.” See Nagao Gadjin, op.cit., 57-59. I do not agree with him in two respects. First, Bhāvaviveka’s description of “true understanding of worldly convention” does not imply an ontological assumption, rather it is a proper expression of the restoration of true worldly convention. Second, Candrakīrti’s “only” worldly convention is not incompatible with expressions such as, “ultimate meaning enunciated (*vyavahriyate*) within the world of experience” and “ultimate meaning manifesting itself and establishing (*vayavasthāpayati*).”

<sup>185</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 529, ll. 6-7.

<sup>186</sup> Loc.cit., ll. 7-8.

<sup>187</sup> Cited from C. W. Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness*, with Geshé Namgyal Wangchen (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1989), 167, verse 80.

<sup>188</sup> Cited from Chr. Lindter, op.cit., 111. Here I follow Lindter's English translation of this verse, but I replace the original phrase "for pragmatic reasons" with "in pursuit of the goal." I do so based on the Japanese translation on this verse. See Ryūshin Uryūzu and Yūichi Kajiyama, contribution, *Ryūju ronshu* [Selected Works of Nāgārjuna], Daijo Butten vol. 14, (Tōkyō: Chūōkōronsha, 1989), 62.

<sup>189</sup> C.f. Mervyn Sprung's translation of this sentence reads: "Let it be that the surpassing sense is inherehently not of the inferior teaching which has to do with the factors of personal existence, the elements, the senses and sense fields, the Buddhist truths, dependent arising and so on which has nothing to do with a higher sense?" See Mervyn Sprung, *The Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way*, Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979), 231. It is important to note that not only can we not find the Sanskrit counterpart of the phrase "the inferior teaching" in this sentence, but the phrase can cause misunderstanding regarding the ultimate truth, that is, ultimate truth is contrasted with the inferior teaching as a superior teaching. Of course, Sprung never go so far as to advocate that the ultimate truth is identical with the superior teaching, but Kosai Yasui really interprets the Two Truths as the two different levels of teaching.

<sup>190</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 494, ll. 6-11.

<sup>191</sup> The term *śūnyatāprajojana* means "purpose," "function" and "utility" of *śūnyatā*, but I use it here in this context in its meaning as "the function of *śūnyatā*."

<sup>192</sup> *Karma* and *kleśa* are translated into English as "karmic defilements" (Kenneth K. Inada), "defilements of action" (David J. Karupahana) and "the pains (*kleśa*) of action" (Frederick J. Streng) by some scholars, but Candrakīrti while commenting on this verse treats *karma* and *kleśa* as separate terms. See *Prasannapadā*, 350 l. 19-351 l. 3. Also, all the versions of Tibetan and Chinese translations commonly translate these two terms, *karma* and *kleśa*, separately. See Mitsuyoshi Saigusa, *Chūron geju sōran* (Tōkyō: Daisanbunmeisha, 1985), 520-521.

<sup>193</sup> The Sanskrit term *prapñca* is translated into Tibetan as *spros pa* and into Chinese as *xilun*. The Tibetan *spros (pa)* commonly means 1) "spreading out," "enlargement" and 2) "activity; the Chinese *xinlun* means "frivolous talk." See Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, vol.

II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 380-381.

<sup>194</sup> I assert that the characterization of *nirvāṇa* as “the destruction of *prāpañca*” is attributed to Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna’s notion of *nirvāṇa* characterized as *prāñcaupaśama* or “the destruction of *prapañca*” had a great influence on Vedāntic notion of Freedom, the most representative, expressed as *prapañcapravailaya* or “the destruction of *prapañca*.”

<sup>195</sup> Teruyoshi Tanji, *Chinmoku to kyōsetsu*, Kansai Daigaku Tōzai Gakujutsu Kenkyū sōkan 6, Chūgan shisō kenkyū I (Suita: Kansai Daigaku Tōzai Gakujutsu Kenkyūjo, Shōwa 63 [1988]), 85-127.

<sup>196</sup> The first four translations are based on the Sanskrit original of the *Kārikā*, however, the last two are based on Tibetan and Chinese translations.

<sup>197</sup> Murti translates *prapañca* as “verbal elaboration,” “the conceptual function of Reason,” etc. See T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, (London: Unwin paperbacks, 1980), 142; 146.

<sup>198</sup> This translation seems to be far from the original meaning of the same verse.

<sup>199</sup> Teruyoshi Tanji, op.cit., 90.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., 89-90.

<sup>203</sup> Bimal K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 29-30.

<sup>204</sup> Kumārila, belonging to the Mīmāṃsā school, seems to agree with Bhartṛhari when he remarks that, “Word or speech can generate cognition even of entities which are totally non-existent.” See Ibid., 123.

<sup>205</sup> *Pranannapadā*, 364, ll. 6-10.

<sup>206</sup> Chr. Lindtner has little doubt that the *Ratnāvalī* is authored by Nāgārjuna. See Chr. Lindtner, op.cit, 163.

<sup>207</sup> Teruyoshi Tanji, op.cit., 91.

<sup>208</sup> Loc.cit. Buddhist scholars do not agree on the question of Piṅgala's authorship of *The Middle Treatise*. Some hold that Piṅgala wrote a commentary on the *Kārikā* and Kumārajīva translated it into Chinese. Others argue that the text was written by Kumārajīva himself. Here it seems that Teruyoshi Tanji follows the latter position.

<sup>209</sup> Brian Bocking provides us with a strange translation. He identifies *prapañca* with "a name for the common man," and then defines the common man as "the unenlightened man." See Brian Bocking, op.cit., 142-143.

<sup>210</sup> Teruyoshi Tanji, op.cit., 98-99; *Prasannapadā*, 538, ll. 7-8.

<sup>211</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 265 l. 1. The concept of *svabhāva* as "permanently existent" is already reflected in *Kārikā* 15: 8 which says, "If existence were through essence (*prakṛti*), then there would be no nonexistence. Because a change in essence could never be tenable."

<sup>212</sup> David J., Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), 80. Apart from whether the concept of *svabhāva*, which Nāgārjuna targets for criticism, belongs to the Sarvāstivādins, his main opponent, at least in the *Kārikā*, would be a Buddhist school in that he denies the idea that *śūnyatā* destroys Buddhist doctrines, while he holds that the clinging of opponents to the concept of *svabhāva* destroys them. See *Kārikā* Chapter 24.

<sup>213</sup> According to David J. Kalupahana, this Sarvāstivādin conception of *svabhāva* is designed to resolve the difficulty of explaining causal efficiency in the theory of moments. David J. Kalupahana (1975), op. cit., 72-73.

<sup>214</sup> In the *Ratnavālī* (1:63) Nāgārjuna denies both the concepts of consistency (*tiṣṭhaty*) and moments (*kṣaṇam*). See "*vibhavaṃ naiti nāyāti na tiṣṭhaty api ca kṣaṇam/ traikālyavyativṛttātmā loka evaṃ kuto 'rthataḥ*" // (1:63).

<sup>215</sup> Around 8th C.E., after the demise of Nāgārjuna, the Mādhyamika Buddhists, such as Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Atīśa, attempt to positively verify the reasons of *niḥsvabhāva* in a unique way. See Yasunori Ejima, *Chugan shisō no tenkai* (Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, 1980), 202-258.

<sup>216</sup> Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison/Milwaukee/London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 50-51. In the same text Robinson also maintains that, besides these Nāgārjuna introduces the principle of variables. It is clear that by using the principle of variables,

Nāgārjuna intends to apply the aforesaid two principles for all the cases within the same pattern.

<sup>217</sup> See Richard H. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System", *PEW* 6, no. 4 (Jan 1957): 295-296.

<sup>218</sup> "*vināśāt pratipakṣād vā syād astitvasya nāstitā vināśaḥ pratipakṣo vā katthaṃ syād astyasambhavāt*/" (1:72)

<sup>219</sup> J. N. Mohanty, "Understanding Some Ontological Differences in Indian Philosophy", *JIP* 8 (1980): 216.

<sup>220</sup> Nāgārjuna (1978), op.cit., 31. For a critical study of *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, see Mark Siderits, "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology. I." *JIP* 8 (1980): 307-335.

<sup>221</sup> Musashi Tachikawa maintains this as well, See Musashi Tachikawa, op.cit., 268.

<sup>222</sup> Murti holds that "Philosophical consciousness attains its fruition through the working of its inner dynamism, through the three moments of the dialectic: dogmatism (*dṛṣṭi*), criticism (*śūnyatā* or *prasaṅga*) and intuition (*prajñā*)....Philosophy then culminates in intellectual intuition, *prajñā*." T. R. V. Murti, op.cit., 141-142.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., 146, footnote.

<sup>224</sup> J. W. De Jong, "Emptiness," *JIP* 2, no. 1 (Dec 1972): 11.

<sup>225</sup> Loc.cit.

<sup>226</sup> Frederick J. Streng. op.cit., 149

<sup>227</sup> Loc.cit.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 148.

<sup>229</sup> J. W. De Jong, op.cit., 14.

<sup>230</sup> Related to this, Thupten Jinpa's accounts of Tsongkhapa's views of Mādhyamika dialectic deserve attention, although I do not agree with his attempt to regard the ultimate as the absolute. In his article he writes:

This is to say that Tsongkhapa does not share the views of those who assert where we perceive the “absolute” (which is supposedly indeterminate, indivisible, and ineffable) through a higher faculty. This higher faculty (or intuition), in this view, is supposed to be awakened within us by the “paralysis of reason” brought about by Mādhyamika dialectic. Tsongkhapa reads the Mādhyamika dialectic as arguing against what may be called “essentialist ontology”, i.e., an ontology that entails a belief in “intrinsic being” (*svabhāva*). [Thupten Jinpa, “Delineating Reason’s Scope for Negation: Tsongkhapa’s Contribution to Mādhyamika’s Dialectical Method,” *JIP* 26 (Aug 1998): 277.]

<sup>231</sup> Since the term “dialectic” is used differently among scholars, I prefer to use the word “refutation” to it.

<sup>232</sup> *śāśvatāśāśvatādyatra kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam/ antānantādi cāpyatra kutaḥ śānte cauṣṭayam//*

<sup>233</sup> *prabhākarīṭṭiyā tu śāntajñānaprabhodbhavāt/ dhyānābhijñāsamutpādād rāgadveṣaparikṣayāt//* (*Ratnavālī* 5:45)

<sup>234</sup> For the examples of *jñāna* see 1:4, 2:23, 4:83, and 5:93; for the examples of *prajñā* see 2:38, 39, 40. Here, my position is diametrically opposed to that of Chr. Lindtner’s that Nāgārjuna intended to distinguish *jñāna* from *prajñā*. Lindtner claims that “*prajñā* is a discursive, intellectual understanding presupposing analysis or experience of phenomena, whereas *jñāna* is the intuitive knowledge gradually developed by exercising *prajñā*.” See Chr. Lindtner, op.cit., 20, footnote 62.

<sup>235</sup> *Prasannapadā*, 533, l. 17.

<sup>236</sup> The *Dazhidu lun*, a commentary on the 25,000 Verses is considered as unauthentic by some scholars since E. Romotte first proposed this matter. However, it is traditional within Asian scholarship to hold that the text is ascribed to Nāgārjuna. I am not ready to champion my own view of the authorship of the *Dazhidu lun*. Given that many verses in the *Dazhidu lun* are extracted from the *Kārikā*, a family similarity between these two texts is without doubt. According to Mitsuyoshi Saigusa, the verses of the *Kārikā* are quoted in the *Dazhidu lun* as many as nineteen times and the numbers of the quoted verses amount to thirty without to counting the duplicated ones. See Mitsuyoshi Saigusa, “*Daichido ron shoshū geju to chūron ju*”, *IBK* 15, no. 1 (Dec. Shōwa 41 [1966]), 85-97.

<sup>237</sup> In his work *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning* Streng devotes an entire chapter (chapter 6) to the discussion of Nāgārjuna's view of *prajñā*, but he relies exclusively on the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*. Frederick J. Streng, op.cit., 82-98. Of course, there is no doubt that these *Sūtras* underlie Nāgārjuna's understanding of *prajñā*, but we should extend our concern to the *Ratnavālī* in order to fully understand Nāgārjuna's view of *prajñā*.

<sup>238</sup> In *Kārikā* 24:32 Nāgārjuna suggests that enlightenment can be achieved by practice of the Bodhisattva Path (*bodhisattvacaryā*) when he says, "According to your assertion, anyone who is not Buddha in virtue of self-existence cannot hope to attain enlightenment even by serious endeavor or by practice of the Bodhisattva Path."

<sup>239</sup> For such an example of the six *pāramitā*, see the *Ratnavālī* 3:80; for examples of the seven *pāramitā*, see 5:35, 36, 37.

<sup>240</sup> Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācārya*, ed. Henry Clarke Warren, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1989, 375. Also for the English translation see *The Path of Purification*, trans. Bikkhu Ñāṇamoli, 5th ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991, 442.

<sup>241</sup> De Jong, op.cit., 14. However, De Jong did not mention anything about the source of this statement.

<sup>242</sup> Noritoshi Aramaki holds that the idea of the Ten Stages of the Bodhisattva Path has developed differently through the history of Buddhism. See Noritoshi Aramaki, "Jūji shisō no seiritzu to Tenkai," *Kegon shisō* (Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, 1996), 81. I assert that the Candrakīrti's *Mādhyamikāvatara* relies heavily on the *Ratnavālī* with respect to the idea of Ten Stages. The only differences between these two is that the former treats each stage more incrementally. However, in the introductory portion prior to his translation of this text, C. W. Huntington has no reference to any specific relation between the *Ratnavālī* and the *Mādhyamikāvatara* concerning the idea of Ten Stages. Huntington instead argues thus:

Although the bodhisattva ideal plays a vital role in practically every Mahāyāna text, there are a few particular compositions in which the career of the bodhisattva is treated in considerable detail. Among these, in addition to the present treatise [*Mādhyamikāvatara*], I might also cite as especially authoritative sources the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BB), the *Mahāvastu* (MVA), and the *Daśabhūmika* (DB), which was in all likelihood the *locus classicus* for the Ten Stages described in Candrakīrti's text. [See



C. W. Huntington, Jr. *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction of Early Indian Mādhyamika* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 19.]

<sup>243</sup> In the *Mādhyamikāvatara* Candrakīrti refutes the four kinds of arising which are believed to be Abhimānika's views at the sixth stage, but in contrast, he did not give any specific remarks on the heretics's views at the fifth stage. See C. W. Huntington, Jr., *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 156-184.

<sup>244</sup> The list of the ninth and tenth stages is not available in Sanskrit, but we know them through Tibetan and Chinese translations of the *Ratnavālī*, both of which are extant.

<sup>245</sup> “*dānaṃ svārthaparitāgaḥ śīlaṃ parahitakriyā/ kṣāntiḥ  
krodhavinirmuktir vīryaṃ śubhapaṇigrahaḥ*”

<sup>246</sup> Buddhagoṣa, op.cit., 370, entry no. 7. In his translation of *Visuddhimagga* Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli says in a footnote that, “A phenomenon's own essence (*sako bhāvo*) or existing essence (*samānovā bhāvo*) is its individual essence (*sabhāva*). See *The Path of Purification*, 804, footnote 3.

<sup>247</sup> “*dhyānaṃ aikāgryaṃ akliṣṭaṃ prajñā satyārthanīścayaḥ/  
kṛpā sarveṣu sattaveṣu karuṇaikaṇḍasā matiḥ*”

<sup>248</sup> *śrāddhatvād bhajate dharmaṃ prajñātvād vetti tattvataḥ/  
prajñā pradhānaṃ tvanyoḥ śraddhā pūrvamgamāsyā tu* (1:5)

<sup>249</sup> Streng says in a similar context and while comparing the Abhidharma and the *Prajñāpāramitā* writings with reference to the concept of *prajñā*:

“Wisdom” in both the Abhidharma and the *Prajñāpāramitā* writings meant “looking at things as they are.” However, whereas the Abhidharma had tried to see the nonsubstantiality of things by seeing the factors which composed them, the *Prajñāpāramitā* maintained that the factors themselves were empty of independent reality, and that the notion of “path,” “*dharma*,” or “the Buddha” were meaningless if they designated entities which had particular and unique characteristics. [See Streng, op.cit., 84.]

<sup>250</sup> The claim that “entities do not intrinsically exist” is found in *Mādhyamikāvatara*. See C. W. Huntington, Jr., op.cit., 161 entry no. 34.

<sup>251</sup> Nayak identifies *prajñā* with “a philosophical insight,” “a philosophical enlightenment,” or “a philosophical wisdom.” G. C. Nayak, op.cit., 476-490. I reject this position.

<sup>252</sup> Musashi Tachikawa, op.cit., 167.

<sup>253</sup> The same cases are found in *Kārikā* 22:7, 23:17, 18, 20, etc.

<sup>254</sup> The same cases are found in *Kārikā* 20: 7; 23:22, etc.

<sup>255</sup> Musashi Tachikawa, op.cit., 167-169.

<sup>256</sup> T. R. V. Murti, op. cit., 129.

<sup>257</sup> As Yasui Kosai indicates, the Eight Negations in the Dedicatory Verse of the *Kārikā* reflect both aspects of Wisdom and refutation. According to Yasui, the Eight Negations represent *nirvāṇa*, while they manifest it through the refutation of the theory of *svabhāva*. See Yasui Kosai, op.cit., 107-108.

<sup>258</sup> Nāgārjuna (1978), op.cit., 22.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>260</sup> Nāgārjuna, *Nagarjuna's Refutation of Logic (Nyaya): Vaidalyaprakarana*, ed., Alex Wayman, trans., Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1995. However, the authorship of the *Vaidalyaprakarana* is debated among scholars. In the above text (pp. 7-15) doubt concerning Nāgārjuna's authorship of the *Vaidalyaprakarana* is discussed in detail. In contrast, some scholars like Chr. Lindtner attribute the *Vaidalyaprakarana* to Nāgārjuna, insisting that, “Judging solely from the text itself, the style and tenets would indicate the same author as for VV [*Vigrahavyāvartanī*], the work where the parallels are closest out of all those ascribed to Nāgārjuna.” [See Chr. Lindtner, op.cit., p. 87.]

<sup>261</sup> “*yatha svābhyupagamavirodhacodanayāpi paro na nivartate/ tadāpi nirlajjitatayā.... Prasannapadā*, 15, ll. 9-10.

<sup>262</sup> Guy Newland, op.cit., 9.

<sup>263</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 7, 8, 10, 11, 239, 241, etc.

<sup>264</sup> Hiroo Kasiwagi holds that the Two Gates was developed from the critical mind of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature and Mādhyamika Buddhism.

Although he does not speak in a direct manner about the relationship between the Two Truths and the Two Gates, it is safe to assume that he was conscious of the relationship between the two. See Hiroo Kasiwagi, *op.cit.*, 469-470.

<sup>265</sup> Dale Wright seems to believe that the Two Truths and the Two Gates share a common foundation, given that he did not endeavor to distinguish the former from the latter at all. I assert that the two are at least distinguished from each other with regard to linguistic strategy. See Dale Wright, "Language and Truth in Hua yen Buddhism", *JCP* 13 (1986): 25.

<sup>266</sup> T. no. 1666, 576a5-6.

<sup>267</sup> Loc.cit., a8-13.

<sup>268</sup> The idea of "One Dharma World" (*yifajie*) or One World (*yijie*) is found earlier in the *Foshuo fozengfogan jing*. T. no. 668, 466b8-9.

<sup>269</sup> T. no. 1666, 576a13-18.

<sup>270</sup> Loc.cit., a24-26.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., 575c21-22.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., 576a6-7.

<sup>273</sup> Some scholars like Dale Wright tend to view One Mind in an ontological sense. In this regard, he says, "the One Mind is not an existent being; it is ontologically more fundamental than existence. Rather, it is the ground (*ben*) and source (*yuan*) for the existence of anything at all." See Dale Wright, *op.cit.*, 25. I reject any attempt to see a cataphatic language as One Mind in an ontological sense.

<sup>274</sup> *So*, 704b5-8.

<sup>275</sup> Loc.cit., b21-22.

<sup>276</sup> T. 1666, 579 a12-20.

<sup>277</sup> Loc.cit., b10-11

<sup>278</sup> Loc.cit., b14-15

<sup>279</sup> T. no 1666, 576b8-9.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., 579b9-17.

<sup>281</sup> Loc.cit., b17-9.

<sup>282</sup> Loc.cit., c20.

<sup>283</sup> Loc.cit., a19-23.

<sup>284</sup> So, 723,a10-11.

<sup>285</sup> T. no. 1666, 580b15-581c5.

<sup>286</sup> Loc.cit., b8-9

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., 579c26-580b14.

<sup>288</sup> So, 723a22-23.

<sup>289</sup> T. no. 1666, 576b7.

<sup>290</sup> Some scholars hold that the *ti/yong* paradigm is of a Neo-Daoist origin, but Kashiwagi Hiroo holds that the concept of *ti/yong* as a category of speculation is not found in the traditional Chinese literature belonging to the pre-Dang period.

<sup>291</sup> According to Walen Lai, “the water-and-waves” metaphor is found in the *Lañkāvatara Sūtra* and is subtly modified by the *Awakening of Faith*.” See Whalen Lai, “Ch’an Metaphors: Waves, water, mirror, lamp,” *PEW* 29, no. 3 (July 1979): 243-253.

<sup>292</sup> T. no. 1666, 578a5-13.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid., 576c11-16. For the translation see Yoshito S. Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 41.

<sup>294</sup> Loc.cit., c16-19. For this translation I credit Hakeda with minor changes.

<sup>295</sup> AAR Annual Meeting in Boston, MA (Dec.1999).

<sup>296</sup> Chinul, *Chinshim chikso*, *HPC*, vol. 4, 717b12-17.

<sup>297</sup> However, I think that there still remains a question: To what extent the *mom/momchit* paradigm can be paralleled with the *ti/yong* paradigm.

<sup>298</sup> The formula of *neng/suo* does not match Cartesian dualism of the subject and object as two distinct entities. In Chinese Buddhism the distinction of *neng/suo* is generally used to denote the state of a deluded mind which is not intrinsic but temporal and expedient. Fazang regards the formulas of *neng/so* and *ti/yong* as two axes for understanding the relationship between the *dacheng* and *qixin* in the title. I will deal with this matter later in detail.

<sup>299</sup> Sungbae Park, op.cit., 41.

<sup>300</sup> Yoshito S. Hakeda, op.cit., 28.

<sup>301</sup> “The conception of the absolute is believed to begin with the references to the Christian God as unlimited, unconditioned, and incomparable in an ontological sense.” See Tom Rockmore, *Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Berkeley: University of California, 1997), 180.

<sup>302</sup> Hakeda holds that “[One] Mind symbolizes the metaphysical principle.” Yoshito S. Hakeda, op.cit., 29. I think that Hakeda’s words are unable to legitimate the claim that One Mind is identical with a Reality in an ontological sense. For Hakeda “the metaphysical principle” is nothing else but a way of expressing One Mind for religious purposes.

<sup>303</sup> Sungbae Park (1983), op.cit., 39.

<sup>304</sup> Huiyan holds: “Faith is the foundation of all deeds. Therefore, it is said to arouse the root of Mahāyāna-Faith.” Huiyuan, *Dacheng qixin lun yishu*, Part I, T. no. 1843, 177 b29-c2. According to Wonhyo, “the Awakening of Mahāyāna Right-Faith” means to believe and understand that Mahāyāna is nothing but One Mind. See *So*, 701c13-14.

<sup>305</sup> The *Dacheng qixin lun* mentions three types of *faxin*, 1) the *faxin* through the establishment of Right-Faith; 2) the *faxin* through Understanding and [Non-doing] Practice; and 3) the *faxin* through Insight. In the following chapters, I will explain in detail these three types of *faxin*.

<sup>306</sup> T. no. 1666, 577 b29-c1.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., 581a17-19.

<sup>308</sup> The *Dacheng qixin lun* targets both sentient beings of superior capacity and sentient beings of lower capacity. I will deal with this in detail in the following sections.

<sup>309</sup> T. no. 1666, 581c8-13.

<sup>310</sup> Sungbae Park (1983), op.cit., 38.

<sup>311</sup> *So*, 726b6-19.

<sup>312</sup> The *Dacheng qixin lun yiji bieji* (A sub-commentary on *Dacheng qixin lun yiji*), T. no. 1847, 288a3-11. In the *Dacheng qixin lun yiji*, however, Fazang interprets, respectively, *dacheng* as “the object of Faith” (*suoxin zhi jing*) and *qixin* as “the Mind arousing Faith” (*nengxin zhi xin*) in terms of *xinjing men*, taking into consideration both sides of Mind and object” (*xinjing hemu*). T. no. 1846, 245b15-16.

<sup>313</sup> *So*, 699c6-13.

<sup>314</sup> Wonhyo, *Kūmgang samme kyōng non*, HPC, vol. 1, 604b1-c1; see Sungbae Park (1999), op.cit., Appendix.

<sup>315</sup> *So*, 704b11-13.

<sup>316</sup> For more detail, see T. no. 1666, 579b20-c9. For the translation see Hakeda, op.cit., 69-72. William H. Grosnick argues that one of the fundamental distinction between Daoist and Buddhist notions of *yong* is that Buddhist notion of *yong* is connected with the Buddhist notion of the three Buddha-bodies. William H. Grosnick, op.cit., 68.

<sup>317</sup> Sōkō Takeuchi, “*Pult’akwan ũ pyōnchōn (Butsudakan no henssen)*,” in *Taesŭng pulkyo gaeron (Daijō bukkyō toha nanika)*, translated into Korean by SŬngsŏk Chōng (Seoul: Kimyōngsa, 1984), 180-208. For a good English article on the Buddhist notion of three Buddha-bodies see Gadjin Nagao, “On the Theory of Buddha-Body (Buddha-kāya)” *EB* 6. no. 1 (May 1973): 271-276.

<sup>318</sup> It is true, of course, that the theory of permeation found in the Yogācāra literature like *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra*, is earlier than *Dacheng qixin lun*, but the theory of permeation for Yogācāra Buddhism centers on demonstrating the activities of the deluded mind in terms of *samsara* process almost exclusively.

<sup>319</sup> T. no. 1666, 579a1-7.

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**APPENDIX A**  
**BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHINESE, KOREAN, AND JAPANESE WORKS IN THE**  
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## **APPENDEX B**

### **A GLOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS**

(Chinese, Japanese and Korean words are signified by "C", "K" and "J")

Banruobu (C) 般若部

benjue (C) 本覺

bianzhi (C) 徧知

buding zhiguan (C) 不定止觀

bukong (C) 不空

busiyi yexiang (C) 不思議業相

busuo (C) 不所

buyou (C) 不有

Chan (C); Sŏn (K); Zen (J) 禪

chinshin myoyong (K); zhenxin miaoyong (C) 真心妙用

Cidi chanmen (C) 次第禪門

Dacheng qixin lun 大乘起信論

Dacheng xuanlun 大乘玄論

Dapin (C) 大品

Dazhidu lun (C) 大智度論

Dilun (C) 地論

Ertiyi (C) 二諦義

fa (C) 法

faxin (C) 發心

Fazang (C) 法藏

feikong (C) 非空

feiyou (C) 非有

fenbie (C) 分別

Fosuo xingzan (C) 佛所行讚

gongan (C); kong'an (K); koan (J) 公安

guan (C) 觀

Heyan jing (C) 華嚴經

Huiyuan (C) 慧遠

Hwajaeng (K) 和靜



ipp'amue (K); lipowuai (C) 立破無碍

Izang'üi (K) 二障義

jia (C) 假(가)

jianci zhiguan (C) 漸次止觀

jingyong (C) 淨用

Jizang (C) 吉藏

juetixiang (C) 覺體相

Juzupin (C) 具足品

kaehapchajae (K); kaihezizai (C) 開合自在

kongsuo (C) 空所

kong yi feikong (C) 空亦復空

Kūm'gang samme kyōngnon (K) 金剛三昧經論

li (C) 理

Liu miaofa men (C) 六妙法門

liyan zhenru (C) 離言眞如

Mahe banruo (C) 摩訶般若

Mahe zhiguan (C) 摩訶止觀

Maming (C) 馬鳴

mom/momchit (K) 몸/몸짓

musobullip (K); wusobuli (C) 無所不立

musobulp'a (K); wusobupo (C) 無所不破

nengqi (C) 能起

neng/suo (C) 能所

nengxin (C) 能信

Nieban jing (C) 涅槃經

nulaizang busiyi yeyong (C) 如來藏不思議業用

Posal kyebon chibŭm yogi (K) 菩薩戒本持範要記

Pŏphwa (kyŏng) chong'yo (K) 法華[經]宗要

qi dacheng zhengxin (C) 起大乘正信

Renwang jing (C) 仁王經

Sanlun (C) 三論

sede (C) 色德

se wuaie (C) 色無碍

She(dacheng) lun (C) 攝(大乘)論

Shengmie men (C) 生滅門

Shengmie xiang (C) 生滅相

Shengtian wang banruo bolomi jing (C) 勝天王般若婆羅蜜經

Shi (C) 事

Shier men lun (C) 十二門論

suiran benjue (C) 隨染本覺

suishun (C) 隨順

suokong (C) 所空

suoqi (C) 所起

suoxin (C) 所信

Taehyedokyōng chong'yo (K) 大慧度經宗要

Taesŭng kishillon pyōlgi (K) 大乘起信論別記

Taesŭng kishillon sŏ (K) 大乘起信論疏

Tientai (C) 天台

tī/yong (C) 体用

ti/yong men 体用門

Weimo(jie soshuo) jing (C) 維摩(詰所說)經

Weishi lun (C) 唯識論

Wonhyo (K) 元曉

wuming xunxi (C) 無明熏習

wuti (C) 無諦

xiang (C) 相

xilun (C) 戲論

xinde (C) 心德

xingjing benjue (C) 性淨本覺

xing/jing men (C) 心境門

xinxin xiuxing (C) 信心修行

yi (C) 義

Yinglo jing (C) 瓔珞經

Yingyinban xicang dazangjing (C) 影印版西藏大藏經

yixin (C) 一心

yiyan zhenru (C) 依言眞如

yi Yin (C) 一音

you fa nengqi moheyan xingen (C) 有摩訶衍信根

youti (C) 有諦

Yōl'ban (kyōng) chong'yo (K) 涅槃[經]宗要

yuandun zhiguan (C) 圓頓止觀

yuanyin (C) 圓音

Zaahan jing (C) 雜阿含經

zhenggan (C) 正觀

zhennu xunxi (C) 眞如熏習

zhenru men (C) 眞如門

zhenru xiang (C) 眞如相

Zhenti (C) 眞諦

zhijingxiang (C) 智淨相

Zhiyi (C) 智顗

Zhong (C) 中

zhongdao tiyiyiti (C) 中道第一義諦

Zhongguan lun (C) 中觀論

Zhongguan lunshu (C) 中觀論疏

ziti (C) 自体

ziti xunxi (C) 自体熏習

zizai (C) 自在

zuishengye (C) 最勝業